Scott v. Ray

• Decision Date: 24 January 2019
• Docket Number: C/A No. 4:17-3100-RBH-TER
• Parties: BERNARD SCOTT, Plaintiff, v. PATRICIA RAY, ALLISON DAYS, ANGELA SUMPTER, AND CPL. SHANNON, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

BERNARD SCOTT, Plaintiff, v. PATRICIA RAY, ALLISON DAYS,ANGELA SUMPTER, AND CPL. SHANNON, Defendants.

C/A No. 4:17-3100-RBH-TER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA FLORENCE DIVISION

January 24, 2019

Report and Recommendation

This is a civil action filed pro se by Bernard Scott ("Plaintiff") on November 14, 2017. At all times pertaining to the allegations in the complaint, Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee housed at the Glenn Campbell Detention Center/Darlington County Detention Center (DCDC).¹ This matter is currently before the court on the motion for summary judgment filed on behalf of Defendants on April 30, 2018. (ECF #34).² As the Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court issued an order on or about April 30, 2018, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4^th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of themotion for summary judgment procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately. Plaintiff filed a document entitled "Declaration For Retaliation" appearing to allege changes in classification as a form of retaliation. Therefore, the Defendants were given twenty days to brief the issue and Plaintiff was given fifteen days from the date Defendants responded to the order to file a response. Defendants filed a reply to the order on October 31, 2018. Plaintiff did not file a response.

DISCUSSION

STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The federal court is charged with liberally construing the complaints filed by pro se litigants, to allow them to fully develop potentially meritorious cases. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). The court's function, however, is not to decide issues of fact, but to decide whether there is an issue of fact to be tried. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a federal claim, Weller v. Dep't of Social Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990), nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. If none can be shown, the motion should be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party bears the burden of showing that summary judgment is proper. Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Summary judgment is proper if the non-moving partyfails to establish an essential element of any cause of action upon which the non-moving party has the burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. 317. Once the moving party has brought into question whether there is a genuine dispute for trial on a material element of the non-moving party's claims, the non-moving party bears the burden of coming forward with specific facts which show a genuine dispute for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The non-moving party must come forward with enough evidence, beyond a mere scintilla, upon which the fact finder could reasonably find for it. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1011 (4^th Cir. 1991). However, the non-moving party may not rely on beliefs, conjecture, speculation, or conclusory allegations to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 874-75 (4^th Cir. 1992). The evidence relied on must meet "the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at a trial on the merits." Mitchell v. Data General Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4^th Cir. 1993).

To show that a genuine dispute of material fact exists, a party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (Rule 56(e) permits a proper summary judgment motion to be opposed by any of the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves). Rather, the party must present evidence supporting his or her position through "depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with . . . affidavits, if any." Id. at 322; seealso Cray Communications, Inc. v. Novatel Computer Systems, Inc., 33 F.3d 390 (4^th Cir. 1994); Orsi v. Kickwood, 999 F.2d 86 (4^th Cir. 1993); Local Rules 7.04, 7.05, D.S.C.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff alleges that while a pre-trial detainee³ housed at the Glenn Campbell Detention Center/Darlington County Detention Center ("DCDC"), he was unfairly classified as a security threat and not allowed to have a cell mate by Corporal Shannon who based his classification upon hearsay from other inmates that he sexually propositioned another detainee. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that his classification changed as a form of retaliation after he filed a grievance against Defendant Sumpter for calling Plaintiff a crackhead. (ECF No. 1 at 7). Plaintiff asserts that Defendants claimed the classification changed to place him in a cell by himself without a cell mate due to the fact they said he was a registered sex offender. Plaintiff alleges that before he filed the grievance he was allowed to have cellmates and that other registered sex offenders were allowed to have cellmates. Plaintiff also attached his declaration stating that the classification issues began after filingthe grievance against Officer Sumpter for calling him a crackhead. Plaintiff submitted a declaration from another detainee, Robert Ham, stating that Sumpter told him that Plaintiff filed a grievance on her, that she was going to get him back for it, and that she would make his time hard. Plaintiff also submitted a declaration from inmate William Johnson who declared that he heard "Sgt. Sumpter called Mr. Scott a crackhead then she walk away from his cell. Called him a 'faggot ass mother fucker, ain't nothing but trouble.'" (ECF. No. 1-1 at 4). In his response to the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff states that "[t]his suit is an issue of defamation of character, written and slander (oral defamation) which harmed Plaintiff's reputation . . ." (ECF No. 46 at 7).

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment arguing prisoners generally do not have a constitutionally recognized liberty interest in a particular security classification or prison placement, and Plaintiff cannot show a violation of a protected liberty interest due to his disciplinary detention or custody classification. Additionally, Defendants assert that Plaintiff has failed to set forth any facts sufficient to proceed on such a claim in this case. As to any allegations that Defendants failed to follow certain policies or rules as to his classification or that Defendants purposely refused to investigate his grievances, the allegations fail to state a constitutional claim. Defendants argue that any allegations concerning verbal abuse fail to state a cause of action as allegations of verbal abuse of inmates by guards without more, fail to state a claim under §1983. With regard to Plaintiff's allegations of retaliation for filing a grievance, Defendants responded that the action should be dismissed and provided the affidavit of Patricia Ray "Ray", the Director of GlennCampbell Detention Center, in support of the motion. (ECF #62-1). Ray attests that every detainee and inmate entering the GCDC is instructed on the rules of conduct within the facility, receives the instructions by the use of a video presentation, and receives a copy of the Darlington County Detention Center Inmate Handbook. (Id.) Detainees are expected to read and refer to the Handbook to guide their conduct within the facility, to follow the rules and regulations, and to obey commands of correctional officers. (Id.). Darlington County Detention Center has two categories for discipline: Minor and Major. (Id.). Major offenses are defined as any offense that carries a possible sanction of segregation in excess of 72 hours, assignment to more restrictive housing, or loss of good time credits. (Id.). Two minor offenses committed at the same time or within a 30 day time period constitute a major infraction. (Id.). Any detainee charged with a major offense may request a disciplinary hearing before an impartial Hearing Committee, may appeal the decision if not satisfied within five days of the hearing date, and the Director/designee is allowed five working days to investigate and respond to the appeal. (Id.). A decision by the Director/designee is considered final and there are no further appeals. A detainees' failure to follow these rules and regulations will result in disciplinary action. (Id.). Plaintiff was charged with passing personal property on March 21, 2018, to another detainee. Plaintiff was charged with committing two minor offenses for disobeying an Order not to pass anything across a red line and by passing personal property to another detainee. (Id.). However, even though Plaintiff could have been charged with two minor offenses which would have led to a major violation, he was only charged with one and placed on 24 hour lock down. On April 19, 2018, Plaintiffwas charged with a major violation when observed passing contraband to another detainee, George Matuse. As a result, Plaintiff was transferred to maximum segregation pending a review board hearing. (Id.). A disciplinary hearing was held on April 23, 2018, and Plaintiff was sanctioned thirty days for passing contraband, a major offense. (Id.). Plaintiff did not appeal the conviction.(Id.). Plaintiff was placed in disciplinary segregation for thirty days because he repeatedly violated the rules of the Detention Center and not for retaliation. (Id.). Plaintiff continued to violate detention center rules. (Id.). On May 4, 2018, Plaintiff, along with eleven other inmates, were sanctioned for blocking or covering his cell...