Scott v. Rite Aid of Ga., Inc.

Decision Date18 January 2013
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 7:11–CV–180 (HL).
Citation918 F.Supp.2d 1292
PartiesRonda SCOTT, Plaintiff, v. RITE AID OF GEORGIA, INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Roy W. Copeland, Valdosta, GA, for Plaintiff.

Beth A. Moeller, Kristy G. Offitt, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant.

ORDER

HUGH LAWSON, Senior District Judge.

This case is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 28). After consideration of the briefs, affidavits, depositions, and other materials submitted, the Court grants Defendant's motion.

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires that summary judgment be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “The moving party bears ‘the initial responsibility of informing the ... court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.’ Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir.2004) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (internal quotations omitted)). Where the moving party makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the non-movant, who must go beyond the pleadings and present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact does exist. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The applicable substantive law identifies which facts are material. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A fact is not material if a dispute over that fact will not affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. An issue is genuine when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

In resolving a motion for summary judgment, the court must view all evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Patton v. Triad Guar. Ins. Corp., 277 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir.2002). But, the court is bound only to draw those inferences which are reasonable. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir.1997) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (internal citations omitted).

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In accordance with Local Rule 56, Defendant filed a statement of material facts to which it contends there is no genuine dispute. (Doc. 30). As required by Local Rule 56, each fact statement is supported by a specific citation to the record. See M.D. Ga. L.R. 56. Plaintiff was required to respond to each of Defendant's fact statements. Id. She did not file any such response or specifically controvert Defendant's facts by specific citation to the record. Instead, she merely included her own statement of material facts that did not correspond with or respond to any of the numbered paragraphs provided in Defendant's statement. Therefore, in accordance with Local Rule 56, the facts in Defendant's statement of material facts are deemed admitted. Id.

Even though Defendant's submitted facts are deemed admitted, Defendant “continues to shoulder the initial burden of production in demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, and the court must satisfy itself that the burden has been satisfactorily discharged.” Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1268 (11th Cir.2008). The Court must “review the movant's citations to the record to determine if there is, indeed, no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 1269 (quotation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court has so reviewed the record, and viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, finds the facts for purposes of summary judgment to be as follows.2

Plaintiff received a bachelor of science degree in pharmacy in 1988 and a doctor of pharmacy degree in 1989. Plaintiff began working for Rite Aid as a staff pharmacist in 2000. She was promoted to a pharmacy manager position shortly thereafter at a Rite Aid store in Waycross. Plaintiff left this position in 2002 for another job.

In November of 2006, Plaintiff re-applied with the company for a staff pharmacist position at Store 11852, located at 1905 North Ashley Street, Valdosta, Georgia. Plaintiff was interviewed for the position and subsequently hired. Plaintiff's direct supervisor was Pharmacy District Manager Cindy Woolfolk. Woolfolk promoted Plaintiff to pharmacy manager at the Ashley Street store in September of 2007. As pharmacy manager, Plaintiff's responsibilities included overseeing pharmacy operations, supervising ancillary support (pharmacy cashiers and technicians and staff and floater pharmacists), providing patient counseling, meeting performance and customer focus metrics, pharmacy compliance, and inventory management and control.

Defendant uses several metrics to evaluate the performance of each pharmacy. These include the number of prescription sales, growth in the number of prescription sales over time, Customer Service Index, Key Performance Indicators, and Overall Customer Satisfaction. The Customer Service Index measures customer satisfaction through surveys. The company requires a minimum Customer Service Index score of 75%, and Plaintiff's store fell below that threshold. In addition, Plaintiff's Overall Customer Satisfaction scores for the time period from February 2009 to July 2010 were generally average or below average.3 Further, the Ashley Street store was ranked 26th in sales volume out of 27 stores in the district. Plaintiff could not recall her Key Performance Indicator scores while at the Ashley Street location.4 Plaintiff blames the poor store performance on the demographics of the area and a lack of permanent staff.

Plaintiff became interested in becoming a Pharmacy District Manager (“PDM”). She expressed her interest in her annual self-evaluations for fiscal years 2008 and 2009. Plaintiff also spoke with Cindy Woolfolk and Larry Weed about her desire to become a PDM.

Pharmacy District Managers are responsible for directing the pharmacy operations in multiple stores in a district to operate in an efficient manner, adhering to company policies, procedures, and programs that maximize potential sales, prescription growth, margin, and profitability, among other duties. Pharmacy District Managers are also responsible for supervising all of the pharmacists and pharmacy managers within their district and helping those pharmacy managers meet and exceed all of their performance metrics. Because pharmacy performance metrics are so important, Defendant tries to recruit PDMs who have either demonstrated that they grasp the metrics and have excelled at them, or otherwise demonstrate a strong business acumen and leadership skills which Defendant believes will lead to success in the role. A pharmacy degree is not required for the PDM position, and non-pharmacists have successfully served in the position in the past.

Defendant usually posts openings for PDMs internally first in an effort to hire from within. However, if a viable internal candidate cannot be identified, the positions are posted externally. In 2009, the company's openings would have been posted internally through SYSMS, which is a form of email. A message would be sent out notifying associates that there was a PDM position open and that interested candidates should apply. Generally, if an internal candidate applies for a PDM position, a company talent manager confers with the applicant's direct supervisor to find out whether the supervisor recommends the applicant for the position or whether the supervisor feels the applicant is a viable candidate.5 Once the talent manager identifies potentially viable candidates from the initial applicant pool, he recommends those applicants to the Regional Pharmacy Vice President for further review and interviews. If the Regional Pharmacy Vice President selects a candidate, the candidate is then interviewed by a Senior Vice President and the Director of Human Resources for final approval.

As noted above, Cindy Woolfolk was Plaintiff's PDM when Plaintiff rejoined the company in 2006. Woolfolk was later transferred to another position within the company, and in March 2008, Larry Weed replaced Woolfolk as Plaintiff's PDM. In early 2009, Chip Stewart replaced Weed as the PDM for Plaintiff's district.

In January 2009, Tammy Rogers became the Regional Pharmacy Vice President for the Southeast Region. Chip Stewart left the PDM position, and in March 2009, Dominic Torchia, a white male, replaced Stewart as the Southwest District PDM and became Plaintiff's supervisor. Torchia was selected by Tammy Rogers for the position and was approved by the Director of Human Resources and Senior Vice President. Torchia is a licensed pharmacist. He has a bachelor's of pharmacy degree and a master's degree in science education. Prior to working for Rite Aid, Torchia worked for several years as a PDM for CVS and Revco. He worked in Rite Aid's acquisitions department immediately before taking the PDM position, and assumed the management position after the acquisitions department closed. The PDM position filled by Torchia was never posted for applications.

In June 2009, Plaintiff applied for a PDM position in the Northwest District. Cathy Hugues was the company talent manager in charge of the application process for this position. After receiving Plaintiff...

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