Scott v. Scott
| Decision Date | 20 December 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-434,89-434 |
| Citation | 246 Mont. 10,803 P.2d 620 |
| Parties | In re the Marriage of Edgar C. SCOTT, Petitioner and Respondent, v. Charlotte L. SCOTT, Respondent and Appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Paul N. Cooley, Missoula, for respondent and appellant.
Daniel R. Sweeney, Butte, for petitioner and respondent.
Charlotte Loy Scott appeals the dissolution proceeding in the District Court of the Second Judicial District, Silver Bow County. We reverse and remand.
The parties raise the following issues on appeal:
1. Whether the District Court erred in not ordering the sale of the family residence?
2. Whether the District Court erred in receiving the inventory and appraisement of the Elmer L. Mayhew Estate?
3. Whether the District Court erred in valuing Charlotte's equity in her 1976 Cadillac?
4. Whether the District Court erred in equitably distributing the marital estate?
5. Whether the District Court failed to take into account Edgar's vested benefits under the company pension plan?
6. Whether Edgar failed to disclose all of his Westinghouse savings plan?
7. Whether the District Court failed to account for funds which Edgar applied to marital obligations?
8. Whether the District Court erred in valuing Charlotte's equity in the family home at $39,500?
9. Whether the District Court erred in denying Charlotte maintenance?
Charlotte and Edgar were married in Malta, Montana, on June 14, 1964. Twenty-four years later, on August 22, 1988, Edgar filed a petition for dissolution with the District Court. The couple have four children. At the time of the hearing, however, only Rhonda, was under the age of 18, and thus the issues of child support and custody only concern Rhonda.
Charlotte has a high school education, and has been a housewife during all of the parties' 25-year marriage. Charlotte possesses no real job skills, and would require extensive job training to compete in the current job market. To compound Charlotte's economic woes, she suffers from chronic alcoholism.
The District Court found that Charlotte has admitted "to receiving a devise from her father, Elmer Mayhem's Estate in the amount of $42,000, of which she has spent approximately $34,000 for her living expenses since their separation, which were not reimbursed by petitioner and has assigned to her sister an addition sum of approximately $66,420. from her father's estate." Furthermore, the District Court explained that Charlotte "may be entitled to approximately $400 per month from promissory notes due and owing in her father's estate."
Edgar has a college education, and earns approximately $50,974 a year plus bonuses as an engineer for Westinghouse. He supports Rhonda without financial assistance from his wife. His job with Westinghouse provides him with full benefits, life insurance and a pension. The parties dispute the value of the pension. Charlotte contends the pension plan has a present value of $51,000 that will pay Edgar about $1,400 per month at retirement if he quit working today. Edgar values his pension plan at $18,214. The District Court agreed with Edgar.
The District Court found the parties acquired the following real property
Family residence, Butte, MT (FMV) $140,000.00
Mortgage Balance due 61,000.00
-----------
Equity $ 79,000.00
Condominium, Phoenix, Az (FMV) $ 47,000.00
Mortgage Balance Due 21,858.00
-----------
Equity $ 25,142.00
The District Court awarded the possession and use of the family residence in Butte to Edgar, until Rhonda reached the age of majority, or is otherwise emancipated. At that time the court ordered the residence sold and half of the equity in the family home, as of the date of the decree, turned over to Charlotte. The District Court awarded the Phoenix condominium solely to Charlotte. The District Court suggested that Charlotte sell the condominium to aid in her maintenance.
Next, the District Court found the parties acquired the following personal property during their marriage:
The District Court applied the parties' cash on deposit in the American Federal Savings and Loan Association in the amount of $12,800, and $4,000 of the parties' Westinghouse stock to the above debts, leaving a balance due of $5,776. The court ordered Edgar responsible for the remaining $5,776.
Based on the above figures the District Court found the net value of the marital estate was $168,738. The District Court then distributed the marital estate as follows:
Petitioner (Edgar)
Kemper IRA $ 7,115
Petitioner's Westinghouse Retirement 18,214
Home Equity--family residence 39,500
Petitioner's Westinghouse Savings 14,828
Household Furnishings 4,212
1956 Austin Healey 500
-------
TOTAL $84,369
Respondent (Charlotte)
Kemper IRA $ 7,115
Condominium in Phoenix 25,142
1976 Cadillac 1,500
Stocks 7,084
Household Furnishings 4,028
Home Equity--family 39,500
-------
TOTAL $84,369
Charlotte testified that she needed maintenance in the amount of $500 per month. The District Court determined that Charlotte was not in need of maintenance in addition to her share of the marital estate.
The District Court awarded custody of Rhonda to Edgar, and granted Charlotte liberal visitation rights. The court did not hold Charlotte responsible for any child support obligations while Rhonda is in the care and custody of her father.
Charlotte now, with different counsel, challenges the District Court's valuation and distribution of the marital estate. Our standard of review is that the District Court's judgment, when based upon substantial credible evidence, will not be altered unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. In re the Marriage of Watson (1987), 227 Mont. 383, 387, 739 P.2d 951, 954; In re the Marriage of Stewart (1988), 232 Mont. 40, 42, 757 P.2d 765, 767. With this standard in mind, we now review the issues presented to this Court.
sale of the family residence?
Charlotte contends that given her immediate need for housing, at the time of the decree she was living with her sister, it was an abuse of discretion not to order the family home sold. We disagree with Charlotte. The District Court awarded the possession and use of the family home to Edgar until Rhonda "reaches the age of majority, or is otherwise emancipated." The family home is necessary to provide a stable environment for the parties' minor child Rhonda as determined by the District Court.
Next, Charlotte relying on In re the Marriage of Hereford (1986), 223 Mont. 31, 34-35, 723 P.2d 960, 962, argues that the District Court failed to place a burden on an identifiable party with regards to the eventual sale of the family home. In Hereford, we discussed the problems the parties face when a decree fails to make one party responsible for the sale of the family home:
The problem in this case is in the drafting of the original dissolution decree. The language "the parties shall cause the said property to be appraised by a qualified appraiser, and placed for sale ..." is not a model of clarity in drafting. The decree places no specific burden on an identifiable party within any time period. It requires only that someone appraise and list the house. It technically does not even require the house to be sold. The property could be, and has been, listed for years without selling. Yet sales remain within the language, if not the spirit, of the decree. Clearly the decree must be modified to place specific burdens on identifiable parties to get the house sold within a reasonable time.
The District Court's order does provide a specific time for the sale of the family home, Rhonda's majority or her emancipation, the order, however, fails to list a specific person responsible for the sale. Rather than remand this issue back to the District Court, we order Edgar responsible for the sale of the property at the time Rhonda reaches her majority or is otherwise emancipated. This revision of the District Court's order complies with our holding in Hereford.
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
In re Marriage of Howard
... ... In re Marriage of Scott, 246 Mont. 10, 20-21, 803 P.2d 620, 626 (1990). In Scott, the record reflected testimony regarding the check, but the court's findings did not ... ...
-
Marriage of Pfeifer, In re, 98-054
... ... They do not do so in a vacuum, of course; the distribution must be predicated on the net worth of the estate. See, e.g., Scott v. Scott (1990), 246 Mont. 10, 18, 803 P.2d 620, 625 (citation omitted); In re Marriage of Gies (1984), 210 Mont. 234, 238, 681 P.2d 1092, 1095 ... ...
-
Marriage of McLean, In re, 92-195
... ... The court concluded that Kathleen did not fully explain the charges to the account. In In re Marriage of Scott (1990), 246 Mont. 10, 803 P.2d 620, we refused to accept a district court's determination that a post-separation credit card debt was a marital debt, ... ...
-
IN RE MARRIAGE OF FISHBAUGH, 01-705.
... ... See Scott v. Scott (1990), 246 Mont. 10, 21, 803 P.2d 620, 627. Based on the evidence before us, we conclude the court's findings of fact regarding custody of ... ...
-
§ 13.02 Division of Property at Divorce
...Duby, 163 Mich. App. 396, 413 N.W.2d 807 (1987). Minnesota: Bateman v. Bateman, 382 N.W.2d 240 (Minn. App. 1986). Montana: Scott v. Scott, 246 Mont. 10, 803 P.2d 620 (1990). Nebraska: Anderson v. Anderson, 222 Neb. 212, 382 N.W.2d 620 (1986). New York: Beach v. Beach, 551 N.Y.S.2d 429 (N.Y.......