Scott v. Seabd. Air Line Ry. Co
Court | United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina |
Writing for the Court | POPE |
Citation | 45 S.E. 129,67 S.C. 136 |
Parties | SCOTT. v. SEABOARD AIR LINE RY. CO. |
Decision Date | 15 July 1902 |
45 S.E. 129
67 S.C. 136
SCOTT.
v.
SEABOARD AIR LINE RY. CO.
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
July 15, 1902.
INJURIES TO EMPLOYS—NONSUIT—DUTY OF MASTER—ASSUMPTION OF RISK —INSTRUCTIONS.
1. In an action to recover for the death of an employe, where there was material evidence showing defendant's negligence, it was proper to refuse a nonsuit.
2. An instruction, in an action for injuries to a railroad employe, that the railroad company owes no duty to one on its tracks, though it be a watchman whose duty is to watch over the track, except not to injure him in a wanton and willful manner, was properly refused.
3. An instruction that the assumption of risk by a servant does not mean that a person employed by the railroad assumes the risk of other employes, but he assumes the risk of his employment, and, where a person is employed and some other employe of the company injures him. he does not assume the risk of the other employe, is proper.
4. An exception pointing out no specific error is too general to be reviewed.
5. Where there is no evidence to sustain the plea of contributory negligence, it is not error to refuse to charge on such issues.
6. A general averment, in a plea in an action for. injuries to a servant, that he was guilty of contributory negligence, is insufficient; the default constituting such negligence must be averred.
v 6. See Master and Servant, vol. 34, Cent. Dig. § 859; Negligence, vol. 37, Cent. Dig. § 195.
Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Richland County; Klugh, Judge.
Action by Donie E. Scott, as administratrix of James Daniel Scott, against the Seaboard Air Line Railway Company. Prom judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Lyles & McMahan, Efird & Dreher, and E. McC. Clarkson, for appellant.
W. Boyd Evans, E. M. Thompson, and L. D. Melton, for respondent.
POPE, C. J. This action is directed to the recovery by the plaintiff, in her representative capacity, of damages for killing the intestate by the defendant, on the 30th July, 1901, while such intestate was employed as a watchman over the bridge and trestle work of defendant over the Congaree river, near the city of Columbia, S. C. The case was tried before his honor Judge Klugh and a jury. The verdict was in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $8,000. At the close of plaintiff's testimony, defendant moved for a nonsuit, which motion was denied. After the verdict the defendant moved for a new trial, on the grounds of insufficiency of evidence and that the verdict was excessive. Motion on both grounds refused. Judgment having been duly entered, the defendant then appealed to this court.
Before proceeding to a consideration of the grounds of appeal, we deem it proper to give a brief recital of the pleadings and testimony. After a proper allegation as to de fendant's liability for the acts of the late South Bound Railway, the plaintiff showed that her husband, the late James Daniel Scott, at his death was survived by herself, as his widow, and his three children, naming each one; that he was employed by defendant's predecessor corporation as a night watchman over the Congaree bridge and trestle works adjacent thereto, setting out that his duties as such watchman required him to cross backwards and forwards over said bridge and trestle works of said railway to extinguish any fire that might appear thereon. That on the particular night of the tragedy, train No. 66, while running from the city of Savannah, Ga., to the city of Columbia, in this state, knocked the intestate from the trestle work on the Lexington side of the Congaree river, "negligently, carelessly, recklessly, and wantonly, " in utter disregard of its duty and the safety of the said night watchman, without any headlight upon its engine, and without giving any signal or warning by bell or whistle or otherwise of its approach, as was its duty and custom to do, and without keeping any lookout whatsoever, and without any prudence or forethought which the engineer or person in charge of said engine should have kept upon the track where they knew said employs was at work, running at a rapid and reckless rate of speed, whereby the said intestate was killed. That his body was found thrown between two rocks, with his neck broken and his ribs were crushed and broken. Not only so, but the complaint further charged that no whistle was sounded or bell rung at the crossing by said railway over the public road near Cayces, S. C, which was about 200 yards from said bridge and trestle. And then followed the usual recitals of the loss in material support, society, etc., caused by the death of the said intestate.
The answer dealt in general denials, except, as a second defense, it used this language: "It denies each and every allegation of the complaint, and alleges that, if the plaintiff's intestate was killed by the locomotive and cars of the defendant, that he contributed thereto by his carelessness and negligence, and this defendant is not liable therefor."
The testimony of the plaintiff tended to show the corporate capacity of the defendant, and its employment for some nine months prior to the tragic death of the intestate as said night watchman at a salary of $30 per month; that on the night he was killed the said intestate was seen with his lamp burning—that is, a lantern with a light burning therein—going to the bridge and trestle work; that intestate was passed on said bridge with his lantern still burning, going in the direction of the Lexington side of said bridge and adjacent trestle works, just before the train No. 66, consisting of an engine and passenger coaches, came upon said trestle work and I bridge, on its way to Columbia, S. C; that
[45 S.E. 130]said engine was ahead of its schedule time, both on its arrival at the bridge and also on its arrival at the depot in the city of Columbia, S. C; that said engine had no headlight thereon; that the engineer and fireman on the engine, while on the bridge, were seen with their faces turned to each other in close conversation; that said engine did not slacken its speed on its approach to said bridge and trestle, but was being run at the rate of 50 or 60 miles an hour; that there was no whistle sounded or bell rung either at Cayces or at or near the bridge; that a witness saw the intestate seem to swing his lantern, and that he barely escaped from death while on said bridge from the said No. 66 train by jumping onto a little platform on the bridge, where barrels of water were constantly kept; that, after train No. 66 had passed this witness, he went across the bridge and trestle works to where he had seen the night watchman swing his lantern, and at or near the trestle works he found the lantern, and when he called out for the watchman he received no reply; that on the next morning another witness, at about the hour of 6 o'clock, found the remains of the night watchman, with his neck broken and the whole right side crushed, every rib being broken; that physician testified that such bruises could have been and likely were caused by a collision of the bumper near the cattle guard of the engine with the body of the deceased. These matters of testimony...
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Woodworth v. Skeen, (No. 12782.)
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Chi., R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Barton, Case Number: 6058
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