Scott v. Sec'y
| Decision Date | 31 July 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 8:14-cv-951-T-27AAS |
| Parties | JAMARR LANARD SCOTT, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner, a Florida prisoner, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Dkt. 1) challenging his 2008 convictions for attempted second degree murder in the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court, Pinellas County, Florida. Respondent filed a response (Dkt. 5), and Petitioner replied (Dkt. 10). The petition is DENIED.
On November 16, 2007, Petitioner was charged by Information with nine counts of attempted second degree murder (Respondent's Ex. 1). Although he had appointed counsel (Respondent's Ex. 2), he filed a pro se demand for a speedy trial on March 24, 2008 (Respondent's Ex. 3). On April 9, 2008, he filed a second demand for speedy trial that both he and counsel signed (Respondent's Ex. 4). Trial was held on May 13-14, 2008, and he was convicted on all nine counts (Respondent's Ex. 6). He was sentenced to 20 years on each count, consecutive (Respondent's Ex. 7). His convictions were affirmed (Respondent's Ex. 10). He filed several post-conviction motions alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, all of which were denied (Respondent's Exs. 11-20). He filed his federal habeas petition alleging nine grounds for relief (Dkt.1).
Habeas relief can only be granted if a state prisoner is in custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Section 2254(d), which sets forth a highly deferential standard for federal court review of a state court adjudication, states:
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000), the Supreme Court interpreted this deferential standard:
In sum, § 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied—the state-court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) "was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or (2) "involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
"The focus . . . is on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable . . . an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). "As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement" Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). Accord Brown v. Head, 272 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) (). The phrase "clearly established Federal law" encompasses only the holdings of the United States Supreme Court "as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.
The purpose of federal review is not to re-try the case. "The [AEDPA] modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Cone, 535 U.S. at 693. In other words, "AEDPA prevents defendants—and federal courts—from using federal habeas corpus review as a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 779 (2010). See also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) () (citations omitted).
Petitioner bears the burden of overcoming by clear and convincing evidence a state court factual determination. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed under the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which requires a petitioner to demonstrate both deficient performance by counsel and resulting prejudice. Demonstrating deficient performance "requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 687. Deficient performance is established if, "in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions [of counsel] were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Id. at 690. However, "counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Id. Additionally, "a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." Id.
Petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's alleged errors prejudiced the defense because "[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment." Id. at 691-92. To show prejudice, a petitioner must show Id. at 694.
Sustaining a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on federal habeas review is very difficult because "[t]he standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both 'highly deferential,'and when the two apply in tandem, review is 'doubly' so." Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (citations omitted). See also Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 202 ().
If a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be resolved through one of the Strickland test's two prongs, the other prong need not be considered. 466 U.S. at 697 (); Sims v. Singletary, 155 F.3d 1297, 1305 (11th Cir. 1998) ().
The State Post-Conviction Court's Adjudication of Petitioner's Claim That Trial Counsel was Ineffective for Waiving Closing (Final) Argument was Contrary to or an Unreasonable Application of Strickland v. Washington or was Based on an Unreasonable Determination of the Facts
Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective in waiving closing argument. Counsel waived closing argument because he determined that he could not effectively or ethically argue the defense he presented at trial, namely, that Petitioner did not act with the intent to kill the victims.2 Although Petitioner concedes that counsel could not argue that Petitioner did not intend to kill the victims, he contends that counsel should have argued that there was a lack of evidence that Petitioner "committed an 'act' of shooting at an individual victim alleged in separate counts with a firearm."(Dkt. 1, p. 7).
In state court, Petitioner raised this claim in Ground One of his amended Rule 3.850 motion (Respondent's Ex. 17, pp. 4-7). In denying the claim, the state post-conviction court stated:
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