Scott v. Sec'y
| Decision Date | 19 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 8:11-CV-764-T-27MAP |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
| Parties | KENYAL SCOTT, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. |
Petitioner, a state of Florida inmate proceeding pro se, initiated this action by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Dkt. 1). Petitioner challenges his convictions for aggravated battery (great bodily harm with a weapon) and obstructing or opposing an officer without violence, entered in 2003 in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Hillsborough County, Florida. In its response (Dkt. 8), Respondent asserts that the petition should be denied. Upon review, the petition must be denied.
On March 27, 2003, the State of Florida filed a felony information charging Petitioner with "aggravated battery (great bodily harm and weapon)" (count one). (Dkt. 10, Ex. 1.) The information specifically charged that in committing the aggravated battery, Petitioner "did intentionally or knowingly cause great bodily harm, permanent disability or permanent disfigurement" to the victim contrary to § 784.045, Fla. Stat. (Id.) The information also charged that "during the course of the commission of the offense [Petitioner] carried, displayed, used, threatened to use, or attempted touse a weapon, to-wit: aknife" and referred to § 775.087(1), Fla. Stat, which permits reclassification of certain offenses if a defendant uses a weapon in such a manner. (Id.) Petitioner was also charged with obstructing or opposing an officer without violence (count two). (Id.)
A jury convicted Petitioner on August 18, 2003. He was sentenced on September 22, 2003, to life imprisonment as a habitual felony offender with a thirty-year term as a prison releasee reoffender on count one, and to time served on count two. (Dkt. 10, Ex. 3.) On September 29, 2003, the trial court resentenced Petitioner to thirty years' imprisonment as a prison releasee reoffender on count one. (Dkt. 10, Ex. 4.)
On May 21, 2004, Petitioner filed a Motion to Correct Sentencing Error under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2). He alleged in relevant part that the trial court was without jurisdiction to conduct resentencing on September 29, 2003, because he filed a notice of appeal prior to that date, and that the court erred in resentencing him without counsel. (Dkt. 10, Ex. 5.) In an order entered August 11, 2004, the trial court granted Petitioner's Rule 3.800(b)(2) motion as to these claims. (Dkt. 10, Ex. 6.) It appears that an amended sentence was entered on September 20, 2004, reflecting Petitioner's sentence of thirty years' imprisonment as a prison releasee reoffender on count one. (Dkt. 10, Ex. 7, pp. 6-7.) The state appellate court per curiam affirmed Petitioner's judgment and sentence on August 3, 2005. Scott v. State, 908 So.2d 1072 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (table).
Petitioner filed a motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 on May 4, 2006, raising ten claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.1 (Dkt. 10, Ex. 9.)Petitioner also filed a motion to correct illegal sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) on November 28, 2006.2 (Dkt. 10, Ex. 11.) The state court denied this motion in an order entered January 19, 2007. (Dkt. 10, Ex. 13.) The state appellate court per curiam affirmed that order on May 30, 2007. Scott v. State, 957 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (table). The mandate issued on June 21, 2007. (Dkt. 10, Ex. 14.)
During this time, Petitioner's Rule 3.850 motion remained pending. The state court entered several orders summarily denying some of the claims, directing Petitioner to amend other claims, and instructing the State to respond to numerous claims. (Dkt. 10, Ex. 15, 18.) On May 29, 2009, the court entered an order granting an evidentiary hearing on three of Petitioner's claims. (Dkt. 10, Ex. 19.) The court conducted the evidentiary hearing on October 6, 2009, and entered its final order denying Petitioner's Rule 3.850 motion on December 17, 2009. (Dkt. 10, Ex. 20, 21.) This order of denial was per curiam affirmed on November 19, 2010. Scott v. State, 49 So.3d 249 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (table). The mandate issued on December 15, 2010. (Dkt. 10, Ex. 22.)
This petition is subject to the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") effective April 24, 1996. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1997). Habeas relief can only be granted if a petitioner is in custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Section 2254(d) sets forth a highly deferential standard for federal court review of a state court's findings of law and fact. It provides that habeasrelief may not be granted on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless such determination:
The Supreme Court explained the review of a state court's findings referenced in subsection (1) above in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000):
Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
A state court's factual findings must also be given deference, as set forth in subsection (2) above. Specifically, a state court's determinations of fact "shall be presumed to be correct," and the habeas petitioner "shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 890-91 (11th Cir. 2003).
In order to pursue federal habeas relief, a state prisoner must exhaust every available state court remedy for challenging his conviction. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). "[T]he state prisoner must give the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims before he presents those claims to a federalcourt in a habeas petition." O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). A federal habeas petitioner "shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State ... if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c); Pruitt v. Jones, 348 F.3d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir. 2003).
To exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must make the state court aware of both the legal and factual bases for his claim. "To present a federal constitutional claim properly in state court, 'the petitioner must make the state court aware that the claims asserted present federal constitutional issues.'" Zeigler v. Crosby, 345 F.3d 1300, 1307 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 735 (11th Cir. 1998)). "[T]he prohibition against raising nonexhausted claims in federal court extends not only to broad legal theories of relief, but also to the specific assertions of fact that might support relief." Kelley v. Secy for Dep't of Corr., 377 F.3d 1317, 1344 (11th Cir. 2004).
The doctrine of procedural default provides that "[i]f the petitioner has failed to exhaust state remedies that are no longer available, that failure is a procedural default which will bar federal habeas relief, unless either the cause and prejudice or the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is applicable." Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1138 (11th Cir. 2001). See also O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 848; Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299, 1302-03 (11th Cir. 1999).
Similarly, a federal habeas petition must involve a question of federal law. A state court's interpretation of state laws or rules, when no federal constitutional issue is addressed, does not provide a basis for federal habeas relief. Therefore, a claim that solely involves state law is not cognizable in a § 2254 petition. See Branan v. Booth, 861 F.2d 1507, 1508 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Carrizales v. Wainwright, 699 F.2d 1053, 1054-55 (11th Cir. 1983)).
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To obtain relief under Strickland, a petitioner must show that counsel's performance was deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced the petitioner. Id. at 687. In order to show deficient performance, a petitioner must demonstrate that "in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions [of counsel] were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Id. at 690. To demonstrate prejudice, a petitioner must show Id. at 694.
Counsel is presumed to have provided effective assistance. Id. at 690. Further, "a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." Id. If a reviewing court can dispose of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on one prong of the Strickla...
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