Scott v. Shay

• Decision Date: 26 June 2007
• Docket Number: No. 18 MDA 2006.,18 MDA 2006.
• Citation: 928 A.2d 312
• Parties: Leonard SCOTT, Appellant v. Robin SHAY, Appellee.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

928 A.2d 312

Leonard SCOTT, Appellant v. Robin SHAY, Appellee.

No. 18 MDA 2006.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued November 15, 2006.

Filed June 26, 2007.

William G. Tressler, Bellefonte, for appellant.

Douglas L. Hearn, State College, for appellee.

BEFORE: TODD, BENDER AND COLVILLE^*, JJ.

OPINION BY COLVILLE, J.:

¶ 1 This case is an appeal of a protection from abuse (PFA) order against Appellant. He argues: (1) Appellee had no standing to seek a PFA order and (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the order. We reverse.

Facts

¶ 2 At some point in the 1980s, when Appellee was a child, she was friends with Appellant's son. Appellee's father and Appellant also knew each other. In or around 1989, Appellant was convicted of indecent assault, Appellee being the victim. In the years that followed, Appellee saw Appellant from time to time in grocery stores, a restaurant where she used to work and a department store where she also worked. Sometimes Appellant was with his wife and/or members of his church. Other times he was alone.

¶ 3 In August 2004, Appellant went to Appellee's house. At the PFA hearing Appellee testified that she could not remember everything Appellant said when he came to her home, but he apparently asked where Appellee's father was and inquired about a lawn mower or mower part Appellant had sold to Appellee's father many years earlier. During the conversation, Appellant indicated that his cousin was Appellee's next-door neighbor. The conversation ended when Appellee told Appellant she would have her father and husband call him.

¶ 4 In October 2005, Appellee's church held a gathering as an alternative to Halloween. Several other churches, including Appellant's, were invited to take part. Appellant attended the function, having volunteered to work at the event. The gathering lasted approximately two hours, and there were some two hundred persons, adults and children, in attendance.

¶ 5 Roughly forty-five minutes into the event, Appellee arrived and learned from one of her friends that Appellant was there. Church leaders then told Appellant he had to remain in a limited area for the rest of the evening. They also assigned a church member to stay by Appellant's side. During the night, there was no contact or conversation between Appellant and Appellee, but Appellant apparently looked and smiled at Appellee more than once. At one point, the two were eight to ten feet apart.

¶ 6 Appellee subsequently filed a petition requesting a PFA order against Appellant. The trial court held a hearing and granted the petition. This appeal follows.

Statutory Construction

¶ 7 Appellant's first issue, standing, involves a question of law — namely, the interpretation of a statute. For this issue, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. McCance v. McCance, 908 A.2d 905, 908 (Pa.Super.2006). When we undertake statutory interpretation, our object is to ascertain and then effectuate the intention of the Legislature. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a). When possible, this Court construes every statute so as to give effect to all of its provisions. Id. If the terms of a statute are clear and free of all ambiguity, we will not disregard the letter of the law in favor of pursuing its apparent spirit. Id. at (b). However, when the words of a statute are not explicit, this Court must determine what it was that the General Assembly intended. Id. at (c). We then apply the legislators' intent when interpreting the law in question. See id. at (a), (b), (c).

¶ 8 When determining legislative intent, there are a number of factors that may be helpful. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(c) (listing factors to consider). Among these are the occasion, necessity and circumstances of the enactment of the statute, the mischief to be remedied and the object to be attained thereby. McCance, 908 A.2d at 908, 909. Also important are the consequences of our interpretation. Id. More specifically, we must consider whether that interpretation furthers the Legislature's purpose. See id.

Protection from Abuse Act

¶ 9 The purpose of the Protection from Abuse Act ("the Act") is to protect victims of domestic violence from the perpetrators of that type of abuse and to prevent domestic violence from occurring. Fonner v. Fonner, 731 A.2d 160, 161 (Pa.Super.1999). The intent of the remedies under the Act is to allow persons to reside peaceably and without injury within their families and/or residences. McCance, 908 A.2d at 911.

¶ 10 When passing this statute, the Legislature perceived that the criminal law sometimes failed to penetrate the familial setting. Snyder v. Snyder, 427 Pa.Super. 494, 629 A.2d 977, 981 (1993). More particularly, police and prosecutors were sometimes reluctant to pursue charges arising from close domestic relationships. Yankoskie v. Lenker, 363 Pa.Super. 448, 526 A.2d 429, 433 (1987). In this sense, the Act was designed to remedy perceived inadequacies in the criminal law with respect to the domestic landscape. Id. Accordingly, the mischief the Act seeks to remedy is the violence that can sometimes erupt in spousal, parent-child and/or other household or similarly close relationships. Snyder, 629 A.2d at 981. The object of the Act, then, is to forestall domestic abuse. Id.

¶ 11 For the Act to apply, the petitioner seeking to invoke it must have standing, which is to say that the petitioner and the intended respondent must be family or household members. McCance, 908 A.2d at 908; 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6102(a), 6106(a). Family or household members are defined to be spouses or persons who have been spouses, persons living as spouses or who have lived as spouses, parents and children, other persons related by consanguinity or affinity, current or former sexual or intimate partners, or persons who share biological parenthood. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102(a).

¶ 12 Consistent with § 6102(a), case law applies the Act only to those persons fitting the aforesaid definition. See McCance, 908 A.2d at 910 (applying the Act to in-laws interacting with respect to child custody dispute); Varner v. Holley, 854 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa.Super.2004) (applying the Act to persons who had a dating relationship); D.H. v. B.O., 734 A.2d 409, 410 (Pa.Super.1999) (applying the Act to paramours); Miller on Behalf of Walker v. Walker, 445 Pa.Super. 537, 665 A.2d 1252, 1254 (1995) (applying the Act to parent and children); Snyder, 629 A.2d at 978, 981 (applying the Act to husband and wife). In sum, the Act is concerned with persons who have or have had domestic, familial and/or romantic relationships. It is a domestic relations statute, not a statute governing persons without any such relations.

Analysis — Standing

¶ 13 Appellant argues that Appellee has no standing to seek a PFA order because he and Appellee have never had any domestic relationship. Appellee claims she is entitled to protection under the Act by virtue of the fact that Appellant sexually assaulted her some years ago. Appellant and Appellee are not now nor have they ever been spouses. They have never lived as spouses. They are not relatives by blood or marriage. They have not dated; they have not been paramours. The only way that Appellant and Appellee could fall within the definition of family or household members is if the phrase "sexual or intimate partners" is interpreted to include an assailant and a victim.

¶ 14 The Act does not define the term "partners," and it is otherwise unclear whether this term includes the victim of a sex crime. Thus, the term "partners" is not free of all ambiguity. Accordingly, we must interpret the term in light of the legislators' intent. As we have already made clear, their intent was to prevent domestic violence and to promote peace and safety within domestic, familial and/or romantic relationships.

¶ 15 There is certainly no domestic, familial or romantic relationship created between an assailant and a victim of a sex assault. By contrast, the persons who undoubtedly fit the Act's definition of family or household members — e.g., spouses, parents, children, relatives, paramours, and persons who undertake romantic relationships — typically share some significant degree of domestic, familial and/or intimate interdependence. There is often an obvious emotional bond. Frequently, these individuals interface in very practical areas of private life — a mutual residence, common family obligations and/or shared involvement in the affairs of day-to-day living. Even in a dating relationship, where the functional interdependence might not be as substantial as in a family, the participants have elected some measure of personal interaction. This interaction often involves emotional or private concerns not unlike those found in family settings, albeit not normally as extensive or as intense. In sum, the persons protected by the Act as family or household members have a connection rooted in blood, marriage, family-standing, or a chosen romantic relationship.

¶ 16 There simply is no such connection created by an assault. Surely, a victim would not claim to have had a relationship with the attacker based solely on a sex crime. An assailant and a victim do not, by virtue a crime, suddenly have a bond regarding the private matters of life. They have no interface concerning personal issues and concerns. There is nothing at all about a sex crime that creates a domestic or familial link. We thus hold that a criminal assault does not establish a sexual or intimate partnership for the purposes of the Protection from Abuse Act. Rather, sexual or intimate partners are persons who have mutually agreed to enter such relationships.

¶ 17 It is critical to understand that the flaw in Appellee's argument is her contention that a sex assault creates a family or household relationship. To be sure, if individuals already are family or household members, a sex assault would constitute the type of abuse the Act seeks to prevent. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102(a)(1). However, a sex...