Scott v. Spurr

• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: HURT, J.
• Citation: Scott v. Spurr, 169 Ky. 575, 184 S.W. 866 (Ky. Ct. App. 1916)
• Decision Date: 21 April 1916
• Parties: SCOTT v. SPURR.

184 S.W. 866

169 Ky. 575

SCOTT v. SPURR.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

April 21, 1916

Appeal from Circuit Court, Fayette County.

Action by Ruth W. Spurr against D. C. Scott. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

W. C G. Hobbs, of Lexington, for appellant.

S. S Yantis, of Lexington, for appellee.

HURT J.

This is an action in equity instituted in the Fayette circuit court by appellee, Ruth W. Spurr, against the appellant, D. C Scott, for the purpose of reforming the written evidence of a contract which had been entered into by them, by which appellee had rented to appellant a farm of about 260 acres of land which was situated in Fayette county, for a term which began March 1, 1914, and ended March 1, 1915. The contract was made and the writing signed by the appellee on the 1st day of August, 1913. The appellee claimed that it was agreed upon between them to the effect that the farm should be cultivated and used by the appellant as follows: Twenty acres to be cultivated in oats; 55 acres which had been cultivated in corn to be cultivated by the appellant in wheat; and 20 acres to be cultivated in cow peas and millet--and that the remaining portion of the farm should be used for grazing purposes alone, and that these stipulations as to the manner of its cultivation were omitted from the writing which was entered into by oversight and mistake, and asked that the writing be reformed and these stipulations be embraced in it. The appellant interposed a general demurrer to the petition which being overruled, he answered. The answer was simply a traverse of the averments of the petition, and with the further averment that the writing embraced the contract entered into, and that it provided that the farm was leased for general farming purposes, and that he had so used the farm. The affirmative averments of the answer were controverted by reply.

The depositions of a number of witnesses were taken, and upon submission of the case the court adjudged that the appellee was entitled to the relief sought, and that the writing which evidenced the contract should be reformed as prayed for, and from this judgment the appellant has appealed to this court.

The evidence showed that appellee was an aged lady, and resided several miles from the leased farm, adjoining to which the appellant resided. The contract between appellant and appellee was not negotiated by appellee in person, but in the transaction she was represented by her son, who had authority to make the contract for her as her agent.

The terms of the contract were agreed upon between appellant and the son of appellee late in the afternoon of August 1, 1913. One of the terms of the lease was that appellant should pay for the use of the farm during the period of the lease the sum of $1,000, one-half of which should be paid upon the day of the making of the contract, and the remainder at the end of the period of the lease. The son of appellee was a candidate at an election which was to be held on the following day, and had an appointment to meet a number of his friends on that evening. The appellant proceeded from the place of making the contract to secure the money with which to make the cash payment, and before returning secured the services of a lawyer and caused him to reduce a part of the terms of the contract to writing. The writing embraced all the terms of the contract, except the stipulations in regard to the quantity of the lands which were to be cultivated and the character of the crops to be grown. At the place in the written lease in which the omitted stipulations should have been inserted there were several lines left blank. When appellant returned to the room of appellee's son with the money to be paid, he requested him to subscribe the appellee's name to the writing, which the son did after a partial examination of the paper, and, being hurried to meet his friends who were managing his candidacy for him, he subscribed appellee's name, received the money, and delivered the writing back to appellant, who promised to send him a copy of it, but never did so. The appellee did not learn that the contract was attempted to be put into writing until in the month of July of the following year. When she learned that the contract between appellant and her son had been put into writing, she endeavored to see the writing or to secure a copy of it, but failed to do so until the 22d day of September, 1914. After taking possession of the farm, appellant proceeded to put into cultivation in wheat and oats the portion of it which, according to the appellee, he was to cultivate under his contract, and also put into cultivation 8 or 10 acres of it in tobacco, and 90 to 100 acres in corn, and some other portion of it in other crops. The evidence conduces to show that, when cultivated as appellant cultivated it, the reasonable rental of the farm should have been about $2,000, instead of $1,000. According to the terms of the lease as written, the appellant could use any or all of the farm for general farming purposes, and was at liberty to cultivate any part or all of it in any kind of crops which he desired.

The appellant insists that the court below was in error when it adjudged that the terms of the contract which provided that appellant should cultivate 55 acres of the farm in wheat, 20 acres in oats, and 20 acres in peas and millet, and the remainder of the farm was to be used only for grazing purposes, constituted a part of the agreement and were omitted from the writing signed by the agent of appellee by oversight and mistake, and insists that the evidence did not justify the court in arriving at such a conclusion.

The rule in such cases which requires that the evidence, before justifying a reformation of a written memorial of a contract because something has been omitted or something inserted in it by mistake, must be clear, convincing, and satisfactory, is a well-established doctrine in equity. Crabtree v. Sisk, 99 S.W. 268, 30 Ky. Law Rep....