Scott v. State Bar Examining Committee, No. 14210

• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Writing for the Court: Before PETERS; PETERS
• Citation: 220 Conn. 812,601 A.2d 1021
• Parties: Brian T. SCOTT v. STATE BAR EXAMINING COMMITTEE.
• Docket Number: No. 14210
• Decision Date: 14 January 1992

Page 1021

601 A.2d 1021 220 Conn. 812 Brian T. SCOTT
v.
STATE BAR EXAMINING COMMITTEE. No. 14210. Supreme Court of Connecticut. Argued Nov. 7, 1991.
Decided Jan. 14, 1992.

Page 1022

[220 Conn. 813] Dan E. LaBelle, with whom, on the brief, was Thomas P. Moriarty, Manchester, for appellant (respondent).

David J. Laudano, with whom, on the brief, was Raymond W. Ganim, Stratford, for appellee (petitioner).

Before [220 Conn. 812] PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, CALLAHAN, GLASS and BORDEN, JJ.

[220 Conn. 813] PETERS, Chief Justice.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is the scope of the Superior Court's authority to review the decision of the Connecticut bar examining committee denying an applicant's admission to the bar. After receiving the application of the petitioner, Brian T. Scott, to take the state bar examination and for admission to the bar of this state, and after he had passed the bar examination, the Fairfield county committee on admission to the bar (standing committee) interviewed him, and voted unanimously to recommend that he be admitted to the bar.

Page 1023

Thereafter, however, the respondent bar examining committee (BEC), through its executive committee, conducted its own investigation and, upon finding that the petitioner did not possess the present good moral character and the requisite fitness for admission to the bar, rejected his application for admission. The petitioner sought review in the Superior Court, claiming that the BEC had acted arbitrarily, unreasonably or in abuse of its discretion [220 Conn. 814] in making its decision. ¹ The trial court, Hon. Irving Levine, state trial referee, rendered a judgment ordering the petitioner admitted to the bar after concluding that the "[BEC] could not fairly and reasonably have reached the conclusion that it did." From that judgment, the BEC appealed to the Appellate Court and, pursuant to Practice Book § 4023, we transferred the appeal to this court. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The record, briefs and appendices of the parties reveal the following facts. The petitioner used marihuana from 1977 to 1985, a period of eight years. This period of drug use resulted in numerous arrests and three convictions for possession of marihuana and controlled substances. ² Although the petitioner had dropped out of high school in his junior year, he subsequently received his high school graduate equivalency [220 Conn. 815] diploma. He began taking courses at the University of Bridgeport and eventually graduated with a bachelor's degree. He then enrolled at the University of Bridgeport law school and received a law degree.

Following graduation from law school, the petitioner filed an application to take the bar examination and for admission to the bar. He properly revealed his criminal record on the application. The petitioner took the state bar examination on July 29 and 30, 1987. On November 6, 1987, the BEC notified the petitioner that he had passed the examination; however, on November 19, 1987, it advised the petitioner that he was ineligible for admission to the bar. On December 23, 1987, three members of the standing committee conducted a hearing in which the petitioner was questioned about his prior drug use and criminal record. On January 11, 1988, the standing committee notified the petitioner that it had voted unanimously to approve his admission to the state bar. Soon thereafter the BEC notified the petitioner that its executive committee intended to hold a factfinding hearing, on February 19, 1988, concerning his qualifications for admission to the bar. The notice informed the petitioner that the specific area of inquiry was to be his criminal record. It further advised the petitioner that he could bring an attorney as well as "any documents or witnesses relevant to the area of inquiry" but that "[g]eneral character witnesses [would] not be permitted." The petitioner appeared without counsel and responded to extensive questioning.

On May 20, 1988, the members of the executive committee voted unanimously to

Page 1024

deny the petitioner admission to the bar. ³ Each voting member placed the reason [220 Conn. 816] for his vote on the record. The minutes reflect that one member found that the petitioner's "explanation of the facts and events involving his criminal prosecution confirmed in [the member's] mind the belief that the [petitioner's] testimony before the executive committee ... was not credible." Another member "was of the opinion that the applicant displayed a lack of candor and did not appreciate the importance of his testimony" at the hearing. The final member's "opinion that the applicant was unfit to practice law ... was based upon the applicant's conviction in three criminal cases involving illegal substance abuse." The BEC notified the petitioner that it found him to be lacking the present good moral character and the requisite fitness for admission to the bar, and that it therefore was rejecting his application for admission to the bar. The petitioner then filed a petition with the Superior Court, which, without hearing any additional testimony, ⁴ ordered his admission to the bar. ⁵

On appeal, the BEC challenges the propriety of the trial court's rejection of its decision, claiming that questions of good moral character in the attorney admission process are properly delegated to the discretion of the BEC. The petitioner claims that: (1) the BEC lacks standing to bring this appeal; (2) even if this [220 Conn. 817] appeal is properly before this court, the trial court acted within its discretion; and (3) as an alternate ground for affirming the judgment of the trial court, the BEC deprived the petitioner of his due process rights to notice, to an adequate opportunity to rebut evidence and to present evidence and testimony.

I

"Fixing the qualifications for, as well as admitting persons to, the practice of law in this state has ever been an exercise of judicial power." Heiberger v. Clark, 148 Conn. 177, 185, 169 A.2d 652 (1961); State Bar Assn. v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 232, 140 A.2d 863 (1958); O'Brien's Petition, 79 Conn. 46, 55, 63 A. 777 (1906), overruled on other grounds, In re Application of Dinan, 157 Conn. 67, 72, 244 A.2d 608 (1968). "This power has been exercised with the assistance of committees of the bar appointed and acting under rules of court." In re Application of Warren, 149 Conn. 266, 272, 178 A.2d 528 (1962); Heiberger v. Clark, supra, 148 Conn. at 183, 169 A.2d 652. In addition to establishing the BEC, the rules of practice provide for a standing committee on recommendations for admission in each county. Practice Book §§ 11, 19. "Although these committees have a broad power of discretion, they act under the court's supervision. In re Application of Dodd, 132 Conn. 237, 244, 43 A.2d 224 [1945]; see Grievance Committee v. Broder, 112 Conn. 263, 265, 152 A. 292 [1930]. It is the court, and not the bar, or a committee, which takes the final and decisive action. Heiberger v. Clark, supra, [148 Conn. at] 183, [169 A.2d 652] and cases cited therein." In re Application of Warren, supra.

The petitioner properly presented a petition to the Superior Court for review of the BEC's negative recommendation.

Page 1025

Heiberger v. Clark, supra, 148 Conn. at 182, 169 A.2d 652. The Superior Court, however, has only limited discretion to accept or reject the BEC's recommendation on [220 Conn. 818] admission. The hearing on the petition is not de novo. Rather, the Superior Court must review the BEC's decision on its record to determine whether it has conducted a fair and impartial investigation. In re Application of Warren, supra, 149 Conn. at 273-74, 178 A.2d 528. "It has been the established practice for the court to decline to hear evidence on questions entrusted to bar committees. O'Brien's Petition, [supra, 79 Conn. at 55, 63 A. 777]; In re Application of Warren, supra at 273, 178 A.2d 528. This practice applies in cases such as the present one where the issue involves an exercise of the committee's discretion. In re Application of Warren, supra. ... [T]he court will determine whether the committee acted fairly and reasonably or from prejudice and ill will in its consideration of the application." In re Application of Koenig, 152 Conn. 125, 133, 204 A.2d 33 (1964). "[T]he issue before the court is whether the committee or the bar, in withholding its approval for admission, acted arbitrarily or unreasonably or in abuse of its discretion or without a fair investigation of the facts." In re Application of Warren, supra. A

We first address the petitioner's claim that the BEC lacks standing to bring this appeal. He contends that, "[b]eing an arm of the trial court, the Appellant Committee cannot suffer any injury because it cannot be argued that the trial court has injured itself." We disagree. In Grievance Committee v. Broder, supra, which involved a grievance committee appeal from a decision of the trial court, we stated: "If the disbarred attorney should have the opportunity to have reviewed by the highest tribunal of the State an alleged unreasonable exercise of discretion by the trial court, or some irregularity or unfairness in the conduct of the proceedings, equally should it be the right of the court and the public and the due of the proper administration of justice that an exercise of discretion, claimed to be unreasonable [220 Conn. 819] to the court and the public and the administration of justice, should be reviewed. The granting of an appeal to the disbarred attorney and the denial of a like appeal to the representative of the public interest would be an unheard of procedure in this jurisdiction. The Supreme Court ... is the court of last resort for the correction of errors of law and it is only by an appeal to it that such errors may be finally determined.... To deny an appeal to the representative of the public interests involved would leave the decision to the...