Scott v. State
Decision Date | 27 January 2021 |
Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-CR-1131 |
Citation | 162 N.E.3d 578 |
Parties | Harmony S. SCOTT, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Attorney for Appellant: Jennifer L. Koethe, Navarre, Florida
Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Taylor Carpenter, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
[1] Harmony Scott presented substantial, uncontested evidence that she is a victim of human trafficking. Even so, the trial court refused to include her history of victimization as a mitigating circumstance in its sentencing order. Despite this mistake, Scott's fourteen-year sentence on one count of Level 3 felony robbery and three counts of Level 5 felony fraud is not inappropriate. Accordingly, we affirm.
[2] In 2015, Harmony Scott and her sister impersonated sheriff's deputies to get Tracy Lindsey to open her door. Then they attacked Lindsey with the butt of a pistol and a pair of scissors, forcibly entered Lindsey's home, and removed items. The State charged Scott with Level 2 felony burglary while armed with a deadly weapon; Level 3 felony robbery resulting in bodily injury; and Level 5 felony battery with a deadly weapon. She was already on probation in Texas for cocaine possession at the time of the crime. Her trial on the burglary, robbery, and battery charges ended in a mistrial in 2016 after the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict.
[3] In 2018, Scott illicitly withdrew thousands of dollars from her grandfather's bank account. The State charged her with nine counts of Level 5 felony fraud on a financial institution.
[4] In March 2019, Scott was charged with domestic battery in the presence of a juvenile for allegedly hitting her girlfriend while Scott's son was in the other room.
[5] At some point, Scott became a cooperating victim witness in a federal prosecution for human trafficking in the Eastern District of Wisconsin. She was referred to Indiana-based human trafficking victim services in March 2019. The record does not clearly state when Scott allegedly was trafficked, but Scott reported having been in a relationship with her trafficker, who is the father of her child, from 2011 to 2018. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 199. She says he forced her into prostitution. Id. One of Scott's witnesses indicated Scott was being trafficked at the time Scott robbed Lindsey. Tr. Vol. II p. 50.
[6] In December 2019, Scott pleaded guilty to Level 3 felony robbery for the 2015 attack against Lindsey and to three counts of Level 5 felony fraud for the 2018 theft from her grandfather. In exchange for her plea, the State agreed to cap sentencing for the robbery and fraud counts at ten and four years, respectively. The State also dismissed the burglary, battery, and domestic battery counts against Scott, along with five counts of fraud. Scott agreed to complete any substance abuse programs recommended by the court. She was later jailed for failing to comply with a court order to attend her pre-sentencing investigation interview.
[7] In its sentencing order, the trial court found the following aggravators:
[8] The only mitigators in the trial court's sentencing order were Scott's acceptance of responsibility and guilty plea. Finding the aggravators far outweighed the mitigators, the trial court sentenced Scott to the maximum term under her plea agreement: fourteen years imprisonment. Scott now appeals her sentence.
[9] Scott argues the trial court abused its discretion for failing to include her history as a trafficking victim, her remorse, and her substance abuse issues as mitigators. She also argues that her sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of her crimes and her character. We find the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider Scott's victimization, but the error was harmless. Additionally, we find Scott's sentence was not inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).
[10] Sentencing is a discretionary function of the trial court, which we review only for an abuse of discretion.
Anglemyer v. State , 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007). A trial court abuses its discretion if the decision is "clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom." Id. (quoting K.S. v. State , 849 N.E.2d 538, 544 (Ind. 2006) ). To facilitate our review, the trial court must detail its rationale in a sentencing statement. Id. A trial court abuses its discretion by omitting from this statement mitigators clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration. Id. at 491. Scott bears the burden of showing "the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record." McElfresh v. State , 51 N.E.3d 103, 112 (Ind. 2016) (citing Anglemyer , 868 N.E.2d at 493 ).
[11] Turning first to Scott's claims that the trial court failed to consider her remorse and history of drug abuse as mitigating factors, we find no error. At sentencing, the trial court adequately addressed Scott's contrition, stating:
I finally got a picture of a somewhat contrite and remorseful Harmony. Absolutely no showing of remorse throughout the process.... All of a sudden it's come to you.... I didn't use it as an aggravator that you weren't remorse[ful] because I finally saw it today....
Tr. Vol. II p. 72. This observation supported the trial court's acceptance of Scott's plea deal, though the court indicated a longer sentence likely would have been appropriate. The court also adequately considered Scott's continued drug use, finding it to be an aggravator. A trial court does not abuse its discretion in considering a history of drug abuse to be an aggravator, rather than a mitigator. See, e.g. , Rose v. State , 810 N.E.2d 361, 366-67 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) ( ).
[12] Scott's history as a trafficking victim is another matter. Although trafficking is not listed as a mitigator in our criminal code, courts may consider factors beyond those enumerated by statute. Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1(c).Traumatic experiences are commonly included as mitigators. See , e.g. , Davis v. State , 971 N.E.2d 719, 724 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) ( ); Kilgore v. State , 720 N.E.2d 1155, 1156 (Ind. 1999) ( ); Merrill v. State , 716 N.E.2d 902 (Ind. 1999) ( ); Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1(b)(13) ( ).
[13] The record clearly supports Scott's assertion that she is a victim of human trafficking. Scott presented two witnesses who met her in their work with Indiana's statewide human trafficking task force, Indiana Protection for Abused and Trafficked Humans (IPATH). The U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Wisconsin referred Scott to these services and, with Scott's assistance, is prosecuting her trafficker. The pre-sentencing investigation report (PSI) also documents Scott's history of being trafficked. Appellant's App. Vol. II, pp. 194, 199, 201. The State did not contest any of this evidence.
[14] Scott's history as a trafficking victim is significant because it clearly coincided with her criminal prosecution. At the beginning of this case, it appears Scott was being trafficked; at the end, she was assisting in the prosecution of her trafficker. Representatives from IPATH testified extensively to the effects of these experiences on Scott, including nightmares, flashbacks, and trouble sleeping. Tr. Vol. II p. 23. Scott was also afraid of being alone, particularly after the Eastern District of Wisconsin failed to redact her address in a court filing in the trafficking case. Id. at 23, 37. One of the IPATH advocates stated that in "many, many, many, many incidences [Scott] was forced to do things that she did not want to do and did not have an option if she wanted to live ..." Id. at 42. When that advocate began to testify to how consistent exposure to trauma like trafficking can change the biology of the brain, the trial court cut her off, saying, Id. at 34-35.
[15] Perhaps the trial court disbelieved Scott's report of her own mental condition—an assessment we would not second-guess. See Pickens v. State , 767 N.E.2d 530, 535 (Ind. 2002) (). However, in refusing to consider trafficking a mitigating circumstance, the court effectively found that Scott experienced no trauma whatsoever. To support such a finding, the trial court would have to conclude either that Scott was never trafficked at all and had hoodwinked the IPATH advocates and federal prosecutors in Wisconsin or that her victimization had no traumatic effect. Tr. Vol. II p. 35. Both conclusions are clearly against the logic and effect of the facts before the court.
[16] At the very least, Scott's history of victimization was relevant to the aggravators the...
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