Scott v. State
| Decision Date | 26 March 2010 |
| Docket Number | CR–06–2233 |
| Citation | 262 So.3d 1239 |
| Parties | Willie Earl SCOTT v. STATE of Alabama |
| Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
262 So.3d 1239
Willie Earl SCOTT
v.
STATE of Alabama
CR–06–2233
Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama
March 26, 2010
Rehearing Denied June 11, 2010
John Edward Goodman, John Mark Goodman, and Michael F. Walker, Birmingham; and Thomas P. Hanrahan and Ellyce R. Cooper, Los Angeles, California, for appellant.
Troy King, atty. gen., and J. Clayton Crenshaw and Michael A. Nunnelley, asst. attys. gen., for appellee.
On Return to Remand *
MAIN, Judge.
Willie Earl Scott appeals the circuit court's summary dismissal of his Rule 32, Ala.R.Crim.P., petition for postconviction relief, challenging his capital-murder convictions for two counts of capital murder and his resulting sentence of death; and his convictions for first-degree rape, attempted murder, and first-degree burglary, and his resulting sentences of life imprisonment for each of those convictions.
On August 16, 2002, Scott was convicted of two counts of capital murder for killing 10–year–old Latonya Sager. The murder was made capital because it was committed during a rape, see § 13A–5–40(a)(3), Ala.Code 1975, and because the victim was under the age of 14, see § 13A–5–40(a)(15), Ala.Code 1975. Scott was also convicted, for events involving a different victim, of first-degree rape, attempted murder, and first-degree burglary. After a sentencing hearing, the jury recommended, by a vote of 10–2, that Scott be sentenced to death for his capital-murder convictions. The trial court accepted the jury's recommendation and sentenced Scott to death for his capital-murder convictions. The trial court also sentenced Scott to consecutive terms of life imprisonment for each of the noncapital convictions.
On direct appeal, this Court remanded the case for the trial court to correct a deficiency in the capital-sentencing order. On May 27, 2005, this Court affirmed Scott's capital-murder convictions and death sentence on return to remand. See Scott v. State, 937 So.2d 1065, 1088 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (opinion on return to remand). On September 16, 2005, this Court overruled Scott's application for rehearing. Scott petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for certiorari review, and on February 17, 2006, the Alabama Supreme Court denied Scott's petition for the writ of certiorari. Thereafter, Scott petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari review. On October 2, 2006, the United States Supreme Court denied Scott's petition for the writ of certiorari. See Scott v. Alabama, 549 U.S. 841, 127 S.Ct. 99, 166 L.Ed.2d 71 (2006).
On February 15, 2007, Scott, with the assistance of counsel, filed a Rule 32, Ala.R.Crim.P., petition in the Jefferson Circuit Court, asserting a number of claims. On May 11, 2007, Scott filed a motion seeking discovery of a number of documents, including records pertaining to himself, the victims, and assorted family members of the victims'; records pertaining to assorted physical evidence; and documents pertaining to the investigation of the offenses. On May 29, 2007, the State filed an answer to Scott's petition, challenging the claims
in Scott's petition on preclusionary, pleading, and evidentiary grounds. On July 20, 2007, the State and Scott filed a joint status update requesting that the circuit court advise the parties if the court wanted either party to provide any additional information; the pleading further indicated that the State anticipated filing a motion to dismiss the petition "later this year" and that Scott would respond to the motion to dismiss "soon thereafter." (C. 396.) On July 30, 2007, the circuit court issued a written order summarily denying Scott's petition on preclusionary, pleading, and evidentiary grounds. On August 10, 2007, Scott filed a motion to reconsider the summary denial of his petition and a motion objecting to the circuit court's essentially adopting the State's answer as its order denying the petition. On September 5, 2007, the circuit court denied Scott's motion to reconsider. Scott filed a timely notice of appeal on September 5, 2007, and this appeal followed.
Scott reargues most of the claims from his petition and challenges the propriety of the circuit court's summary denial on various procedural grounds.1
I.
Scott first argues that the circuit court erred in summarily denying his Rule 32 petition without granting, or even considering granting Scott leave to amend the petition.
A.
In Ex parte Rhone, 900 So.2d 455 (Ala.2004), the Alabama Supreme Court held that " ‘[a]mendments to pleadings may be permitted at any stage of the proceedings prior to the entry of judgment.’ " 900 So.2d at 457, quoting Rule 32.7(b), Ala.R.Crim.P.(first emphasis original; second emphasis added). However, nothing in Ex parte Rhone, its progeny, or the cases cited therein, imposes any duty on the circuit court to grant leave to amend a petition after the entry of a judgment on the petition. Here, Scott did not request leave to amend the petition until after the circuit court had entered its order summarily denying the petition. Thus, the circuit court's summary denial of the petition in this case does not conflict with the holding in Ex parte Rhone or the other legal authority cited in Scott's brief.
B.
Scott also opines that his amendment was filed after the judgment was entered because he logically waited to amend his petition until he received the discovery he requested. Scott challenges the circuit court's statement in its order denying his motion to reconsider the denial of his petition that "Scott was not entitled to any discovery." (C. 467.) Scott cites Ex parte Land, 775 So.2d 847 (Ala.2000), for the proposition that "[t]he right to seek discovery is not debatable." (Scott's brief at p. 14.) Although Scott is correct that a petitioner may seek discovery in postconviction proceedings, there is no absolute right to discovery. Rather, as the Alabama Supreme Court stated in Ex parte Land:
"We emphasize that this holding—that postconviction discovery motions
are to be judged by a good-cause standard—does not automatically allow discovery under Rule 32, Ala.R.Crim.P., and that it does not expand the discovery procedures within Rule 32.4. Accord [ State v.] Lewis, [656 So.2d 1248,] 1250 [ (Fla.1994) ], wherein the Florida Supreme Court stated that the good-cause standard did not affect Florida's rules relating to postconviction procedure, which are similar to ours. By adopting this standard, we are only recognizing that a trial court, upon a petitioner's showing of good cause, may exercise its inherent authority to order discovery in a proceeding for postconviction relief. In addition, we caution that postconviction discovery does not provide a petitioner with a right to ‘fish’ through official files and that it ‘is not a device for investigating possible claims, but a means of vindicating actual claims.’ People v. Gonzalez, 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1260, 800 P.2d 1159, 1206, 275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 776 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 835, 112 S.Ct. 117, 116 L.Ed.2d 85 (1991)."
775 So.2d at 852.2 Thus, as there is no right to discovery in postconviction proceedings, and, because Scott did not actually request leave to amend the petition or notify the circuit court that he wanted to amend the petition until after judgment was entered, Scott's argument that he was withholding his amendment pending discovery is not well-taken.
C.
Scott further asserts that the circuit court erred in summarily denying the petition when the State had not yet filed a motion to dismiss the petition.
Initially, we note that although the State's May 29, 2007, pleading was styled as an "answer" to the petition rather than a "motion to dismiss" the petition, the pleading clearly advocated and sought summary dismissal of the majority of Scott's claims.3 In any event, and without belaboring the point, Rule 32.7(d), Ala.R.Crim.P., clearly provides that "[i]f the court determines that the petition is not sufficiently specific, or is precluded, or fails to state a claim, or that no material issue of fact or law exists which would entitle the petitioner to relief .... the court may either dismiss the petition or grant leave to file an amended petition." There is no requirement that a circuit court even receive a response or a motion to dismiss from the State before summarily denying a Rule 32 petition. See Bishop v. State, 608 So.2d 345, 347–48 (Ala.1992) (holding that where a simple reading of a petition for postconviction relief shows that, assuming every allegation of the petition to be true, it is obviously without merit or is precluded, the circuit court may summarily dismiss that petition without requiring a response from the district attorney). Thus, for the reasons discussed more fully in Part III of this opinion, because Scott's claims were precluded, insufficiently pleaded or facially without merit, we do not find error in the timing of the circuit court's summary denial of the petition.
II.
Scott next challenges the circuit court's adoption of the State's answer as its order summarily denying his petition.
The wholesale adoption of orders proposed by the prevailing party is reviewed on a case-by-case basis and...
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