Scott v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.

• Citation: 86 F.Supp.3d 727
• Decision Date: 22 January 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. 13–13287.
• Parties: Kelly SCOTT, Plaintiff, v. STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY and Kevin Saulter, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

86 F.Supp.3d 727

Kelly SCOTT, Plaintiff

v.STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY and Kevin Saulter, Defendants.

Case No. 13–13287.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

Signed Jan. 22, 2015.

Todd J. Weglarz, Law Offices of Todd J. Weglarz, PLLC, Farmington Hills, MI, for Plaintiff.

Kenneth C. Newa, Plunkett & Cooney, Detroit, MI, Matthew G. Berard, Plunkett Cooney, P.C., Bloomfield Hills, MI, Jack J. Mazzara, Matthew D. Smith, Mazzara Law Firm, PLLC, Grosse Pointe Woods, MI, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

LINDA V. PARKER, District Judge.

This declaratory judgment action arises from a boating accident, in which Plaintiff Kelly Scott (“Scott”) was injured. At the time, Scott was riding a tube towed by a boat owned and operated by Defendant Kevin Saulter (“Saulter”). The accident occurred when the tube collided with a boat hoist. In her Complaint, Scott alleges that Defendant State Farm Fire & Casualty Company (“State Farm”) issued a Homeowners Policy and Boatowners Policy to Saulter, one or both of which provide coverage for the subject accident: State Farm Insurance Homeowners Policy No. 22–BJ–J–802–6 (“Homeowners Policy”) and State Farm Insurance Boatowners Policy No. 22–B–H–J–647–2 (“Boatowners Policy”). Scott seeks a declaration as to State Farm's duty to provide coverage and indemnify Saulter in an underlying action Scott has filed against Saulter in the Circuit Court for Oakland County, Michigan.

Presently before the Court is State Farm's motion for summary judgment, filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 on September 26, 2014. (ECF No. 29.) In the motion, State Farm asserts that there is no insurance coverage for the accident involving Scott under the plain and unambiguous language of either the Homeowners Policy or Boatowners Policy. Scott filed a response to State Farm's motion on November 12, 2014. (ECF No. 32.) Saulter filed a pleading on November 13, 2014, in which he states that he concurs in Scott's response except to the extent that she alleges Saulter was negligent in the water tubing accident. (ECF No. 33.) State Farm filed a reply to Scott's response brief on November 26, 2014. (ECF No. 35.) The Court concludes that oral argument will not aid in its disposition of State Farm's motion and therefore has dispensed with oral argument pursuant to Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(f). For the reasons that follow, the Court now grants State Farm's motion.

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The central inquiry is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). After adequate time for discovery and upon motion, Rule 56 mandates summary judgment against a party who fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The movant has the initial burden of showing “the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the movant meets this burden, the “nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To demonstrate a genuine issue, the nonmoving party must present sufficient evidence upon which a jury could reasonably find for that party; a “scintilla of evidence” is insufficient. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

“A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed” must designate specifically the materials in the record supporting the assertion, “including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).

The court must accept as true the non-movant's evidence and draw “all justifiable inferences” in the non-movant's favor. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

II. Scott's Procedural Objections to State Farm's Motion

As an initial matter, Scott asserts two procedural challenges to State Farm's summary judgment motion in her response to the motion. First, Scott contends that the filing of the motion without first seeking leave of court violates Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(b)(2). Second, Scott argues that the motion is premature because discovery has not been completed.

Local Rule 7.1(b)(2) provides that “[a] party must obtain leave of court to file more than one motion for summary judgment. For example, a challenge to several counts of a complaint generally must be in a single motion.” E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(b)(2). On January 31, 2014, State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Michigan law bars Scott's action against it. Specifically, State Farm contended that Michigan Compiled Laws Section 500.3030 bars this “direct action” by an injured third-party against the insurer of the alleged tortfeasor. State Farm had filed the motion at the direction of the Honorable Mark A. Goldsmith, who initially was assigned this lawsuit.¹ This Court subsequently denied the motion.

The Court believes that Judge Goldsmith's order to file the initial summary judgment motion constituted permission for State Farm to file more than one summary judgment motion.² In any event, to the extent there is any dispute with respect to this issue, the Court is granting nunc pro tunc State Farm's request in its reply brief for leave to file the pending summary judgment motion. (See State Farm's Reply at Pg ID 485 n. 4, ECF No. 35.)

With respect to Scott's contention that State Farm's motion is premature because discovery is not complete, there is no rule stating that a summary judgment motion may not be filed until all discovery has been conducted. In fact, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that “[u]nless a different time is set by local rule or the court orders otherwise, a party may file a motion for summary judgment at any time until 30 days after the close of all discovery.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b) (emphasis added). Rule 56 also sets forth the proper procedure for a non-movant to follow when it believes that the filing of a summary judgment motion before the close of discovery inhibits its ability to respond to the motion. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d). Notably, Scott does not contend that she cannot present facts essential to justify her opposition to State Farm's motion. In any event, she has not followed the procedures of Rule 56(d) for seeking a delay of the Court's consideration of State Farm's motion.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

In a recorded statement taken under oath on August 30, 2011, Saulter informed State Farm's representative that he purchased the boat involved in the boating accident, a 1991 SeaRay 170 speedboat (“SeaRay”), from a neighbor on June 28, 2011. (Scott's Resp., Ex. A at Pg ID 464, ECF No. 32–1; See also State Farm's Mot., Ex. C, ECF No. 29–6.) The SeaRay has a 170 horsepower motor. (Scott's Resp., Ex. A at Pg ID 463, ECF No. 32–1.) According to Saulter in the same recorded statement, after taking the boat out on the water for a test run, he removed it from the water and did not put it back in until July 9 or 10, 2011. (Id. at Pg ID 464.)

On July 31, 2011, Saulter was operating the SeaRay while pulling Scott and two other individuals on a three-man tube. (Id. at Pg ID 463, 465; Compl. ¶ 9, ECF No. 2.) While executing a turn, the tube struck a boat hoist. (Id. ) Scott suffered serious injuries as a result of the collision. (Id. )

The Boatowners Policy was in effect at the time of the accident. (Boatowners Policy Renewal Certificate, ECF No. 15–3 at Pg ID 130.) The Declarations describe a 1994 Crest boat and a 1994 Hoosier trailer. (Id. ) The Boatowners Policy provides coverage for the boat and trailer described in the Declarations, as well as “newly acquired watercraft.” (See id. §§ I, II.) As defined by the Boatowners Policy, to be considered “newly acquired watercraft”, a boat, motor or boat trailer

... must be newly acquired by you [i.e., “the named insured” or Saulter] and:

c. replace property insured by this policy; or

d. be additional property. On the date of its delivery to you we must insure all other boats and motors you own.

You must:

c. tell us about it within 30 days after it is delivered to you;

f. tell us which Boatowners Policy applies; and

g. pay any premium due.

(Id., Definitions ¶ 8.)

Saulter also was insured under the Homeowners Policy at the time of the accident. (Homeowners Policy Renewal Certificate, ECF No. 29–4 at Pg ID 364.) As relevant to State Farm's pending motion, the Homeowners Policy provides the following exclusion for “Coverage L” (i.e., personal liability) and “Coverage M” (i.e., medical payments):

e. bodily injury or property damage arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of:

...

(3) a watercraft:

(a) owned or rented to any insured if it has inboard or inboard-outdrive motor power of more than 50 horsepower; ...

(Id. § II(1)(e).)

On September 11, 2011, Scott filed a lawsuit against Saulter and the owner of the boat hoist, Kurt Doll, in the Circuit Court for Oakland County, Michigan (the “First Underlying Action”). (State Farm's Mot., Ex. A, ECF No. 29–2.) Saulter tendered the First Underlying Action to State Farm for defense and indemnity under the Boatowners Policy, only. By letter dated ...