Scott v. State
| Decision Date | 11 October 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 143,143 |
| Citation | 366 Md. 121,782 A.2d 862 |
| Parties | Aaron A. SCOTT v. STATE of Maryland. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Nancy S. Forster, Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, for appellant.
Gary E. Bair, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen. of Maryland, and Michelle W. Cole, Staff Atty., on brief), Baltimore, for appellee.
Argued Before BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, and BATTAGLIA, JJ.
Before us, for the first time, is the validity of a motel room search pursuant to a police technique called "knock and talk"— a technique that, in recent years, has become quite popular with police agencies around the country. The courts, on the whole, have sustained it. Petitioner, Aaron Scott, who, as a direct result of such a search, was convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and, as a repeat offender, sentenced to a prison term of 10 years without parole, raises two questions:
Our answer to both questions is "No," and we shall therefore affirm the Circuit Court judgment.
On May 19, 2000, Scott and his girlfriend, Antonia Hampton, rented Room 237 at the Regal Inn Motel, on Pulaski Highway (U.S. Route 40) in Baltimore County. Scott claimed it was just a night out with his girlfriend. He took to the room with him, however, some marijuana and a shoe box containing six pieces of crack cocaine, 63 vials of cocaine, 924 vial caps, 491 vials, an electronic scale, a razor blade, 178 ziploc baggies, and a box of sandwich bags. The shoe box was placed in a dresser drawer.
Just after 11:30 that evening, Detective Schwanke, accompanied by five or six other police officers, visited the motel. They had no warrant. Nor did they have probable cause to believe, or even a reasonable articulable suspicion, that there was any illegal activity at the time anywhere at the motel, including in Room 237. Schwanke said that the police had received a lot of complaints about prostitution, drug use, and drug distribution in the area and that the Regal Inn Motel, in particular, was known by detectives to be frequented by drug sellers and users. They "routinely" visited motels along that part of Route 40 after 11:00 in the evening, where they would knock on doors, identify themselves as police officers, advise any occupants of the problems plaguing the area, ask if they could enter the room to speak to the occupants, and then question them about whether they had any contraband or knew of any unlawful activity. Schwanke said that he had conducted that kind of operation between 50 and 100 times at the Regal Inn Motel.
When the officers arrived at the motel on May 19, they apparently split into two teams, Schwanke and two or three other officers taking one row of rooms and the other team taking another. At 11:37 p.m., Schwanke knocked on the door to Room 237. He did not know who, if anyone, was in the room, as he had not checked the register or talked to any motel employee. The officers were in casual plain clothes, with their police badges displayed and their holstered handguns visible. There was some dispute, not particularly relevant, as to whether there were four, or only three, officers in Schwanke's group.
Schwanke said that he knocked on the door, that Scott opened the door, that Schwanke explained the problems plaguing the Route 40 area, and that he asked "if we could come in and talk to him." Schwanke continued that Scott "invited us in the room," that he said "come on in." Schwanke described the room as being about 10 feet by 12 feet, that it contained a double bed, a chest of drawers, an end table next to the bed, and a round card table, and that there was a bathroom off to the side. As soon as he entered, Schwanke detected the odor of burning marijuana. He also saw Ms. Hampton on the bed but could not recall how she, or Scott, was dressed. Notwithstanding his immediate detection of the burning marijuana, Schwanke said that he advised Scott and Hampton of the problems in the area and asked whether they knew of any illegal activity and whether they had any drugs or weapons in their possession. When they responded in the negative, Schwanke asked for permission to search the room, to which Scott said "go ahead." Schwanke said that, in addition to his olfactory perceptions, he had visually observed contraband in the room—a partially-smoked marijuana cigar in the ashtray.
At some point, apparently prior to the search, Ms. Hampton informed Schwanke that there were, indeed, other drugs in the room, and she retrieved another marijuana cigar. In response to the consent given by Scott, the police searched the room and recovered the shoe box containing the cocaine and paraphernalia from one of the dresser drawers. At that point, Scott and Hampton were placed under arrest. According to Schwanke, the total time that elapsed between the knock on the door and discovery of the box was two to three minutes. Schwanke could not recall whether, prior to discovery of the contraband, he ever asked Scott his name or requested any identification. In a subsequent interrogation at the police station, Scott admitted that the contraband was his and did not belong to Ms. Hampton.
Detective Schwanke confirmed that there was no peep hole in the door although Scott could have observed the officers by looking through the window to the room. He said that, prior to Scott's opening the door, he merely identified himself as a police officer and did not inform Scott of the purpose of his visit. He acknowledged as well that he never informed Scott that Scott had a right to refuse entry, that he did not have to open the door, that he did not have to talk to Schwanke, and that Schwanke had no legal basis for entering the room absent Scott's consent. Once in the room, and having received permission to look through it, Schwanke never asked for specific permission to search the drawers or open the shoe box.
Scott had a different version of what occurred. He said that the room was equipped with a hot tub and a television set, both of which were running when Detective Schwanke knocked on the door. Even with that background noise, the knock, he said was loud enough "to scare me and made me jump up and go straight to the door."1 He heard Schwanke identify himself as police, whereupon Scott "cracked" the door and observed four officers. Scott was in his underwear and Ms. Hampton was either on or in the bed naked. Scott testified:
While Detective Schwanke spoke briefly with Scott, another officer went directly to the bathroom, opened that door and looked around, and then looked at the table containing the marijuana cigar. Scott said that he never told the officers that they could come in and search the room. When asked why he opened the door, he said that He added that he had to step back because there was no other way that he could open the door and that he did not try to stop the officers: Scott said that, had the visitors not been police, he would not have opened the door.
On this evidence, Scott moved to suppress the items seized, arguing that, even if the testimony of Detective Schwanke was credited, the search and seizure were unlawful—that the entry into the room was unlawful and that there was no valid consent. The court concluded, and the State does not contest, that, absent consent, the police had no authority to enter the room—that even the smell of the burning marijuana detected upon the opening of the door did not authorize a warrantless entry. The court found no Constitutional violation in the knocking itself and determined that "the police asked for permission to talk with the Defendant and asked for permission to enter the room, and that permission was given." It stated:
The court continued that the consent extended to the opening of the shoe box: "[I]f they are looking for drugs, drug paraphernalia, they can open shoe boxes."
Scott views what occurred at the motel as a dual violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment and Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. He contends first that the very...
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