Scott v. State

Citation2021 VT 39
Decision Date28 May 2021
Docket NumberNo. 2020-207,2020-207
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Vermont
PartiesEarl Scott v. State of Vermont

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions by email at: JUD.Reporter@vermont.gov or by mail at: Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801, of any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.

On Appeal from Superior Court, Washington Unit, Civil Division

Timothy B. Tomasi, J.

David C. Sleigh of Sleigh Law, St. Johnsbury, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Thomas J. Donovan, Jr., Attorney General, and Philip Back, Assistant Attorney General, Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellee.

PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Robinson, Eaton, Carroll and Cohen, JJ.

¶ 1. EATON, J. Earl Scott appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the State of Vermont concerning his claim for compensation under the Vermont Innocence Protection Act (VIPA). We affirm.

¶ 2. The following facts are undisputed for summary-judgment purposes. In April 2010, Scott was charged with two counts of sexual assault against a person under the age of sixteen. Scott was twenty-two at the time the charges were filed. The offenses were alleged to have occurred "sometime during 2003 or 2004." Subsequently, Scott pleaded guilty to an amended charge of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child and was sentenced to two to five years' incarceration. He began serving his sentence in January 2012.

¶ 3. While in custody under sentence, Scott brought a claim for post-conviction relief (PCR) in civil court. The claim was later amended to assert that the plea colloquy did not comply with the requirements of Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 11(f) and that his criminal counsel was ineffective on several other grounds. While the PCR claim was pending, Scott reached his maximum sentence date and was released in March 2016.

¶ 4. In May 2016, the State conceded that Scott's plea colloquy did not comply with Rule 11 and that his conviction should be vacated, resulting in the remand of the prosecution to the criminal division. Scott's counsel submitted a proposed order vacating the criminal conviction on June 22, 2016, providing Scott with a copy.

¶ 5. Also, while the PCR claim was pending, Scott learned that he had not been given proper credit for good time and had therefore served time beyond his actual maximum release date. He made a claim seeking compensation for the time he remained in jail beyond that point. On July 12, 2016, with knowledge that his criminal conviction was going to be vacated, Scott signed a general release of claims against the State in exchange for $40,000.

¶ 6. The general release stated, in pertinent part:

GENERAL RELEASE

For and in consideration of the sum of Forty Thousand and No/100 DOLLARS ($40,000), lawful money of the United States, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the undersigned Earl Scott, Jr. ("Releasor") does for himself, his representatives, executors, guardians, administrators, successors, and assigns, hereby release and forever discharge the STATE OF VERMONT, along with its agencies, departments and political subdivisions ("Releasees"), and their employees, officers, directors, agents, adjusters, insurers, attorneys, contractors, representatives, administrators, successors and assigns, of and from any and all manner of action and actions, cause and causes of action, suits, damages, judgments, executions, claims for any and all personal injuries, pain and suffering, property damage, medical payments, civil rights violations, and demands whatsoever, in law or in equity, including any claims for attorneys' fees or costs, and any and all liens which Releasor had, now has or which hereafter he and/or his heirs, representatives, executors, insurers, administrators, successors, and assigns can, shall, or may have against Releaseesand their employees, officers, directors, agents, adjusters, insurers, attorneys, contractors, representatives, administrators, successors and assigns for, upon, or by reason of any matter, cause or thing whatsoever, from the beginning of the world up to the date of execution of this document, and particularly, but without in any manner limiting the foregoing, on account of all issues and claims for relief that could have been raised based on his term of incarceration commencing on January 5, 2012, and terminating on March 23, 2016, resulting from his conviction in the matter entitled State v. Earl Scott, Docket No. 182-4-10 Oscr. By this agreement, Releasor further extinguishes any unknown, undiscovered, and undiscoverable claims on behalf of himself or his successors, heirs, representatives or assigns, and all persons who could in any way be subjected to these claims, including principals, members, employees, agents, officers, shareholders and insurers.

¶ 7. Pursuant to the unopposed motion, the civil division vacated Scott's conviction. The matter was returned to the criminal division, where the State ultimately dismissed the charge.

¶ 8. Scott filed the instant action on August 30, 2018, seeking recovery from the State under the VIPA. That statute provides that "[a] person convicted and imprisoned for a crime of which the person was exonerated . . . shall have a cause of action for damages against the State." 13 V.S.A. § 5572(a). Scott argued that as he was not yet sixteen at the time of the conduct giving rise to the charges, his actions could not have been a crime because the criminal division did not have jurisdiction under the statutory scheme then in place. See In re D.K., 2012 VT 23, ¶ 13, 191 Vt. 328, 47 A.3d 347 ("[W]hether an individual is deemed to be a child subject to the jurisdiction of the family division depends on the offender's age at the time the delinquent act was committed, not at the time that the offender was charged.").

¶ 9. The State moved for summary judgment, arguing that the general release barred Scott's claim. And even if it did not, the State contended, he was not entitled to relief because he did not meet two preconditions to recovery under the VIPA: he was not "actually innocent," see 13 V.S.A. § 5574(a)(3) (requiring claimant to establish he "is actually innocent of the felony or felonies that are the basis for the claim"), and he either fabricated evidence or committed perjury during proceedings related to the charged offense, see id. § 5574(a)(4) (requiring claimant toestablish he did not fabricate evidence or commit or suborn perjury during proceedings related to crime as condition of judgment). In ruling on the motion, the court held that the language of the release was unambiguous, and that it plainly operated to preclude Scott's claim. The court also determined that, even setting aside the general release, plaintiff's action could not proceed because he did not meet the VIPA's actual-innocence requirement. It did not reach the State's alternative argument that plaintiff had either fabricated evidence or perjured himself, otherwise defeating his VIPA claim.

¶ 10. Scott appeals, arguing that the terms of the general release do not preclude his VIPA claim, or, in the alternative, public-policy principles void the release. He maintains that he is entitled to recovery under the VIPA because he can demonstrate actual innocence and did not fabricate evidence or commit perjury during related proceedings.

¶ 11. We review a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo, applying the identical standard. Pettersen v. Monaghan Safar Ducham PLLC, 2021 VT 16, ¶ 9, ___ Vt. ___, ___ A.3d ___. Under this familiar metric, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment upon a showing that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and that judgment is appropriate as a matter of law. V.R.C.P. 56(a). Here, the material facts are not at issue for purposes of the summary-judgment motion; rather, the questions posed in this case turn on matters of law—interpretation of both the general release and the provisions of the VIPA.

¶ 12. A release is interpreted, like all contracts, with the goal of effectuating the parties' intent. N. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Mitec Elecs., Ltd., 2008 VT 96, ¶ 20, 184 Vt 303, 965 A.2d 447; Economou v. Economou, 136 Vt. 611, 619, 399 A.2d 496, 500 (1979). When the language of a release is clear, we presume it reflects that intent. N. Sec. Ins. Co., 2008 VT 96, ¶ 20. Releases must be specific to be valid, and as a general matter are interpreted narrowly. Id. Where the language is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence—also called "parol evidence"—may be brought to bear in interpreting it. Isbrandtsen v. N. Branch Corp., 150 Vt. 575, 577-78, 556 A.2d 81, 83-84 (1988).

¶ 13. A similar principle governs our interpretation of statutes: our purpose is to discern and give effect to the Legislature's intent, and where a provision is clear, we assume it reflects that intent. Northfield Sch. Bd. v. Washington S. Educ. Ass'n, 2019 VT 26, ¶ 13, 210 Vt. 15, 210 A.3d 460. Only where a statute's language is ambiguous will we invoke canons of statutory interpretation to aid in determining legislative intent. Id.

¶ 14. Scott maintains that the general release either does not or should not bar his claim for several reasons. First, he contends that, read narrowly and in context, the release does not encompass the instant cause of action. On this point, he also suggests that the intent underlying the release is better understood with reference to extrinsic evidence of the circumstances surrounding its execution. Alternatively, Scott argues that the release is void as a matter of public policy: first, because manifest injustice would arise from barring a claim which had yet to accrue at the time the release was executed; and second, because he was neither given written notice of the potential for a claim under the VIPA prior to the vacatur of his...

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3 cases
  • State v. George
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • May 6, 2022
    ... ... (quotation omitted). "The parties are entitled to rely ... upon the express terms of the agreement." State v ... Johnstone , 2013 VT 57, ¶ 11, 194 Vt. 230, 75 A.3d ... 642. Therefore, when the language of a contract is clear, it ... shall be interpreted as written. Scott v. State , ... 2021 VT 39, ¶ 12, __Vt.__, 256 A.3d 105. The meaning of ... the proffer agreement is a question of law reviewed de novo ... Melvin , 730 F.3d at 37 ...          ¶ ... 17. We begin by looking at the text of the written proffer ... agreement. City of Newport v ... ...
  • Pieciak v. Crowe LLP
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Vermont
    • October 17, 2022
    ...be denied on other grounds, the court declines to address whether the exculpatory clause is void as a matter of public policy. See Scott v. State, 2021 VT 39, ¶ 256 A.3d 105, 114 (“[T]he power to declare a contract void because it violates public policy is a very delicate and undefined powe......
  • Human Rights Def. Ctr. v. Correct Care Sols.
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • September 3, 2021
    ... ... Lia ... Ernst and James Diaz, ACLU Foundation of Vermont, Montpelier, ... for Amici Curiae Secretary of State James Condos, Auditor ... Doug Hoffer, Prisoners' Rights Office, New England First ... Amendment Association, and the American Civil ... that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and ... judgment is appropriate as a matter of law. Scott v ... State , 2021 VT 39, ¶ 11, __Vt.__, __A.3d__; see ... also V.R.C.P. 56(a). The only issue presented in this case is ... a ... ...

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