Scott v. Superior Court

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: WOODS
• Citation: Scott v. Superior Court, 202 Cal.Rptr. 920, 156 Cal.App.3d 577 (Cal. App. 1984)
• Decision Date: 30 May 1984
• Docket Number: No. B003176,B003176
• Parties: Donald R. SCOTT, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the County of Los Angeles, Respondent, Denise SCOTT, an incompetent person, by Roslyn SCOTT, Guardian ad Litem, Real Party in Interest.

Page 920

202 Cal.Rptr. 920

156 Cal.App.3d 577

Donald R. SCOTT, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the County of Los Angeles, Respondent Denise SCOTT, an incompetent person, by Roslyn SCOTT, Guardian ad Litem, Real Party in Interest.

No. B003176.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.

May 30, 1984.

Overton, Lyman & Prince, George M. Lindahl, Los Angeles, and Gary L. Sperling, Sepulveda, for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

Marvin M. Mitchelson and Sharon G. Webster, Los Angeles, for real party in interest.

WOODS, Presiding Justice.

By petition for writ of mandate, a California resident sued for support by his adult daughter who is a New York resident, seeks to vacate a trial court order denying his motion for summary judgment. The motion was based upon the contention that the law of New York, which does not recognize the claimed support obligation, should apply.

The issue of first impression presented is whether choice of law principles require application of California law, which recognizes a parental obligation to support dependent adult children, or application of New York law, which negates such obligation for resident parents.

The material facts are simple and not disputed. Defendant is a California resident and is the natural father of plaintiff. Plaintiff is the 28-year-old daughter of defendant and is now, and has been for at least one year prior to commencement of the action, a resident of New York. Plaintiff's action commenced in respondent court in February, 1982, alleges that her mental disability renders her unable to work to support herself, and that she is thus financially "in need" within the meaning of section 206 of the Civil Code.

Defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that under California's "governmental interest approach" to choice of law questions, New York is the only state having a true interest in the application of its law. Defendant asserts that the only material facts for purposes of this motion are the states of residence of the parties.

Plaintiff's opposition to the motion contends that defendant's conclusions under the California governmental interests analysis are incorrect. Specifically, plaintiff contends that this case presents a "false conflict" where New York has no interest in seeing its law applied and California has either a minimal interest or no interest. She contends that California law should apply.

Plaintiff submitted the declaration of a New York psychiatrist, Michael Kenin, M.D., which states that he has treated plaintiff since 1974, and that she suffers from a mental disability which renders her "extremely disturbed" and unable to "function independently." In his opinion, plaintiff's condition will remain "extremely guarded" under the treatments now affordable by her but "might change for the better" if she is able to afford long term hospitalization and more costly intensive individual psychotherapy.

After hearing argument, respondent denied defendant's motion. Respondent determined that section 206 of the California Civil Code evidenced a strong state interest in preventing adult children from becoming public charges and in promoting "familial responsibilities and hence strengthen[ing] the family unit." It found that New York's refusal to impose a similar support obligation on its resident parents does not mean New York has an interest in denying support to a dependent adult child residing there when support could be available from a source other than a New York resident parent or the state of New York itself.

I

The procedure employed by California courts to resolve a "choice of law" question under the governmental interest approach is as follows: (1) determine whether the law of the two or more states involved is different on the subject at hand; (2) determine whether each of the states has a legitimate interest in the application of its own law and policy which results in a true conflict or whether the apparent conflict is false because only one state has such an interest; and (3) if more than one state has such an interest, ascertain the potential "comparative impairment" to the competing interests (i.e., which state's interest would be most frustrated by application of the law of the other state and which state's interest shows a greater "comparative pertinence" to the action). (Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 157, 166, 148 Cal.Rptr. 867, 583 P.2d 721; Hurtado v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 574, 579-582, 114 Cal.Rptr. 106, 522 P.2d 666; Reich v. Purcell (1967) 67 Cal.2d 551, 553-556, 63 Cal.Rptr. 31, 432 P.2d 727.)

In the underlying action, it is apparent that California and New York law are squarely in conflict as to whether resident parents should be legally obligated to support their needy adult children.

California Civil Code section 206 has, in relevant part, provided in substance since 1872: "Parents and children; reciprocal duty of support; ... [p] It is the duty of the father, the mother, and the children of any person in need who is unable to maintain himself by work, to maintain such person to the extent of their ability." (Paxton v. Paxton (1907) 150 Cal. 667, 669, 89 P. 1083; Woolams v. Woolams (1952) 115 Cal.App.2d 1, 6, 251 P.2d 392; Bryant v. Swoap (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 431, 438, 121 Cal.Rptr. 867.)

In direct contrast to California law, New York Social Welfare Law section 101 has provided since 1966 that:

" '1. The spouse or parent of a recipient of public assistance or care or of a person liable to become in need thereof shall, if of sufficient ability, be responsible for the support of such person, provided that a parent shall be responsible only for the support of a minor child.' " (Jones v. Jones (1966) 273 N.Y.S.2d 661, 665, 51 Misc.2d 610.) (Emphasis in original.)

New York Domestic Relations Law, section 32 provides a similar support obligation making "[p]arents liable for support of their child or children under 21 years of age" whether the parent and child reside within the same state or reside in different states having similar or reciprocal support laws.

Prior to 1966 dependent adult children had been entitled under New York law to support from financially able New York resident parents irrespective of where the child resided. (See Dabbs v. Burrell (1967) 278 N.Y.S.2d 436, 53 Misc.2d 349.)

The state interest of New York underlying the 1966 amendment to its Social Welfare law, section 101 (and by analogy the 1967 conforming amendment to its Domestic Relations law, section 32) is suggested by the comments of the proponent of that amendment. In Jones v. Jones, supra, 273 N.Y.S.2d 661, 51 Misc.2d 610, it was observed: "[E]limination of responsibility of parents for an adult child who is disabled was clearly intended as a matter of public policy. Governor Rockefeller in asking for the enactment of the law [citation] stated: [p] '... The legislation I have submitted ... limits the class of relatives responsible for such support by eliminating the financial responsibility of a parent for an adult child who is blind or disabled.... [p] 'These far reaching limitations on the financial responsibility of relatives for support of the needy will lift an often heavy burden on those obligated to pay for assistance under existing State laws. Experience has shown that the financial responsibility of a broad class of relatives, imposed by statute, is more often a destructive, rather than cohesive, factor in family unity....' " (273 N.Y.S.2d at p. 666.) (See also Dabbs v. Burrell, supra, 278 N.Y.S.2d 436, 53 Misc.2d 349.)

The ostensible purposes behind limiting parental legal support obligations to children under 21 years of age are thus two-fold: primarily, to protect resident New York parents from financial burden, and, secondarily, to obtain an expected derivative benefit to family unity.

Both of New York's avowed interests in negating the obligation to support needy adult children are essentially local in nature. The interest in financial protection of New York resident parents is necessarily exclusively local. (Cf. Hurtado v. Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.3d at pp. 581-586, 114 Cal.Rptr. 106, 522 P.2d 666.) However, the intensity of the interest in avoiding family disunity appears to diminish where the child is the only family member residing in New York.

Although plaintiff contends and respondent determined that New York has no interest in denying its resident needy adult children parental support where New York parents are not involved, this reasoning ignores the fact that at least the proponent of the New York law has mentioned a secondary purpose underlying negation of the support obligation. This second purpose, as pointed out above, is attenuated but not entirely negated by the absence of a New York parent.

The primary state interest underlying California's statutory imposition of a reciprocal support obligation benefiting needy adult children and needy parents has long been identified in case law in the context of needy parents. "The main purpose of the statutes seems to be to protect the public from the burden of supporting poor people who have children able to support them." (Emphasis added.) (Duffy v. Yordi (1906) 149 Cal. 140, 142, 84 P. 838; Swoap v. Superior Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 490, 503, 111 Cal.Rptr. 136, 516 P.2d 840; Radich v. Kruly (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 683, 686, 38 Cal.Rptr. 340.) This same "main purpose" has also been recognized in the context of needy adult children "... to protect the public from the burden of supporting a person who has a parent able to support her." (Woolams v. Woolams, supra, 115 Cal.App.2d at p. 6, 251 P.2d 392; Bryant v. Swoap, supra, 48 Cal.App.3d at p. 438, 121 Cal.Rptr. 867.)

As to the interest of California in application of its support law to this action, the "main purpose" of relieving the state of the burden of support when the needy adult child has financially capable parents will not...