Scott v. United States, 11432

• Citation: 91 US App. DC 232,202 F.2d 354
• Decision Date: 07 August 1952
• Docket Number: 11434 and 11435.,No. 11432,11433,11432
• Parties: SCOTT v. UNITED STATES. JONES v. UNITED STATES. JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES. BAYNE v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

91 US App. DC 232, 202 F.2d 354 (1952)

SCOTT v. UNITED STATES.

JONES v. UNITED STATES.

JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES.

BAYNE v. UNITED STATES.

Nos. 11432, 11433, 11434 and 11435.

United States Court of Appeals. District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued July 3, 1952.

Decided August 7, 1952.

Writ of Certiorari Denied November 10, 1952.

William E. Owen and Earl H. Davis, Washington, D. C., for appellants.

William J. Peck, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., with whom Charles M. Irelan, U. S. Atty., and Frederick C. Smithson, Grace B. Stiles, Joseph M. Howard and William E. Kirk, Jr., Asst. U. S. Attys., Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee.

Before PRETTYMAN, PROCTOR and BAZELON, Circuit Judges.

Writ of Certiorari Denied November 10, 1952. See 73 S.Ct. 176.

PER CURIAM.

When appellants were first brought to trial on the indictment involved here, the court, sua sponte, declared a mistrial. Upon the retrial which is under review here, appellants claimed that the first trial constituted former jeopardy and moved to be discharged. The trial judge denied this motion, and the correctness of his ruling is the sole issue presented by this appeal.

Briefly, these are the circumstances which are said to constitute former jeopardy. At the first trial appellants Scott, Jones and Johnson, hereinafter referred to as the three appellants, were represented by one counsel. Appellant Bayne was represented by separate counsel. After the jury had been impaneled, counsel for the three appellants obtained the admission of an associate pro hac vice to render "passive assistance to him at the counsel table" in the defense of the three appellants. When the court convened the following day, the trial judge announced, out of the hearing of the jury, that he had erred in admitting this associate.¹ After lengthy discussion with counsel for the three appellants, the trial judge permitted the associate to withdraw from the case and indicated a willingness to declare a mistrial. Counsel, however, declined to request one. In further colloquy the court elicited from counsel for the three appellants the statement that his clients would be "put to disadvantage" and that the withdrawal of assisting counsel "is definite to reflect a certain amount of prejudice." The court concluded therefrom that a declaration of mistrial was essential in the interests of justice and ordered a mistrial sua sponte.

We are in agreement in respect to the three appellants, Scott, Jones and Johnson. The principles first enunciated in United States v. Perez,² and most recently applied by the Supreme Court in Wade v. Hunter,³ are applicable. On that basis we cannot find that the trial judge abused his discretion in declaring a mistrial as to them. In the Perez case the Supreme Court said:

"* * * the law has invested courts of justice with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. They are to exercise a sound discretion on the subject; and it is impossible to define all the circumstances which would render it proper to interfere. To be sure, the power ought to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes; * * *"⁴

In Wade v. Hunter the Court said:

"When justice requires that a particular trial be discontinued is a question that should be decided by persons conversant with factors relevant to the determination. * * *

"The rule announced in the Perez case has been the basis for all later decisions of this Court on double jeopardy. It attempts to lay down no rigid formula. Under the rule a trial can be discontinued when particular circumstances manifest a necessity for so doing, and when failure to discontinue would defeat the ends of justice."⁵

The plea of former jeopardy in the subsequent trial under review here must fail.

With respect to Bayne we are not in agreement, but a majority of the court are of opinion that the judgment as to him should be affirmed. It is true that the circumstances which gave rise to the mistrial revolved about the other three defendants. But the trial which had begun was one trial — a joint trial of four people. To be sure, the judge might then have made a severance. He did not do so; he was not asked to do so. He exercised his discretion and declared the whole trial a mistrial. It is said that he did not consider separately the situation as to Bayne. But there is nothing in the record to indicate that he did not do so, and we cannot assume that he did not. He certainly knew that four defendants were before him; he knew that the circumstances which gave rise to the mistrial did not concern Bayne; and he knew that he declared the whole trial off, not just three-fourths of it. In short, he must have acted consciously with respect to Bayne in the light of the action required in respect to the other three. As the matter stood at that moment, no one could tell whether continuance of the trial of Bayne alone would prejudice him or not; the jury knew that there were four defendants — why were three dismissed and this one left? The judge's disposition of the problem was within his permitted discretion.

In oral argument appellant says that...