Scott v. United States

• Decision Date: 03 June 1947
• Docket Number: No. 10387.,10387.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
• Parties: SCOTT et al. v. UNITED STATES.

161 F.2d 1009 (1947)

SCOTT et al. v. UNITED STATES.

No. 10387.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

June 3, 1947.

Lewis S. Pope, of Nashville, Tenn. (Lewis S. Pope, of Nashville, Tenn., and J. H. Reneau, Sr. and J. H. Reneau, Jr., both of Celina, Tenn., on the brief), for appellants.

Alvin O. West, of Washington, D. C. (David L. Bazelon, of Washington, D. C., Horace Frierson and S. E. Wasson, both of Nashville, Tenn., Keith Bohanon, of Cookeville, Tenn., Roger P. Marquis and Alvin O. West, both of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellee.

Before SIMONS, ALLEN and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.

MARTIN, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered on a directed verdict in a land condemnation case, in which the United States of America is plaintiff. The jury was instructed to return a verdict for $10,688, being the amount specified in an option contract executed by appellants F. A. Scott and Geneva Scott, on November 26, 1942. The owner of the land, F. A. Scott, who could neither read nor write, executed the option agreement by affixing his mark thereto. Geneva Scott, in her capacity as his wife, joined in the option by signing her name to it.

The agreement provided that, in the event the United States determined to acquire the land by eminent domain or judicial proceedings, the vendor would cooperate to the end of expediting such proceedings; and that the amount stated in the option would be the award to be decreed for the taking of the property.

On December 17, 1942, the United States filed eminent domain proceedings under specified Acts of Congress to condemn more than 6,000 acres of land in Clay County, Tennessee, as a part of an authorized flood-control project. Included in the land sought to be condemned was the farm of 203.3 acres, more or less, belonging to appellant, F. A. Scott. The condemnation petition prayed for a trial by jury, as provided by Chapter 252 of the Acts of Tennessee for 1937. It is not Chapter 252, but is Chapter 262 of the Acts of 1937, however, which provides for a jury trial in land condemnation cases. See Williams' Tennessee Code of 1934, section 3171.5. The petition made no mention of any option agreement pertaining to the land described.

In their original answer, appellants admitted the right of the government to condemn the land, provided they received just compensation for its taking. They denied that the amount deposited in the registry of the court constituted just compensation for the fair and reasonable value of the property. They waived a jury of view, and demanded a trial by jury.

In an amendment to their answer, appellants asserted that the tract of land owned by Scott is divided into two parts of approximately equal acreage "cut apart by a road practically in the middle," one-half being known as the Wolf River side and the other as the Obey River side. The amended answer stated that, a short time before the execution of the option, a man came to appellants' home and asked Mr. Scott what he would take for the land being condemned by the United States and received the reply that appellant did not know, but that shortly before he had been offered $10,500 for the half of the land on the Wolf River side and that he thought the other side was worth fully as much. The man then asked him "whether or not he would take that for it and settle it;" and appellant replied that he would. Soon thereafter, the same man, or some other person representing the government, brought the option agreement to him and told him that it covered only the Wolf River side.

The answer averred that the paper was not read to appellant; that Scott can neither read nor write; that he had confidence in the man, even though a stranger, because he represented the United States Government; and that Scott authorized his mark to be made to the paper with the clear and positive understanding that it covered only the Wolf River side of his farm.

It was further averred that the two tracts of the Scott farm are worth considerably more than $20,000; that Scott paid $15,000 for the land more than 20 years ago; that he has added buildings and improvements and repaired other buildings; that he has farmed the land in such manner as to improve it; and that the tracts are considerably more available than when he bought them.

It was pleaded in the answer, moreover, that the option contract was procured either by error, mistake, or misunderstanding on the part of appellant, or from fraud practiced by the representative of the United States Government.

When the case came on for trial, a continuance for the term was granted on motion of the United States. Before the trial appellants presented a second amendment to their answer, averring that when they learned for the first time in December, 1942, that the government was claiming that the option covered the whole of the farm, they gave first, oral notice and, later, on January 12, 1943, notice in writing that under the facts and circumstances surrounding the procurement of the option on the property they deemed it null and void and would not execute a deed to the United States for the consideration stated in the option. The district court erroneously declined, in our judgment, to permit this amendment.

The case came on for trial on June 13, 1946; and both sides introduced the testimony of several witnesses. The option agreement was offered by the government and received in evidence. We do not intend to review the evidence in the case, but will limit discussion of the facts merely to pointing out the substantial evidence upon which the plaintiffs, now appellants, were entitled to have their case submitted to the jury.

The testimony of both appellants, F. A. Scott and his wife, Geneva Scott, directly contradicted the testimony of J. B. Pierce, the only witness offered by the government as to the execution of the option agreement. Mrs. Scott testified that Pierce neither read nor offered to read that document to them; but that he explained that the option which they were signing was for half of the farm and that "there would be another man there the next week with another option to sign for the other half of it." She swore, also, that this statement was made in the presence of her husband; and that Pierce said, further, that the buildings would be reserved from the option which they signed.

The testimony of the government witness, Pierce, was also contradicted by appellant, who said that...