Scott v. United States
| Decision Date | 19 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:18-CV-00629-NJR |
| Parties | CRAIG SCOTT, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and PROTESTANT MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC. D/B/A MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, Defendants. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Third-Party Plaintiff, v. OLGA RUDOMIOTOV, M.D.; HANS H. MOOSA, M.D.; and PROTESTANT MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC., D/B/A MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, Third-Party Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
Pending before the court are motions to dismiss the Government's third-party complaint for contribution on behalf of the U.S. Air Force ("USAF," and such complaint hereinafter "USAF Action") by Defendant Protestant Memorial Medical Center ("Memorial") (Doc. 85), Third-Party Defendant Hans Moosa ("Moosa") (Doc. 87), and Third-Party Defendant Olga Rudomiotov ("Rudomiotov") (Doc. 90). Further pending are motions to dismiss the Government's third-party complaint for contribution on behalf of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS," and such complaint hereinafter "HHS Action") by Rudomiotov (Doc. 111), Memorial (Doc. 116), and Moosa (Doc. 120). The Government has further moved to strike certain reply briefs relating to the motions to dismiss the USAF Action (Doc. 110). For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies all of the pending motions.
This case involves a number of actions and cross-claims, which together stem from allegedly negligent treatment received by Plaintiff Craig Scott from several medical providers during and following his visit to the emergency room at Memorial in March 2015. Scott went to the emergency department at Protestant Memorial Medical Center ("Memorial") with a complaint of lower right extremity pain and underwent testing (Doc. 10 at 1). Medical records were sent by the hospital to Scott's primary care provider, Erynn Elleby, M.D. (Id. at 2). Elleby was at that time affiliated with the Belleville Family Health Center ("Belleville Center"), a clinic operated by Southern Illinois Health Care Foundation ("SIHC"), which is a federally qualified health center (Doc. 38 at 2). Unfortunately, the fax was in fact sent to a number affiliated with a nurses' station at a clinic operated by USAF ("USAF Clinic") (Doc. 10 at 2). Scott's underlying condition went undiagnosed, resulting in a partial amputation of his right leg in July 2015 (Id. at 3).
Based on this injury, Scott filed actions against several medical providers in state court in Missouri. In August 2015, Scott filed a medical negligence action in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County against medical providers including Rudomiotov. Scott v. Rudomiotov et al., Case No. 15-SL-CC02922 (Mo. Cir. Ct.). In April 2017, Scott filed anotheraction for medical negligence against Memorial in the Circuit Court of St. Clair County, Illinois. Scott v. Protestant Memorial Medical Center, Inc., 2017-L-181 (Ill. 20th Cir. Ct.). Scott's Illinois action discussed certain testing and reports conducted at Memorial which Moosa, an employee of Memorial, "electronically signed" (Doc. 21-5 at 9-10).
On March 30, 2017, Scott submitted an administrative claim to the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"), alleging that employees of the Belleville Center negligently failed to act when they failed to appropriately care for Scott's circulatory condition and advise him on condition management (Doc. 39-1 at 4). After HHS denied the claim, he filed the instant action under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") against the United States in relation to his HHS claim (Doc. 1).
In 2018, after discovery in the First FTCA Action revealed that Memorial had faxed Scott's records to a number associated with the Air Force Clinic, not the Belleville Center, Scott filed a second administrative claim with the Air Force, and upon denial of the claim filed a second action in this Court. Scott v. United States, 19-cv-367-SMY-MAB (S.D. Ill.). Scott subsequently voluntarily dismissed that action as refiled as Scott v. United States, 19-cv-1029-NJR (S.D. Ill.), which action was consolidated with the instant action on May 21, 2020 (Doc. 60) (the "Consolidated Action").
After consolidation, the United States introduced the USAF and HHS Actions for contribution against Memorial and third-party defendants Moosa and Rudomiotov. Memorial, Moosa, and Rudomiotov have all filed motions to dismiss both third-party complaints.
Memorial and Moosa move to dismiss the USAF Action and the HHS Actionpursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that both actions (1) are untimely and barred by the relevant Illinois statute of limitations and repose; (2) are not supported by a certificate of merit as required under Illinois Law; and (3) both complaints fail to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Rudomiotov seeks to dismiss the USAF Action and HHS Actions under Rule 12(b)(2) and Rule 12(b)(6) arguing first that dismissal of both actions is warranted due to a lack of personal jurisdiction over Rudomiotov, and secondly that both actions are untimely due to the relevant statutes of limitations and repose.
The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to decide the adequacy of the complaint, not to determine the merits of the case or decide whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail. Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff only needs to allege enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A plaintiff need not plead detailed factual allegations, but must provide "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements." Id. For purposes of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and draw all possible inferences in favor of the plaintiff. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 694 F.3d 873, 879 (7th Cir. 2012).
On the other hand, when facing a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that personal jurisdiction exists. Lack v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., 169 F. Supp. 3d 855, 860 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (citing Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys., LLC v. Real ActionPaintball, Inc., 751 F.3d 796, 801 (7th Cir. 2014)). Where the district court rules without holding an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. N. Grain Mktg., LLC v. Greving, 743 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 2014).
Before turning to the matters at issue in the various motions to dismiss, the Court must first address the Government's Motion to Strike. The Government argues that the Third-Party Defendants raised certain arguments related to their motions to dismiss the USAF Action for the first time in their reply briefs. Arguments not raised in an initial filing are waived and cannot be raised for the first time in a reply, and for this reason the Government seeks to strike the filings in question pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). See James v. Sheahan, 137 F.3d 1003, 1008 (7th Cir. 1998). Rule 12(f) provides that a Court "may strike from a pleading any redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter."
Generally, district courts have broad discretion in exercising their power to strike, and motions to strike are usually frowned upon due to their potential to create delay. Delta Consulting Grp. v. R. Randle Const., 554 F.3d 1133, 1141-42 (7th Cir. 2009); Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., Inc., 883 F.2d 1286, 1294 (7th Cir. 1989). Here, the filings in question relate to motions to dismiss, which are pleadings that may be freely amended upon a finding by the Court that such amendment is in the interests of justice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Accordingly, as the alleged flaws in the initial filings could be remediedby a mere amendment, the Court concludes that striking would merely delay the expedient resolution of these actions. The Motion to Strike is denied.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(B) provides that "[s]erving a summons establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant who is a party joined under Rule 14 or 19 and is served within a judicial district of the United States and not more than 100 miles from where the summons was issued." This provision appeared in a 1963 amendment to former Rule 4(f) as a response to the increasing incidence of multiparty legislation in federal courts and a desire to ensure that a single district would be able to grant complete relief in multiparty actions. See Coleman v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 405 F.2d 250, 251 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J.); see also Charles Alan Wright et al., 4 Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 1127. Rudomiotov seeks to argue that the key question in determining whether a defendant can be subjected to jurisdiction through exercise of Rule 4(k)(1)(B) is not whether they have any contact with the "bulge" area, but rather whether a defendant located within the bulge has contacts with the actual forum state. Rudomiotov cites in support Coleman, yet that case in fact stands for the opposite proposition, having held that process can be served within the "bulge" on persons subject to personal jurisdiction within the bulge territory but not the forum state. Coleman, 405 F.2d at 251. This rule is standard, and Rudomiotov has not identified any cases that diverge from it. See 16 Moore's Federal Practice - Civil § 108.123 (3d ed. 2020).
Rudomiotov does not appear to argue that she is not subject to personal jurisdiction within the 100-mile bulge area. In the view of this Court, the law regarding4(k)(1)(B) is well settled and requires merely jurisdiction within the bulge area and not a showing of minimum contacts with the forum state itself. Accordingly, the Court finds that it has jurisdiction over Rudomiotov through Rule 4(k)(1)(B) and denies her ...
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