Scott v. Wells

• Decision Date: 04 May 1949
• Docket Number: 16212.
• Citation: Scott v. Wells, 214 S.C. 511, 53 S.E.2d 400 (S.C. 1949)
• Parties: SCOTT v. WELLS et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

53 S.E.2d 400

214 S.C. 511

SCOTT v. WELLS et al.

No. 16212.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

May 4, 1949

Hood & Hood, Anderson, Francis R. Fant Anderson, O. H. Doyle, Anderson, for appellants.

Leon W. Harris, Anderson, John C. Watkins Anderson, for respondent.

STUKES Justice.

Respondent was seriously injured in an automobile accident at a street intersection in the City of Anderson. She sued the owner of the colliding taxicab and his liability insurance carrier. The insurance was required by city ordinance and the joinder was proper under Section 487 of the Code of 1942 and our former decisions so far as liability for negligence was concerned. See the cases collected in 2 S.E.Dig. and Pocket Part, Action, k50(4). Damages were sought in the amount of $35,000 whereas the policy limit of liability was $5,000, which was alleged in the answer and shown by provision of the policy in evidence. The jury returned a verdict against both defendants in the amount of $16,500 actual damages.

The Court was requested by the insurer to instruct the jury that its liability was limited by the insurance contract to the sum of $5,000 and verdict against it should be so restricted. This was refused and instead, in his general charge, the trial judge instructed the jury as follows: 'I charge you further, gentlemen, that in regard to the liability of the insurance company, that you are not concerned with the relative liability or the extent of the liability of the defendant insurance company. That is a matter that is determined by the policy of insurance or the contract of insurance, and if a verdict be rendered for the plaintiff can be determined later. I have not seen the policy. I haven't read it. You gentlemen can take it with you to your jury room if you like, but I repeat that you gentlemen are not concerned with the extent of liability of the defendant insurance company.'

After motion for new trial but before argument and order thereupon the following order was granted upon application of respondent and without notice to defendants: 'A verdict of the jury having been returned against defendants in the amount of sixteen thousand five hundred ($16,500.00) dollars, said verdict being dated October 11, 1948, and the liability of the defendant Pennsylvania Thrashermen and Farmers Mutual Casualty Insurance Company being limited to five thousand ($5,000.00) dollars. It is therefore: Ordered that upon payment of the sum of five thousand ($5,000.00) dollars together with legal interest on said sum of five thousand ($5,000.00) dollars from the time interest would become due thereon by the defendant Pennsylvania Thrashermen and Farmers Mutual Casualty Insurance Company, said defendant Pennsylvania Thrashermen and Farmers Mutual Casualty Insurance Company shall be forever discharged from any and all liability towards the plaintiff and its liability to her shall be finally determined and ended. Order on motion for a new trial to be filed within the next few days.'

There was subsequently rendered an order refusing the motion for new trial in which the previous order, just quoted, was confirmed.

Both defendants appeal upon the contention that the Court erred in refusing to construe the policy of insurance and to instruct the jury as to its limit of liability and the jury may have been misled to understand that the liabilities of the principal and the insurer were co-extensive, whereby the principal was prejudiced. The exceptions thereabout will have to be sustained. The further attack upon the propriety of the ex parte order which has been quoted need not be considered.

It has long been established that notice to the jury of insurance against liability is prejudicial to a defendant and should ordinarily be carefully avoided. Horsford v. Carolina Glass Co., 92 S.C. 236, 75 S.E. 533; Cox v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 191 S.C. 233, 196 S.E. 549; Haynes v. Graham, 192 S.C. 382, 6 S.E.2d 903. Cf. Entzminger v. Seigler, 186 S.C. 194, 195 S.E. 244. In none of these authorities is the principle made dependent upon a showing by appellant that an excessive verdict has resulted, a position which respondent has mistakenly urged in this case. However, the rule is inapplicable because impracticable where the insurance or indemnity is required by statute or ordinance and the insurer may be joined as a defendant pursuant to the code section and decisions to which reference has been made. Benn v. Camel City Coach Co., 162 S.C. 44, 160 S.E. 135; Bryant v. Blue Bird Cab Co., 202 S.C. 456, 25 S.E.2d 489.

The proper trial procedure when...