Scott v. White Trucks

• Decision Date: 07 March 1983
• Docket Number: No. 79-3835,79-3835
• Citation: 699 F.2d 714
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
• Parties: 12 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1472 Otis SCOTT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WHITE TRUCKS, Defendant-Appellee, and Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, Intervenor-Appellant.

Page 714

699 F.2d 714

12 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1472

Otis SCOTT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WHITE TRUCKS, Defendant-Appellee and Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, Intervenor-Appellant.

No. 79-3835.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

March 7, 1983.

S. Michael Cashio, Kenner, La., for plaintiff-appellant.

Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere & Denegre, Claude D. Vasser, New Orleans, La., for Great Atlantic & Pacific.

Bernard, Cassisa, Babst & Saporito, Jerry L. Saporito, Metairie, La., for White Trucks.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Before BROWN, GEE and GARWOOD, Circuit Judges.

GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:

In this Louisiana law diversity suit, plaintiff Scott appeals from a judgment n.o.v. rendered in favor of appellee White Trucks dismissing Scott's products liability claim. ¹ The primary questions are whether there is sufficient evidence to show that the product was defectively designed or manufactured, and if so, whether the defect existed when it left the manufacturer's hands. We hold there is no sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings and affirm the district court's judgment.

I.

White Truck No. 1872, a three-axle tractor, was manufactured for appellee White Trucks by the Freightliner Corporation ("Freightliner") in October 1975. Following initial promulgation of federal regulations ² requiring such devices, Freightliner equipped its White Freightliner models of the 1800 series with an automatic electronic anti-lock system designed to minimize air brake lockup problems and to enhance vehicle stability and control. Air brakes were placed on the steering axle, as well as the rear axles, of these trucks. Each axle was equipped with a separate anti-lock system. The system was manufactured by Wagner-Electric Corporation.

On October 31, 1975, Truck No. 1872 was sold by White Trucks to Hunsaker Truck Lines ("Hunsaker"). In October 1976, this truck and seven other White trucks of the same model and series, were sold by Hunsaker to Leaseway of Louisiana, Inc. ("Leaseway"), who leased them to Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company ("A & P"). Under the lease agreement, Leaseway maintained and repaired the trucks.

Appellant Otis Scott was employed as a truck driver for A & P. On August 17, 1977, about 5:30 a.m. on a wet and rainy dawn near Pascagoula, Mississippi, Scott was driving Truck No. 1872, which was pulling a trailer equipped with a similar braking system, back to New Orleans from Mobile, Alabama. Traffic was heavy, and a car changed lanes in front of Scott. Scott "lightly applied" the brakes, the left front wheel grabbed, the truck swerved to the left, and, as Scott testified, it ran "into the median and mud," he "lost control" and thereupon "it jackknifed." Scott received injuries in the accident.

Scott sued White Trucks and Leaseway, alleging that the truck's braking system was defectively designed or manufactured. ³ The liability issues were tried separately and before the damages issues. After Scott rested, White Trucks moved for a directed verdict, arguing that Scott had produced no evidence of a defect in design or manufacture. The district court denied this motion without prejudice. At the close of all the evidence, White Trucks reurged its motion for a directed verdict, but the district court reserved a ruling on the motion and sent the case to the jury, who found that the braking system in the truck was defectively designed or manufactured, and that the defect was a cause of Scott's accident. The district court then granted White Trucks' motion for directed verdict and rendered a judgment n.o.v. in its favor. The court held that there was no evidence of a defect in the design or manufacture of the truck, and that because of the long delay between the sale of the truck to Hunsaker and the accident, Scott had the burden of proving more than just the fact that the accident was caused by the brakes "grabbing."

II.

Under Louisiana law, an individual "who without fault on his part, sustains an injury caused by a defect in the design, composition, or manufacture of" a product rendering it "unreasonably dangerous to normal use," may recover his damages from the maker of the product and "need not prove any particular negligence by the maker in its manufacture or processing; for the manufacturer is presumed to know of the vices in the things he makes, whether or not he has actual knowledge of them." Weber v. Fidelity & Casualty Insurance Co. of N.Y., 250 So.2d 754, 755-56 (La.1971). The plaintiff, however, not only "has the burden of proving that the product was defective" but also that his "injuries were caused by reason of the defect." Id. at 755. Moreover, recovery is allowed against the manufacturer only "if the injured person proves ... that the product was defective when it left the hands of the manufacturer," and "[w]hile the rule [of strict liability] is harsh, liability is not imposed unless the evidence preponderates ... that the [injury-causing] defect existed when the product left the hands of the manufacturer." Madden v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 334 So.2d 249, 253, 255 (La.App. 4th Cir.1976). ⁴

Cases involving products manufactured, sold, and retained in sealed containers normally present little difficulty in terms of whether a defect existing at the time of injury was also present at the time of manufacture. Weber. Even in other circumstances, the abnormal malfunction of a product shortly after manufacture may, where there is an adequate "accounting" of the use between the manufacture and the accident and evidence tending to negate other causes, give rise to an inference of a defect existing at the time of manufacture. See e.g., Hunt v. Ford Motor Co., 341 So.2d 614, 618 (La.App. 2d Cir.1977) ("considering the well-documented and supported evidence that the steering mechanism 'popped,' 'binded,' and 'hung up' from the time the car was purchased [new by the plaintiff], with no evidence of intervening causation by faulty repairs, other accidents, or the like, it is reasonable to conclude that an unreasonably dangerous defect related to steering existed from the time of manufacture"); Ned v. Hertz Corp., 356 So.2d 1074 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 359 So.2d 197 (La.1978) (brake repairs performed March 5, vehicle returned to service March 6, accident occurred March 11 when brakes grabbed, as they had earlier that day and on other occasions since repair; these circumstances allow an inference that the brakes were defective on completion of March 5 repairs).

However, the manufacturer is under no duty "to make a product that will last forever or will withstand abuse or lack of maintenance" or that is "foolproof," Tri-State Insurance Company v. Fidelity & Casualty Insurance Company, 364 So.2d 657, 660 (La.App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 365 So.2d 248 (La.1978); Foster v. Marshall, 341 So.2d 1354 (La.App. 2d Cir.), writ ref'd, 343 So.2d 1067, 1077 (La.1977), nor one whose component "parts do not wear out." Insurance Company of North America v. Atlas Construction Company, 368 So.2d 1247, 1249 (La.App. 4th Cir.1979); Foster v. Marshall, supra. And, where a particular defect or dangerous condition is not directly shown to exist at the time of manufacture, and the product abnormally malfunctions, or even is directly shown to have a defective component, on the occasion of an accident occurring a significant time after manufacture, this will not alone authorize a finding that the product was defective while in the manufacturer's hands, if maintenance and employment by intervening owners and users is not adequately accounted for. See Simon v. Ford Motor Company, 282 So.2d 126, 128, 132-33 (La.1973) ⁵; Penton v. Budget Rent-A-Car, 304 So.2d 410 (La.App. 1st Cir.1973) ⁶; Farmer v. Ford Motor Company, 316 So.2d 140 (La.App. 2d Cir.1975). ⁷

While language in the Simon, Penton, and Farmer opinions appears to indicate that in those cases the general theory of liability primarily being advanced was one of negligence, rather than strict liability, we do not attach significance to this for present purposes. Some two years before those decisions Weber had established the strict liability of manufacturers for injuries caused by defects in product design, composition, or manufacture. Moreover, the questions of whether the product was defective when it left the manufacturer's hands, and of whether such defect caused the injury, are common to both the strict liability and the negligence theories of recovery. The two theories of liability are distinguished not by any difference in those elements, but rather by the fact that in strict liability the plaintiff need not prove that the presence of the injury-causing defect when the product left the manufacturer's hands was due to "any particular negligence by the maker." Weber, 250 So.2d at 756.

In determining the propriety of the judgment n.o.v. we utilize the standard set forth in Boeing Company v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374-75 (5th Cir.1969):

"On motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict the Court should consider all of the evidence--not just that evidence which supports the non-mover's case--but in the light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party opposed to the motion. If the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the Court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict, granting of the motions is proper. On the other hand, if there is substantial evidence opposed to the motions, that is, evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions, the motions should be denied, and the case submitted to the jury. A mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to present a question for the jury. The motions for directed verdict and judgment n.o.v. should not be...