Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Klub Kutter's Bar & Lounge, LLC
| Decision Date | 24 April 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 17-cv-61321-BLOOM/Valle |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
| Parties | SCOTTSDALE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. KLUB KUTTER'S BAR & LOUNGE, LLC, and DANIELLE ROLAND, Defendants. |
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Plaintiff Scottsdale Insurance Company's ("Plaintiff") Motion for Final Summary Judgment, ECF No. [41] ("Plaintiff's Motion"), and Defendant Klub Kutter's Bar & Lounge, LLC's ("Defendant") Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. [50], ("Defendant's Motion") (collectively, the "Motions"). The Court has carefully reviewed the Motions, the record, all supporting and opposing filings, the exhibits attached thereto, and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons that follow, Defendant's Motion is granted and Plaintiff's Motion is denied.
Danielle Roland ("Roland") filed a lawsuit in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida against Defendant, Case No. CACE16019780 ("the underlying lawsuit"). See ECF No. [42-2]. In the underlying lawsuit, Roland alleged that, on or about September 6, 2015, she was a business invitee on Defendant's premises. Id. at ¶ 5. On that date, Roland claims she was "trampled by a stampede of patrons located within the Defendant's nightclub, resulting in severe and permanent injuries." Id. at ¶ 6. This "stampede was caused by a fight and subsequent shooting which took place at the Defendant's nightclub." Id. at ¶ 7. As a result of this incident, Roland asserted a claim for negligence against Defendant in which she alleged that Defendant "failed to adequately provide security measures to ensure the safety of business invitees while in its club or elsewhere on its premises" and that Defendant's security measures "were not sufficient to provide a reasonably safe condition for its patrons, business invitees or other individuals at the nightclub." Id. at ¶¶ 9-10. In addition, Roland alleged that Defendant breached its duty to provide reasonably safe conditions for its patrons and business invitees by (1) failing "to devise, implement and follow a proper security plan, reasonably designed to protect invitees from harm," (2) failing "to properly employ and deploy an adequate number of security personnel to reasonably protect persons on the premises;" and (3) failing "to utilize reasonable and appropriate measures to protect persons on the premises when it knew or should have known of a dangerous condition on the premises." Id. at ¶ 14. Plaintiff is currently defending Defendant from the claims raised in the underlying lawsuit under a full reservation of rights. See ECF No. [1] at ¶ 18.
Plaintiff issued an insurance policy to Defendant, Policy No. CPS2312936, which commenced on August 31, 2015 and ended on August 31, 2016 (the "Policy"). See ECF No. [42-1]. The Policy, in pertinent part, provides coverage for "bodily injury" and "property damage" if (1) the "bodily injury" or "property damage" is caused by an "occurrence" that takes place in the "coverage territory;" or (2) the "bodily injury" or "property damage" occurs during the policy period. Id. at 17. "Occurrence" is defined as "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions." Id. at 31. However,the Policy also contains certain exclusions, including one for assault and battery ("the Assault and Battery Exclusion"). Id. at 54. It provides as follows:
ASSAULT AND/OR BATTERY EXCLUSION
This endorsement modifies insurance provided under the following:
COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE PART
The following exclusion is added to the Exclusions section:
On July 5, 2017, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against Defendant and Roland, seeking a declaratory judgment.1 See ECF No. [1]. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks a declaration that it does not have a duty to defend or indemnify Defendant under the Policy for the claims made by Roland in the underlying lawsuit. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the Assault and Battery Exclusion removes Roland's claims from coverage under the Policy. Id. Defendant, in turn, filed a Counterclaim against Plaintiff, seeking a declaration that Plaintiff indeed has a duty to defend and indemnify it for Roland's claims. See ECF No. [6]. According to Defendant, the Assault and Battery Exclusion is inapplicable. Id. The parties have since filed their respective Motions for Summary Judgment, seeking competing declarations regarding Plaintiff's duty to defend and indemnify under the Policy. See ECF Nos. [41] and [50]. The parties have also filed their respective Responses and Replies. See ECF Nos. [50], [53], and [54]. As such, the Motions are ripe for adjudication.
The competing motions for summary judgment ask the Court to address the same legal issue - whether Plaintiff owes Defendant a duty to defend and indemnify under the Policy. A district court applies the same legal standards when ruling upon cross-motions for summary judgment as it does when only one party files a motion. See Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London Subscribing to Policy No. SA 10092-11581 v. Waveblast Watersports, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 3d 1311, 1316 (S.D. Fla. 2015). "Cross-motions may, however, be probative of the absence of a factual dispute where they reflect general agreement by the parties as to the controlling legaltheories and material facts." Id. (quoting S. Pilot Ins. Co. v. CECS, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 1240, 1243 ((N.D. Ga. 2014)).
A court may grant a motion for summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The parties may support their positions by citation to the record, including, inter alia, depositions, documents, affidavits, or declarations. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An issue is genuine if "a reasonable trier of fact could return judgment for the non-moving party." Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 516 F. 3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)). A fact is material if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48). The court views the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in the party's favor. See Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 763 (11th Cir. 2006). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which a jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party]." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. The Court does not weigh conflicting evidence. See Skop v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 485 F.3d 1130, 1140 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Carlin Comm'n, Inc. v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir. 1986)).
The moving party shoulders the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Shiver v. Chertoff, 549 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir. 2008). If a movant satisfies this burden, "the nonmoving party 'must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.'" Ray v. Equifax Info. Servs., L.L.C., 327 F. App'x 819, 825 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). Instead, "the non-moving party 'must make a sufficient showing on each essential element of the case for which he has the burden of proof.'" Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). The non-moving party must produce evidence, going beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designating specific facts to suggest that a reasonable jury could find in the non-moving party's favor. Shiver, 549 F.3d at 1343. But even where an opposing party neglects to submit any alleged material facts in controversy, a court cannot grant summary judgment unless it is satisfied that all of the evidence in the record supports the uncontroverted material facts that the movant has proposed. See Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1268-69, 1272 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. One Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 S.W. 74th Ave., Miami, Fla., 363 F.3d 1099, 1103 n.6 (11th Cir. 2004).
As both parties ask the Court to determine, as a matter of law, Plaintiff's obligations under the Policy for Roland's claims against Defendant, the Court addresses the Motions together.
"Under Florida law, an insurance policy is treated like a contract, and therefore ordinary contract principles govern the interpretation and construction of such a policy." Pac. Emp'rs Ins. Co. v. Wausau Bus. Ins. Co., No. 3:05-cv-850-J-32TEM, 2007 WL 2900452, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2007) (citing Graber v. Clarendon Nat'l Ins. Co., 819 So. 2d 840, 842 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)). As with all contracts, the interpretation of an insurance contract - including determining whether an insurance...
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