Scown v. Czarnecki

• Decision Date: 07 October 1914
• Docket Number: No. 9296.,9296.
• Citation: 106 N.E. 276,264 Ill. 305
• Parties: SCOWN v. CZARNECKI et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

264 Ill. 305

106 N.E. 276

SCOWN

v.CZARNECKI et al.

No. 9296.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 13, 1914.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 7, 1914.

Appeal from Superior Court, Cook County; Charles M. Foell, Judge.

Bill by William J. Scown against Anthony Czarnecki and others. Decree for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.Mayer, Meyer, Austrian & Platt, of Chicago (Levy Mayer and Alfred S. Austrian, both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Charles H. Mitchell, of Chicago (John J. Herrick, Charles S. Cutting, and I. T. Greenacre, all of Chicago, and Joel F. Longenecker, of Lander, Wyo., of counsel), McEwen, Weissenbach, Shrimski & Meloan, of Chicago (Williard McEwen and Israel Shrimski, both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellees.

DUNN, J.

William J. Scown Filed a bill in the superior court of Cook county in behalf of all other taxpayers as well as himself to restrain the election commissioners of the city of Chicago and the town of Cicero from expending money for providing separate ballots and ballot boxes for women, and for other purposes, in accordance with the provisions of the act of the Legislature of June 26, 1913, known as the Woman's Suffrage Act (Laws of 1913, p. 333), and the Act of June 30, 1913 (Laws 1913, p. 310), amending the primary election laws. A demurrer was sustained to the bill, which was dismissed for want of equity, and the complainant appealed.

The ground on which the injunction was asked was that the expenditures complained of were not authorized by law because the Woman's Suffrage Act is unconstitutional, and that is the only question to be considered. The act provides as follows:

‘Section 1. Be it enacted by the people of the state of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly: That all women, citizens of the United States, above the age of twenty-one years, having resided in the state one year, in the county ninety days, and in the election district thirty days next preceding any election therein, shall be allowed to vote at such election for presidential electors, member of the State Board of Equalization, clerk of the Appellate Court, county collector, county surveyor, members of board of assessors, members of board of review, sanitary district trustees, and for all officers of cities, villages and towns (except police magistrates), and upon all questions or propositions submitted to a vote of the electors of such municipalities or other political divisions of the state.

‘Sec. 2. All such women may also vote for the following township officers: Supervisor, town clerk, assessor, collector and highway commissioner, and may also participate and vote in all annual and special town meetings in the township in which such election district shall be.

‘Sec. 3. Separate ballot boxes and ballots shall be provided for women which ballots shall contain the names of the candidates for such offices which are to be voted for and the special questions submitted as aforesaid, and the ballots cast by women shall be canvassed with the other ballots cast for such officers and on such questions. At any such election where registration is required, women shall register in the same manner as male voters.’

[1] It is first contended that this act is in violation of section 13 of article 4 of the Constitution, because it amends the general election laws but does not insert in the new act the section amended; reference being made particularly to section 65 of chapter 46 of the Revised Statutes, which is in the identical language of section 1 of article 7 of the Constitution, as follows:

‘Sec. 1. Every person having resided in this state one year, in the county ninety days, and in the election district thirty days next preceding any election therein, who was an elector in this state on the first day of April, in the year of our Lord 1848, or obtained a certificate of naturalization before any court of record in this state prior to the first day of January, in the year of our Lord 1870, or who shall be a male citizen of the United States, above the age of twenty-one years, shall be entitled to vote at such election.’

It cannot be denied that the act in question changes the qualifications prescribed by said section 65 for voters for the offices mentioned in the act, and, if it is to be regarded only as an amendment of that section, the constitutional requirementhas not been complied with and the act is void. Not every enactment, however, which enlarges, restricts, or modifies previous statutes is subject to the constitutional objection made here.

‘Any new provision of law may in some sense be said to amend and change the prior system of laws, and whenever there is an irreconcilable conflict between two acts the later one must prevail. To the extent of the conflict the later act amends the earlier one by implication, and if the later act is not amendatory in form and perfect in itself it is not within the prohibition of the Constitution. It is not necessary, when a new act is passed, that all prior acts modified by it by implication shall be reenacted and published at length.’ Hollingsworth v. Chicago & Carterville Coal Co., 243 Ill. 98, 90 N. E. 276.

The requirement of the Constitution was intended to enable the meaning of enactments directly amending prior statutes to be ascertained by an examination of the enactments themselves, without the necessity of examining all prior statutes on the subject to ascertain the effect of the amendment. The purpose of this provision and its meaning have been announced in numerous cases, and in People v. Crossley, 261 Ill. 78, 103 N. E. 537, the whole question was again considered with reference to these cases, and the rule was reiterated that:

‘An act which is complete in itself and does not purport, either in its title or in the body thereof, to amend or revive any other act, is valid, though it may by implication modify or repeal prior existing statutes.’

This act does not purport to amend or revive any other act, and it is complete in itself. Its only object is to extend to women the right of suffrage so far as the offices and subjects mentioned in it are concerned. The intention of the Legislature can be ascertained without reference to any prior act. The act is entirely intelligible; its meaning appears clearly on its face; no further legislation is necessary; no machinery other than is provided is required to put it in operation and make it effective; nothing remains to be done other than for the women to vote. The act does not violate section 13 of article 4 of the Constitution.

[2][3][4][5][6] It is argued that by section 1 of article 7 of the Constitution, which has already been set out, the power of extending the right of suffrage to women has been denied to the Legislature. This question is one of constitutional construction, purely. We cannot give expression to our own views as to the justice, the wisdom, or the public policy of extending the right of suffrage to women or permit those views to affect the decision of this case. The right to determine who may vote rests with the Legislature and not the courts, and the courts have no aurhority to interfere with the act of the Legislature unless such act has been clearly prohibited by some provision of the Constitution. It is elementary that the right of suffrage is not a natural right but exists only by positive law; that the Constitution is not a grant of authority so far as the Legislature is concerned but is a limitation of legislative power, and that the legislative power of the General Assembly is unlimited, except by such restrictions as the Constitution has imposed in express terms or by necessary implication. It is also true that where the Constitution has prescribed the qualifications of the electors they cannot be changed by the Legislature. The question presented therefore is whether the qualifications of electors prescribed by section 1 of article 7 of the Constitution apply to elections for the officers named in the act under consideration, and this question has been heretofore answered, practically and in principle, by the decisions of this court, in the negative. None of the offices named in the act in question are mentioned in the Constitution, but all have been created by statutory enactments. From the time of the organization of the territory of the United States northwest of the Ohio river under the ordinance of 1787, the right of suffrage under the various acts of Congress, Constitutions, and statutes from time to time in force in the territory now constituting the state of Illinois was confined to male inhabitants or male citizens, and no woman was permitted or authorized to cast a vote for any office or upon any question until 1891. The General Assembly in that year enacted a law ‘to entitle women to vote at any election held for the purpose of choosing any officer under the general or special school laws of this state.’ Immediately the power of the Legislature to extend to women the limited right of suffrage conferred by this act was questioned, the objection to the existence of such power being based upon the section of the Constitution involved in the present case-(section 1 of article 7). The question was presented to this court in a petition for mandamus against the board of election commissioners of Cook county. People v. English, 139 Ill. 622, 29 N. E. 678,15 L. R. A. 131. The precise question in that case was the right of a woman to vote at an election for county superintendent of schools. It was held that the Legislature had no power to grant her such right, upon the ground that the county superintendent of schools was an officer provided for by the Constitution, and that no person not possessing the qualifications prescribed in section 1 of article 7 could have the right to vote for a constitutional officer. The court expressly reserved the question whether it was competent for the Legislature to provide that women might vote at an election of school officers...