Scozzari v. City of Clare, 011515 FED6, 13-1247
| Opinion Judge | HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge. |
| Party Name | STEVEN SCOZZARI as Personal Representative of the Estate of WILLIAM CHRISTI SCOZZARI, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF CLARE, KEN HIBL, a municipal agent of City of Clare, Defendants, and CHIEF DWAYNE MIEDZIANOWSKI, as Agent for the municipal corporation and as an individual, OFFICER JEREMY MCGRAW, as an agent of the municipal corporation a |
| Judge Panel | BEFORE: BOGGS, BATCHELDER, and WHITE, Circuit Judges. ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge, dissenting. |
| Case Date | January 15, 2015 |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals, U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
City of Clare Police Chief Dwayne Miedzianowski and Officer Jeremy McGraw appeal the district court's denial of their post-trial renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff's1 Fourteenth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, asserting that the district court erred in denying their qualified-immunity defense. We disagree and AFFIRM.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Trial testimony established that at 11:06 p.m. on September 18, 2007, a resident of the Lone Pine Motel called the Clare Police Department and reported that shots had been fired at a park near the motel. Chief Miedzianowski was dispatched to the scene at 11:06 p.m. and arrived at 11:12 p.m. Miedzianowski observed a man, later identified as William Scozzari, walking from the nearby VFW Hall carrying a flashlight and a cane. Miedzianowski testified that after Scozzari shined his flashlight in the direction of the police cruiser, Miedzianowski asked him to stop; Scozzari responded with an expletive and continued walking. Miedzianowski followed Scozzari to Cabin 17 of the Lone Pine Motel. Officer McGraw arrived at 11:21 p.m., after Scozzari entered Cabin 17. PID 2638-39, 3997.
The two Officers approached Cabin 17, knocked on the door, and announced "Police. Open Up." Scozzari eventually opened the door and appeared to be clutching a knife and hatchet. McGraw fired a taser when Scozzari took a step forward, but missed Scozzari. Scozzari stepped back inside his cabin, the Officers kicked the door, and Scozzari opened the door, holding a hatchet and knife. The Officers screamed "Drop your weapons, " Scozzari moved toward McGraw, and Miedzianowski opened fire. The two Officers fired eleven shots, five of which hit Scozzari.
At 11:26 p.m., Miedzianowski reported shots fired and a suspect down. A Mobile Medical Response unit (MMR) was dispatched to the scene at 11:27 p.m. At 11:29 p.m., Miedzianowski instructs the dispatcher to call the MMR and have them stage at Pettit Park. The exact time the paramedics arrived at the park is not clear. At 11:34:50 p.m., Miedzianowski radioed dispatch to send in the ambulance. Paramedic Bryans reached Scozzari and began treating him sometime after 11:35 p.m., but was interrupted while police searched Scozzari for weapons. The length of the interruption is unknown, but at 11:37 p.m., MMR was treating Scozzari and at 11:57 p.m. MMR was en route to the hospital.
This case was previously before this court on Defendants' interlocutory appeal of the district court's pretrial denial of qualified immunity; a panel of this court affirmed. Scozzari v. Miedzianowski, 454 F.App'x 455 (6th Cir. 2012) (Scozzari I). The case proceeded to trial on Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim and Fourteenth Amendment claim of denial of timely medical treatment. Over Plaintiff's objection, the district court instructed the jury that Plaintiff had to prove that Defendants' deliberate indifference proximately caused his death. The jury returned a verdict of no cause of action on both claims.
Plaintiff moved for a new trial. The district court granted the motion, limited to the denial-of-medical-treatment claim, on the ground that the proximate-cause jury instruction did not comport with the law of this circuit and prejudiced Plaintiff's case.2
Defendants moved for relief from the order granting a new trial, Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), and renewed their motion for judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff's medical-treatment claim, Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b), asserting that the jury was properly instructed on proximate cause and that, even if the instruction was erroneous, they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there was insufficient evidence for a jury to find that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Scozzari's medical needs. Defendants also argued they were entitled to qualified immunity because the evidence submitted at trial could not support a finding of the deprivation of a clearly established constitutional right. PID 2158. The district court denied Defendants' motion, affirmed its ruling that the jury instruction was erroneous, and denied Defendants qualified immunity. PID 3148.3 Defendants appealed and the district court stayed proceedings pending our disposition.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Invocation of qualified immunity raises a question of law that we review de novo. Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1157 (6th Cir. 1996). Government officials may invoke qualified immunity as a defense only "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). To determine if qualified immunity protects a government official from suit, courts engage in a two-step inquiry: 1) whether the defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether that right was clearly established. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Morrison v. Bd. of Trs. of Green Twp., 583 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 2009). Courts may "exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand." Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236; see also Aldini v. Johnson, 609 F.3d 858, 863 (6th Cir. 2010).
We review de novo the district court's denial of Defendants' renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b). Loesel v. City of Frankenmuth, 692 F.3d 452, 461 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Radvansky v. City of Olmsted Falls, 496 F.3d 609, 614 (6th Cir.2007)). "The motion may be granted only if in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact for the jury, and reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion, in favor of the moving party." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Judgment as a matter of law becomes appropriate when "a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue." Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Jurisdiction
Because Defendants accept the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and raise only issues of law, this court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. T.S. v. Doe, 742 F.3d 632, 635 (6th Cir. 2014).
B. Deliberate Indifference
Defendants contend that the evidence at trial was insufficient as a matter of law to establish that they were deliberately indifferent to Scozzari's serious medical need, and that their Fourteenth Amendment obligation was only to promptly summon medical care for Scozzari.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires government officials to provide adequate medical care to individuals injured while being apprehended by police. Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) ("[T]he due process rights of a [pre-trial detainee] are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner."); Phillips v. Roane Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 2008). To establish a violation of the right to adequate medical care under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Watkins v. City of Battle Creek, 273 F.3d 682, 685 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 492 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). A plaintiff need not show that the official acted "for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result." Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1970)); see also Horn v. Madison Cnty. Fiscal Court, 22 F.3d 653, 660 (6th Cir. 1994) ("Officials may be shown to be deliberately indifferent to such serious needs without evidence of conscious intent to inflict pain."). "[D]eliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner is the equivalent of recklessly disregarding that risk." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836.
"Deliberate indifference is not mere negligence. Deliberate indifference requires that the defendants knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to [a plaintiff's] health and safety." Phillips, 534 F.3d at 539. A claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs has both objective and subjective components. Id. The objective component requires proof of a sufficiently serious medical need. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Phillips, 534 F.3d at 539. To establish the subjective component, a plaintiff must "allege facts which, if true, would show that the official . . . subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the [individual], that he did in fact draw the inference, and that he then disregarded that risk." Comstock, 273 F.3d at 703 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).4 However, a plaintiff need not prove that the official acted "for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result" if the official recklessly disregarded a known risk. Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835).
Where a deliberate-indifference claim is based on delay of medical care, a constitutional...
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