Scranton v. L. G. De Felice & Son
| Decision Date | 13 March 1951 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | SCRANTON v. L. G. DE FELICE & SON, Inc. et al. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut |
Joseph I. Sachs, New Haven, Harry L. Edlin, New Haven, for the appellants (defendants).
Thomas F. Seymour, New Haven (Joseph B. Morse, New Haven, on the brief), for the appellee (plaintiff).
Before JENNINGS, BALDWIN, INGLIS, and O'SULLIVAN, JJ., and SHEA, Superior Court Judge.
This action was brought to recover for damage to the plaintiff's real property resulting from vibrations caused by blasting done by the defendants. The complaint is in three counts, the first sounding in negligence and the third in nuisance, while the second is based on claimed absolute liability for the use of an intrinsically dangerous explosive. The trial court found the issues on the second and third counts for the plaintiff and awarded her damages. In view of our conclusions as to the second count, it will not be necessary to consider the third.
In spite of an excessive number of assignments of error directed at the finding, there is no reason to make any changes therein. It may be summarized briefly: The plaintiff, in the month of February, 1948, and for some time prior thereto, was in the process of erecting a dwelling house and garage on property owned by her on Long Hill in the town of Woodbridge. The foundation of the house was concrete set upon a ledge of rock; the exterior walls were of cinder block covered by plaster; the interior floors were of concrete and the interior walls were of plaster on metal lath. The garage was of similar construction. The defendants, in a joint venture, pursuant to a contract which they had with the state of Connecticut, were general contractors for the construction of the Wilbur Cross Parkway. The center line of the layout of that highway ran east and west about 500 feet south of the plaintiff's house and through the same ledge of rock as that upon which the house stood.
By February 10, 1948, the plaintiff's garage had been completely inclosed and the dwelling had been completed to the extent that the interior walls had been plastered. In connection with the construction of the highway, the defendants used a form of dynamite known as Gelamite to blast through the ledge of rock and, in particular, on the afternoon of February 10 discharged a blast of 750 pounds of such dynamite, using direct action caps. Upon the discharge of this blast, the plaintiff's house and garage shook to a marked and noticeable extent and cracks appeared in the interior and exterior plaster of both buildings. The blasting operation with the intrinsically dangerous substance of dynamite was carried out in such a way as necessarily and obviously to expose the plaintiff's structures to damage.
The trial court concluded that the blast was the cause of the cracks which developed in the plaintiff's plaster, that although the defendants had not been negligent they were liable for the damage which resulted from the blast and that the plaintiff should recover of the defendants as damages the reasonable cost of repairing the cracks.
Upon this appeal the defendants make, in the main, three contentions: The first is that the trial court could not reasonably have concluded that the blast was the cause of the damage. The second is that, inasmuch as whatever damage was caused by the blast resulted from vibrations transmitted through the earth rather than from debris thrown on the plaintiff's property, the defendants would be liable only in the event that they were negligent. The third contention is that, because the blasting was done pursuant to a contract with the state of Connecticut and in furtherance of a governmental project, the defendants were entitled to the same immunity from liability as the state would have been entitled to if the blast had been discharged by its employees.
As regards the first contention, the conclusion of causation may not be disturbed if the subordinate facts reasonably support it. Taylor v. Dennehy, 136 Conn. 398, 403, 71 A.2d 596; Colligan v. Reilly, 129 Conn. 26, 29, 26 A.2d 231; Rinaldi v. Prudential Ins. Co., 118 Conn. 419, 425, 172 A. 777. The finding that the blast in question was followed immediately by a marked and noticeable shaking of the plaintiff's buildings and that cracks then appeared in the exterior and interior plaster is ample under the circumstances to justify the conclusion that the cracks resulted from the blast.
The second contention is the same as the one made by the defendants in Whitman Hotel Corporation v. Elliott & Watrous Engineering Co., Conn., 79 A.2d 591. In that case, we held that under the law of this jurisdiction one who explodes the intrinsically...
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