Scruby v. Vintage Grapevine, Inc.

• Decision Date: 08 August 1995
• Docket Number: No. A066177,A066177
• Citation: 37 Cal.App.4th 697,43 Cal.Rptr.2d 810
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6294, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 10,671 John E. SCRUBY et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. VINTAGE GRAPEVINE, INC., Defendant and Appellant.

Page 810

43 Cal.Rptr.2d 810

37 Cal.App.4th 697, 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6294,

95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 10,671

John E. SCRUBY et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. VINTAGE GRAPEVINE, INC., Defendant and Appellant.

No. A066177.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 5, California.

Aug. 8, 1995.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Sept. 6, 1995.

Review Denied Nov. 16, 1995.

Miller, Starr & Regalia, Lewis J. Soffer and Edmund Regalia, Oakland, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Cannata & Papale, Lawrence G. Papale, David C. Wignall, St. Helena, for defendant and appellant.

KING, Associate Justice.

In this case we hold that a deed granting a nonexclusive easement of a specified width does not, as a matter of law, give the owner of the dominant tenement the right to use every portion of the easement. The trial court properly interpreted this easement to give the owner of the servient tenement the right to place improvements upon the easement as long as they do not unreasonably interfere with the right of the owner of the dominant tenement to ingress and egress.

John E. and Giovanna Scruby (Scruby) brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief to resolve a dispute with Vintage Grapevine, Inc., (Grapevine) the owner of the adjacent property, concerning a nonexclusive easement, 52 feet in width, dedicated to road and utility purposes over Grapevine's property. Scruby alleged certain aspects of Grapevine's winery operations unlawfully interfered with Scruby's right to fully use the easement. Grapevine cross-complained, alleging Scruby had unlawfully interfered with the winery's use of its property. The trial court issued a judgment after a nonjury trial defining the scope of the easement. Both parties appeal.

Statement of Facts

Scruby is the owner of 1.03 acres of land and a single family home at 7429 St. Helena Highway in Napa County, California. Grapevine owns and operates Cosentino Winery located at 7415 St. Helena Highway, consisting of 4.29 acres just south of Scruby's property. The only access to Scruby's landlocked property is over an easement on Grapevine's property which was deeded to Scruby by Grapevine's predecessor in 1986. The recorded Easement Grant Deed describes the property and states that Scruby is granted "[a] nonexclusive easement, 52 feet in width, for road and utility purposes." The precise boundaries of the easement are set out in the deed by reference to a survey map and are generally described in this litigation as a 52-foot wide corridor from Highway 29 along the northern side of the winery property proceeding westward and ending in a cul-de-sac 100 feet in diameter. ¹ By the grant of this easement, Scruby's land became the dominant tenement and the Grapevine property became the servient tenement. (Civ.Code, § 803.)

Scruby filed a complaint in September 1993, seeking to enjoin Grapevine from interfering with Scruby's easement by placing obstructions, such as water tanks and grapevines inside the described easement area. Scruby sought damages as well as injunctive relief to compel Grapevine to remove the tanks and grapevines from the easement area.

Grapevines' answer denied the allegations of Scruby's complaint. In its cross-complaint, Grapevine asked for an injunction restraining Scruby from interfering with the use of Grapevine's property. Among other acts, Grapevine alleged Scruby had paved a new accessway to his residence within the described easement area from Highway 29. The paving done by Scruby did not meet the design criteria approved by the county and by Cal-Trans for the winery. Consequently, Grapevine alleged it was threatened with the loss of its use permit for operation of the winery. Grapevine sought an injunction compelling Scruby to remove the new paving and for damages for destruction of Grapevine's property.

After hearing two days of evidence and touring the disputed easement area, the court entered judgment: (1) that Grapevine's use of the easement in its winery operations did not interfere with Scruby's rights because Scruby did not have the right to use the full width of the 52-foot easement and the 100-foot cul-de-sac but only that portion necessary for ingress and egress to their property; (2) that Grapevine is the fee owner of the property and can use it in any way normally used by the owners of real property as long as such use is not inconsistent with the easement granted to Scruby permitting ingress and egress to their property; (3) that Scruby is not entitled to an injunction ordering Grapevine to remove the vines and water tanks within the easement area nor are they entitled to enjoin Grapevine's lawful use of the easement area as long as Grapevine does not interfere with Scruby's right of ingress and egress; (4) that Scruby, at their own expense, must remove the paving creating separate access to their property from Highway 29 so that Grapevine will remain in compliance with the plan approved by the governmental entities with oversight responsibility for the winery; (5) that Scruby has suffered no damages as a result of any acts or conduct of Grapevine; and finally, (6) that Grapevine must correct a water drainage problem which creates ponding on Scruby's side of the easement. Scruby appeals from the provision numbered (1)-(5), and Grapevine cross-appeals from the provision numbered (6).

The Main Appeal

General Law of Easements

"An easement is a restricted right to specific, limited, definable use or activity upon another's property, which right must be less than the right of ownership." (Mesnick v. Caton (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1248, 1261, 228 Cal.Rptr. 779.) In construing an instrument conveying an easement, the rules applicable to the construction of deeds generally apply. If the language is clear and explicit in the conveyance, there is no occasion for the use of parol evidence to show the nature and extent of the rights acquired. (Wilson v. Abrams (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 1030, 82 Cal.Rptr. 272; County of Sacramento v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 300, 313, 238 Cal.Rptr. 305.) If the language is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence may be used as an aid to interpretation unless such evidence imparts a meaning to which the instrument creating the easement is not reasonably susceptible. (Buehler v. Oregon-Washington Plywood Corp. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 520, 526, 131 Cal.Rptr. 394, 551 P.2d 1226.)

The owner of the dominant tenement must use his or her easements and rights in such a way as to impose as slight a burden as possible on the servient tenement. (Locklin v. City of Lafayette (1994) 7 Cal.4th 327, 356, fn. 17, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 613, 867 P.2d 724.) Every incident of ownership not inconsistent with the easement and the enjoyment of the same is reserved to the owner of the servient estate. (Golden West Baseball Co. v. City of Anaheim (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 11, 35, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 378; City of Los Angeles v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 889, 893-894, 129 Cal.Rptr. 485.)

The owner of the servient estate may make continued use of the area the easement covers so long as the use does not "interfere unreasonably" with the easement's purpose. (Camp Meeker Water System, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com. (1990) 51 Cal.3d 845, 867, 274 Cal.Rptr. 678, 799 P.2d 758; Raab v. Casper (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 866, 876, 124 Cal.Rptr. 590.) Whether a particular use by the servient owner of land subject to an easement is an unreasonable interference with the rights of the dominant owner is a question of fact for the trier of fact, and its findings based on conflicting evidence are binding on appeal. (Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Hacienda Mobile Home Park (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 519, 528, 119 Cal.Rptr. 559, and cases cited therein.)

The conveyance of an easement limited to roadway use grants a right of ingress and egress and a right of unobstructed passage to the holder of the easement. A roadway easement does not include the right to use the easement for any other purpose. (See Marlin v. Robinson (1932) 123 Cal.App. 373, 377, 11 P.2d 70.) When the easement is "nonexclusive" the common users "have to accommodate each other." (Applegate v. Ota (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 702, 712, 194 Cal.Rptr. 331.) An obstruction which unreasonably interferes with the use of a roadway easement can be ordered removed "for the protection and preservation" of the easement. (Id. at pp. 712-713, 194 Cal.Rptr. 331.)

While the parties are in agreement on the controlling principles of law, their dispute is with how the trial court applied these principles to the facts at hand.

Scope of the Easement Grant

Scruby's principal argument, which serves as a springboard for their remaining arguments, is that the court erred in construing the easement to give them a mere roadway of reasonable and convenient access to their residence and that the correct interpretation would have allowed them the right to exclusive use of the entire specifically described easement area. Scruby emphasizes the grant gives them "[a] nonexclusive easement, 52 feet in width, for road and utility purposes." Therefore, Scruby argues, they have "the right, as a matter of law, to use every portion of their 52-foot-wide easement, and the 100-foot diameter cul-de-sac, free of interference by [Grapevine]." (Emphasis in original.) Grapevine does not deny that Scruby has "the right to use the easement to come and go from their property unimpeded," but Grapevine contends that Scruby has "not been granted the right to use discrete 'portions of their easement' which do not relate to the efficient ingress and egress to and from their own property."

From the evidence presented and the court's tour of the premises, the court agreed with Grapevine that the extent of Scruby's right to use Grapevine's land was limited to an easement of ingress and egress to and from the property. The court further found that Grapevine had not used its property in any fashion or in any way which had restricted Scruby's access over the...