Scruggs v. Decatur Mineral & Land Co.

• Decision Date: 08 February 1889
• Citation: 5 So. 440,86 Ala. 173
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Parties: SCRUGGS ET AL. v. DECATUR MINERAL & LAND CO.

5 So. 440

86 Ala. 173

SCRUGGS ET AL. v. DECATUR MINERAL & LAND CO.

Supreme Court of Alabama

February 8, 1889

Appeal from chancery court, Morgan county; THOMAS COBBS, Judge.

Solomon E. Scruggs et al. filed a bill against the Decatur Mineral & Land Company, to set aside a deed. A demurrer to the bill was sustained, and complainants appeal.

O Kyle, John D. Watson, and R. A. & R. H Ballinger, for appellants.

Humes, Walker, Sheffey & Gordon and T. M. Scruggs, for appellee.

CLOPTON J.

The appeal being taken from a decree sustaining a demurrer to the bill, on the ground that the claim of the complainant is stale, and barred by the statute of limitations, a condensed statement of its substantial allegations is essential to a proper consideration and understanding of the questions raised by the demurrer.

Finch P. Scruggs, the father of complainants, purchased the land in controversy in March, 1851. Prior to its purchase he married Susan J. Murphy, both parties having been formerly married. On June the 20th, 1868, he made a deed of about 90 acres of the land on a recited consideration of $1,800 to Susan J. Murphy, (now Nelson,) who was a daughter of his second wife, born of her first marriage. To the deed is appended a certificate that it was executed in lieu of one made in 1858, which was lost or mislaid during the war, and had not been recorded. The complainants, being children of Scruggs born of his first marriage, sue as heirs at law, and seek by the bill to have the deed declared inoperative and vacated on the alleged ground that its execution was obtained by undue influence and false representations. The father of complainants resided with his family on the premises from the time of the purchase, in 1851, until 1864, when he was driven away by the military authorities. After the close of the war he returned, erected buildings and other improvements on the land, exercised other acts of ownership, and continued to reside thereon until the death of his wife, in 1876. The grantee, his stepdaughter, lived with him as a member of his family, and was treated with the affection due his own child. As the special facts constituting the undue influence and false representations by means of which the deed was procured, the bill avers that Scruggs, the grantor, was old and feeble, physically and mentally, in his dotage, that he had great confidence in his step-daughter, and frequently advised with her in his business matters, whereby she gained a controlling influence. She and her mother persistently impressed him with the apprehension that his property was in great danger of being confiscated, and that, if the title was conveyed to his step-daugther, who had been loyal to the federal government, and it could be made to appear that the property belonged to her before and during the war, she could prevent its confiscation, and recover large compensation for the damages committed by the Union forces. The bill further avers that no part of the consideration price expressed in the deed was paid, and that no conveyance was made in 1858, as stated in the annexed certificate. The bill was filed March 9, 1888.

It may be conceded that, on timely application by parties having a right to complain, a court of equity would vacate and cancel the deed on the allegations of the bill being proved. Section 3419, Code 1886, makes the statute of limitations applicable to suits commenced by bill in chancery. Under that statute a suit in equity will be barred by the lapse of the time prescribed as a bar to a corresponding legal remedy. The object of the bill being to avoid the legal title, and assert an equitable right to real estate, the corresponding legal remedy is an action of ejectment. If, therefore, there has been acquiescence in a possession, hostile to the title complainants assert, for a period of 10 years before the commencement of the suit, it is barred, unless there are excusable or explanatory circumstances which take the case out of the operation of the statute. Independent of statutory limitations, courts of equity act on a rule peculiar to themselves, which is designed to promote diligence on the part of suitors by refusing the enforcement of stale demands. The rule is not abrogated by the statute making the limitations of actions at law applicable to suits in chancery. The statutory limitations and the peculiar rule co-exist. In cases not coming directly within the operation of the statute, the court refuses relief where there has been unreasonable delay and long, unexplained acquiescence in the assertion of adverse rights, where the party complaining does not bring himself within the principle-"conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence"-on which activity in awarding relief depends. Nettles v. Nettles, 67 Ala. 599; James v. James, 55 Ala. 525.

It is contended that the bill does not bring the case prima facie within the bar of the statute of limitations, or within the operation of the rule against the enforcement of stale demands; and therefore the defendants cannot avail themselves of the defense by demurrer, but should be put to their plea or answer. It is a well-settled rule that, unless it is apparent upon the face of the bill that there has been an adverse possession for the period prescribed as a bar to the corresponding legal remedy, or acquiescence in the assertion of the...