Scruggs v. Keen

Citation900 F. Supp. 821
Decision Date19 July 1995
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 94-0015-D-R.
PartiesLari P. SCRUGGS, Plaintiff, v. Nadine KEEN, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Thomas Keister Greer, Rocky Mount, VA, William Carrington Thompson, Law Office of William C. Thompson, Chatham, VA, for plaintiff.

James Edward Ghee, James E. Ghee, Farmville, VA, Arelia Smith Langhorne, Lynchburg, VA, for Nadine Keen, Linda Edwards-White.

Dorothy Louise Dillon, Law Office of Dorothy P. Dillon, Rocky Mount, VA, for Kelly M. Steele, Elizabeth A. Abshire.

William David Paxton, John Christopher Clemens, Gentry, Locke, Rakes & Moore, Roanoke, VA, for William B. Gibson, Leonard A. Gereau, County School Board of Franklin County.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

KISER, Chief Judge.

Before the Court is the motion of the defendants Leonard Gereau, William Gibson, and the School Board of Franklin County (the "school board defendants") for summary judgment. These defendants previously filed a summary judgment prior to the commencement of discovery, which I denied. The parties have briefed the issues involved in the renewed motion and the Court heard arguments of counsel. The school board defendants' motion is, therefore, ripe for disposition. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.

FACTS:

Plaintiff brings this suit under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 1994). Plaintiff claims that the school board defendants deprived her of due process and First Amendment rights. Plaintiff was a mathematics teacher at Franklin County High School ("FCHS") during the school year 1992-1993. She also presided over study hall on occasion. In February 1993, plaintiff was in her second year of teaching at FCHS. She was a probationary status teacher teaching under a year-to-year contract.

On February 3, 1993, plaintiff was supervising a study hall. Kelly Steele and Elizabeth Abshire, two students in the study hall,1 approached plaintiff to request a hall pass to purchase tickets for a Black History Month assembly. Plaintiff denied the request as the principal of FCHS, defendant Gibson, had announced that tickets could be purchased between classes or during lunch.

A conversation between plaintiff, Abshire, and Steele ensued. It turned toward the topic of interracial dating when the students asked plaintiff for her comments on the subject. The content of the plaintiff's remarks is hotly debated between the parties. About the only undisputed fact is that her remarks indicated she did not favor interracial dating and that the students could have interpreted her remarks to mean that whites "lowered themselves" when they dated blacks. Abshire reported that plaintiff used a racial slur to describe blacks and an upcoming assembly being held for Black History Month. Plaintiff denies using the slur. Plaintiff also stated that interracial dating could cause problems, suggesting that interracial dating was the cause of recent fights in the school. Plaintiff maintains she was sharing her personal opinion on the topic. She did not know if Steele dated a black person, but did know, after Steele told her, that Steele's sister was dating a black male student. Scruggs Dep. at 84. Plaintiff did not know this, however, until after she shared her opinion on interracial dating. Id.

Prior to the events of February 3, 1993, interracial dating was not a topic frequently discussed. It never arose in school board meetings. No concerns about interracial dating were ever brought to the attention of Gereau. There were no newspaper articles discussing this issue. At the same time, however, it appears that the topic may have been a subject of student concern at FCHS. This conclusion flows from the "Evans Incident." There, a teacher was required to abandon his lesson plan for the day to allow students to discuss racism. A report of a student fight over race sparked the discussion.

Defendant Nadine Keen, an English teacher at FCHS during the 1992-1993 academic year, reported the study hall conversation to the school administration. Abshire told Keen of the conversation. On February 4, 1993, Gibson and Kevin Bezy, an assistant principal at FCHS, met with the plaintiff. At this meeting, they confronted plaintiff with the written statements of Abshire and Steele, obtained earlier that day, regarding what was said in the conversation. Abshire's and Steele's statements were obtained separately. Gibson and Bezy allowed the plaintiff to respond to the students' version of the conversation. Plaintiff admitted making certain comments, could not remember making others, and denied making others.

On February 5, Gibson and Bezy again met with the plaintiff. They read a summary of the prior day's meeting to her, which she indicated was accurate. Then, citing the potential disruptiveness of her comments, Gibson and Bezy notified plaintiff she would be suspended until further notice. She was later notified the suspension would be with pay, for three days. Plaintiff filed no grievance, as she could have under FCHS procedures, over this action.

The administration's reaction did not stop with the three-day suspension. Later on February 4, Gibson met with defendant Gereau, the Division Superintendent, and Florella Johnson, Associate Superintendent. Gereau decided at this time to recommend nonrenewal of plaintiff's teaching contract. Gereau sent a letter to plaintiff informing her of this action on February 24, 1993.

This letter informed plaintiff of her procedural rights in relation to the nonrenewal decision. Specifically, the letter indicates plaintiff may, upon written request, seek the reasons for the decision and, after receiving those reasons, request a conference with Gereau. Plaintiff requested such a conference and one was held on March 10, 1993. This meeting took place between plaintiff and Johnson, Gereau's designee.2

The media became involved in this event in March 1993 as a result of actions of defendant Keen and defendant Linda Edwards-White. Defendant Edwards-White learned of plaintiff's comments at a barber shop. She contacted a television station and wrote to the Virginia Department of Education to request an investigation. Plaintiff concedes that the school board defendants were not responsible for divulging the situation to the media.

As a result of the media coverage, concerns of racial tension at FCHS arose. The local sheriff's office was contacted. Keen reported threats against her and vandalism of her car. This prompted Gibson to place both Keen and plaintiff on a 10-day administrative leave with pay. The leave started on March 15, 1993. Safety concerns motivated this action. The plaintiff filed no grievance.

Plaintiff met with Gereau on March 19 to discuss the nonrenewal decision. Gereau discussed the possibility of resignation with plaintiff at this time. Gereau maintains he did not pressure plaintiff to resign. Plaintiff ultimately did resign, indicating her desire to do so in a typed letter dated March 19. There is some dispute as to when this letter was actually tendered. Gereau maintains it was on March 19 while the plaintiff claims it was March 24. Prior to deciding to resign, the plaintiff consulted Gary Waldo, an official with the Virginia Education Association, as well as her then-counsel. She also discussed the situation with her husband.

On March 25, the school board issued a press release. It does not mention plaintiff's resignation or Gereau's nonrenewal decision. It does indicate that there has been "no increase in discipline problems at FCHS." Toward the end of plaintiff's tenure, her teaching performance was evaluated. That evaluation reflected positive performance and indicated good relationships with students.

DISCUSSION:

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial and summary judgment is appropriate. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Co., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). In considering a motion for summary judgment, "the court is required to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. The plaintiff is entitled to have the credibility of all his evidence presumed." Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 68, 130 L.Ed.2d 24 (1994). There is a genuine issue of fact "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

II. Due Process Claim

Assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff has a liberty interest to protect,3 she received all the process that she was due. The minimum requirements of due process are notice and "some kind of hearing" prior to being suspended. Garraghty v. Jordan, 830 F.2d 1295, 1300 (4th Cir.1987). Affording the public employee the full panoply of rights that a criminal defendant is entitled to is not required. Riccio v. County of Fairfax, 907 F.2d 1459, 1465 (4th Cir.1990). The formalities required may vary depending on the importance of the interests involved and the nature of any subsequent proceedings. Garraghty, 830 F.2d at 1300; Grimes v. Nottoway County Sch. Bd., 462 F.2d 650, 653 (4th Cir.) ("The sufficiency of the procedures employed in any particular situation must be judged in the light of the parties, the subject matter and the circumstances involved."), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1008, 93 S.Ct. 439, 34 L.Ed.2d 300 (1972).

Addressing each possible deprivation seriatim, I turn first to the three-day suspension. At the outset, it is important to note that no significant...

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