Scruggs v. Sims
| Decision Date | 29 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:18-cv-00460-JRS-MJD,2:18-cv-00460-JRS-MJD |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER L. SCRUGGS, Plaintiff, v. MARY SIMS Dr., KELLY INDA M.H.P., D. RUSSELL Correctional Officer (Custody Major), MATT LEOHR Classification Officer, JERRY SNYDER Unit Team Manager (S.C.U.), CHRISTOPHER NICHOLSON (Lieutenant), Correctional Officer, (S.C.U.), DICK BROWN Warden, FRANK LITTLEJOHN Asst. Warden (Operations), KEVIN GILLMORE Asst. Warden (Re-Entry), WILSON Sgt., Correction Officer (Sergeant) (S.C.U.), Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
Before the Court is the motion for summary judgment of Dr. Mary Ruth Sims and Kelly Inda, mental health providers employed at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility (WVCF). Plaintiff Christopher L. Scruggs, an Indiana Department of Correction (IDOC) inmate incarcerated at WVCF, brought suit against these defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his First and Eighth Amendment rights. For the reasons explain in this Order, the motion, dkt. [80], is granted.
Mr. Scruggs alleges that Dr. Sims was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs when she did not treat his mental illnesses. Dkt. 2 (complaint); dkt. 11 (screening order). He also alleges that Dr. Sims and Ms. Inda retaliated against him for his writing grievances by causing him to be held in unsanitary conditions of confinement. Id. Although Mr. Scruggs asserts in his response to the pending motion for summary judgment that Ms. Inda was also deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, see dkt. 89 at 16, this claim was not discerned in the complaint during screening, see dkt. 11 at 2-3. A deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim was allowed to proceed only against Dr. Sims. Id. Mr. Scruggs was allowed an opportunity to file a motion to reconsider or an amended complaint if he thought the Court overlooked a claim and/or defendant. Id. 3. He did not do so, and has never sought leave to file an amended complaint. Accordingly, Mr. Scruggs's allegations of deliberate indifference are considered as against Dr. Sims only.
A motion for summary judgment asks the court to find that a trial is unnecessary because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and, instead, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). On summary judgment, a party must show the court what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of the events. Gekas v. Vasilades, 814 F.3d 890, 896 (7th Cir. 2016). The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if no reasonable fact-finder could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 875 (7th Cir. 2009). To survive a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must set forth specific, admissible evidence showing that there is a material issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The court views the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Skiba v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 884 F.3d 708, 717 (7th Cir. 2018). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the fact-finder. Miller v.Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). The court need only consider the cited materials, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3), and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly assured the district courts that they are not required to "scour every inch of the record" for evidence that is potentially relevant to the summary judgment motion before them. Grant v. Tr. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 573-74 (7th Cir. 2017). The non-moving party bears the burden of specifically identifying the relevant evidence of record. D.Z. v. Buell, 796 F.3d 749, 756 (7th Cir. 2015). This is in part because summary judgment is the "put up or shut up" moment in a lawsuit. Grant, 870 F.3d at 568.
II. Material Facts
B. Material Undisputed Facts
Consistent with the legal standards set out above, the following facts are undisputed. Whitaker v. Milwaukee Cnty, 772 F.3d 802, 808 (7th Cir. 2014). That is, these statements of fact are not necessarily objectively true, but as the summary judgment standard requires, the undisputed facts and any disputed evidence are presented in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Whitaker v. Wisc. Dep't of Health Serv's, 849 F.3d 681, 683 (7th Cir. 2017).1
At all times material to the issues in this lawsuit, Mr. Scruggs was incarcerated at WVCF, where Dr. Sims was employed as a psychologist and Ms. Inda was employed as a Licensed Mental Health Counselor. Dkt. 82-14; dkt. 82-1.
Mr. Scruggs testified that he believes that he has been diagnosed with several mental health conditions, beginning in 2007 when he became incarcerated, but he does not know what these conditions are. Dkt. 82-25 at 10. (Scruggs deposition of Jan. 24, 2020). The first diagnosis was made while he was in the Marion County Jail, where he was prescribed the medications Elavil, Geodon, and another medication that countered the side effects of Geodon. Id. at 11-12. Mr. Scruggs also self-medicated with marijuana. Id. at 14. However, since 2007, he has not been prescribed mental health medications. Id. at 12-13, 15, 20.
Mr. Scruggs entered the IDOC in 2007 and was transferred in 2017 to WVCF where he has been since. He contends that he has not been prescribed any mental health medications since roughly 2007. Id. at 12-13, 15, 20.
In the IDOC, mental health codes are assigned to inmates to indicate the level or seriousness of mental illnesses. An "A" mental health code is assigned to inmates who are "free of mental illness requiring routine therapy or counseling." Dkt. 82-14 at ¶ 26.a. (Sims affidavit). During all times material to this action, Mr. Scruggs's mental health code was "A." Id. at ¶ 26. Dr. Sims does not believe that Mr. Scruggs's conditions fit the criteria for any other mental health code. Id. Mr. Scruggs has never been housed in a mental health unit during his IDOC incarceration. Dkt. 82-25 at 18, 22. At his deposition, Mr. Scruggs testified that "I know what's wrong with me, and I know I need help with it . . . ." When asked what his mental health conditions were, Mr. Scruggs testified "I don't know." Id. at 52.
Mr. Scruggs has been housed only in the Secured Confinement Unit (SCU) or the Custody Confinement Unit (CCU) at WVCF. Id. at 18. Most of that time has been in the SCU, because his time in the CCU was only for approximately ten days. Id. at 18-19. The CCU cells are slightly larger than the SCU cells. Id. at 27.
On May 7, 2018, Mr. Scruggs was placed on suicide watch and initially housed in a SCU holding cell. Dkt. 82-1 at ¶ 4 (Inda affidavit); dkt. 82-25 at 23, 40; dkt. 82-14 at ¶ 5. Mr. Scruggs testified that he requested to be placed on suicide watch "because the C.O. lied on me and said I hit him with a cup of water." Dkt. 82-25 at 40. Ms. Inda had been summoned to the SCU because Mr. Scruggs reportedly said that he was going to harm himself. Dkt. 82-1 at ¶ 4. When she arrived at the SCU, Mr. Scruggs was in a holding cell. Id. As she assessed Mr. Scruggs, he told her that he did not think of ways to harm himself. Id. at ¶ 4. But when asked what would happen if he was returned to his cell, Mr. Scruggs gave an evasive answer. Id. Ms. Inda asked Mr. Scruggs how he could "problem solve" to resolve his perceived threats, but Mr. Scruggs was not interested in the exercise. Id.
A suicide watch is when the patient is continuously observed following self-injurious behavior or other indications that a risk of self-injury is imminent. Dkt. 82-14 at ¶ 6. When a patient is placed on constant observation suicide watch, typically a suicide watch "companion "monitors the patient to ensure that the patient does not engage in self-injurious behavior. Id. at ¶ 7. If a suicide watch companion is unavailable or for some reason inappropriate, a member of the custody staff fills the same role in monitoring the patient. Id.
Removing a patient from suicide watch usually occurs in gradual stages. Id. at ¶ 8. When a patient is under constant observation, the first step in transitioning off of suicide watch is to change the "constant" observation to close observation. Id. Under close observation, there is no suicide watch companion, and a visual observation is done at staggered intervals averaging fifteen minutes. Id. In addition to being used as a step-down from constant observation, close observation is typically used for a patient who has not engaged in physical acts of self-injury but who staff believes may be at increased risk for self-injurious behavior. Id.
If a patient is on close observation suicide watch with no indication of self-injurious behavior, does not display warning signs or clinical indications of self-injurious behavior, and does not express an intention of self-harm, he may be transitioned off of suicide watch following a visit with a mental health clinician. Id. at ¶ 9.
Following removal from suicide watch, the patient is seen for a one-day post-suicide-watch follow-up assessment, one-week follow-up, two-week follow-up, and four-week follow-up. Id. at ¶ 10. During each visit, so long as the patient has no clinical indications of an intent to engage in self-injurious behavior, or show other concerning clinical symptoms, the patient is seen according to a post-suicide-watch timeline. Id. If at any time the patient displays warning signs or communicates an intent to self-harm, the patient can be returned to suicide watch to protect his health and well-being. Id.
The goal of the suicide watch protocol is to protect the patient from self-injurious behavior. Id. at ¶ 11. The protocol implements a gradual transition off of suicide watch to monitor the patient for signs of...
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