Scutt v. Norton

• Decision Date: 17 December 2021
• Docket Number: CIVIL 21-00280 JAO-KJM
• Parties: JASON SCUTT, Plaintiff, v. MARTIN NORTON; CARRIE JOHNSON aka KAREN NORTON, [1] Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii

JASON SCUTT, Plaintiff, v. MARTIN NORTON; CARRIE JOHNSON aka KAREN NORTON, ^[1] Defendants.

CIVIL No. 21-00280 JAO-KJM

United States District Court, D. Hawaii

December 17, 2021

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE ALL CLAIMS

Jill A. Otake, United States District Judge

This case concerns alleged discrimination against pro se Plaintiff Jason Scutt (“Plaintiff”) by her former landlords, pro se Defendants Martin Norton (“Martin”) and Carrie Johnson (“Carrie”) (collectively “Defendants”), under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, also known as the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”).^[2] Defendants seek dismissal of all claims with prejudice. The Court finds this matter suitable for disposition without a hearing pursuant to Rule 7.1(c) of the Local Rules of Practice for the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii. For the following reasons Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 33, is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff commenced this action on June 21, 2021, alleging that Defendants violated the FHA by harassing her and using slurs to target her religion and gender. ECF No. 1 at 6; ECF No 1-1. The Court dismissed the Complaint with leave to amend. ECF No. 7.

On July 12, 2021, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) reasserting the FHA claim and referencing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. ECF No. 10. The Court dismissed the FAC (“Second Dismissal Order”), concluding that Plaintiff's conclusory allegations regarding Defendants' conduct insufficiently demonstrated that they caused the purported harm because of her gender or religion, or any other protected ground, and in fact appeared to concern general landlord-tenant disputes. ECF No. 12 at 6-7. The Court gave Plaintiff a final opportunity to cure the deficiencies identified in the Second Dismissal Order and explained that she must “present facts showing that Defendants acted because of her gender/LGBTQ status or religion” because “[i]t is not enough to merely speculate that they did.” ECF No. 12 at 7.

Plaintiff filed the SAC on July 25, 2021, which exclusively asserts an FHA claim. ECF No. 13. She avers that Defendants were unable to evict her following “prohibited conversations about religion and racist political views” and instead violently forced her to vacate the property. Id. at 1. Plaintiff accuses Defendants of engaging in racist and anti-LGBTQ harassment. Id.

On September 17, 2021, Defendants filed an Answer. ECF No. 27. They subsequently filed this Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice all Claims. ECF No. 33. Plaintiff filed an Opposition on October 19, 2021. ECF No. 39. Defendants filed their Reply on November 15, 2021. ECF No. 42.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a complaint that fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “the court accepts the facts alleged in the complaint as true, ” and “[d]ismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged.” UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)) (alteration in original). However, conclusory allegations of law, unwarranted deductions of fact, and unreasonable inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001); Nat'l Ass'n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

Furthermore, the court need not accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice. See Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988.

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Facial plausibility exists “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The tenet that the court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint does not apply to legal conclusions. See Id. As such, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has not ‘show[n]' — ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Id. at 679 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)) (some alterations in original).

If dismissal is ordered, the plaintiff should be granted leave to amend unless it is clear that the claims could not be saved by amendment. See Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 760 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. The Court Construes The Motion To Dismiss As A Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Defendants filed this Motion after they filed their Answer. FRCP 12(b)(6) motions must be filed before a responsive pleading. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (“A motion asserting any of these defenses must be made before pleading if a responsive pleading is allowed.”); Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). The Court therefore construes the Motion as a motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2) (“Failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . . may be raised . . . by motion under Rule 12(c)[.]”); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 1980) (treating a motion to dismiss as a motion for judgment on the pleadings because FRCP 12(h)(2) specifically authorizes a motion for judgment on the pleadings to assert failure to state a claim, which is only permissible after the pleadings are closed under FRCP 12(c); and noting that FRCP “12(c) and 12(h)(2) together constitute a qualification of [FRCP] 12(b)(6)”); Elvig, 375 F.3d at 954 (explaining that a motion to dismiss filed after the answer should have been treated as a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to FRCP 12(c) or 12(h)(2)).

An FRCP 12(c) motion is functionally equivalent to an FRCP 12(b)(6) motion so the Court applies the same standard of review. See Gregg v. Haw., Dep't of Pub. Safety, 870 F.3d 883, 887 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). “A judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when, ‘taking all the allegations in the pleadings as true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'” Id. (citation omitted).

II. Plaintiff's FHA Claim Fails

The FHA prohibits discrimination “against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). The Ninth Circuit applies the Title VII discrimination analysis in evaluating FHA claims. See Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). FHA discrimination claims may be established “under a theory of disparate treatment or disparate impact.” Id. (citation omitted). To state a prima facie case of disparate treatment, Plaintiff must allege that (1) her rights are protected under the FHA and (2) she suffered a distinct and palpable injury as a result of Defendants' discriminatory conduct. See Id. Discriminatory intent or motive is a requisite element of any disparate treatment claim under the FHA. See Wood v. City of San Diego, 678 F.3d 1075, 1081 (9th Cir. 2012) (identifying discriminatory intent as a requirement in a disparate treatment claim under Title VII).

Plaintiff concludes that Defendants violated the FHA by changing the terms, conditions, and privileges of the rental after discovering her religious beliefs and sex/sexual orientation. ECF No. 13 at 8. However, the SAC advances contradictory and deficient allegations that do not support an FHA claim. Plaintiff entered into a six-month lease with Defendants beginning on July 31, 2020 and concluding on January 31, 2021.^[3] ECF No. 13-1 at 13. She points to grievances spanning from the outset of her lease as evidence of Defendants' culpability, yet admits that the purportedly discriminatory/harassing conduct did not commence until November or December 2020. The vast majority of the alleged landlord-tenant and other grievances are unconnected to any racial, religious, or sex discrimination against her, and are unsupported by the Exhibit Plaintiff submitted with her Opposition.^[4] And many of the instances where Plaintiff offers accusations suggesting discriminatory comments do not pertain specifically to her or Defendants.^[5]

The Court has distilled the relevant facts, and Plaintiff appears to have drawn unwarranted inferences to presume that Defendants discriminated against her. However, this cannot carry the day. Other than her conclusory statements Plaintiff does not present plausible facts suggesting that Defendants had discriminatory intent or that they treated similarly situated individuals outside her protected classes more favorably. See Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 2004); Ting v. Adams & Assocs., Inc., 823 Fed.Appx. 519, 522 (9th Cir. 2020) (affirming dismissal of Title VII claims because the plaintiff failed to allege facts supporting a reasonable inference that the defendant did not rehire her based on her race or that it treated individuals of...