Scutt v. UnitedHealth Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 28 July 2021
• Docket Number: CIVIL NO. 21-00323 JAO-RT
• Parties: JASON SCUTT, Plaintiff, v. UNITEDHEALTH INSURANCE CO. AND SUBSIDIARIES; MAUI COMMUNITY CLINIC aka "MALAMA I KE OLA," Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii

JASON SCUTT, Plaintiff, v. UNITEDHEALTH INSURANCE CO. AND SUBSIDIARIES;

MAUI COMMUNITY CLINIC aka "MALAMA I KE OLA," Defendants.

CIVIL NO. 21-00323 JAO-RT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII

July 28, 2021

ORDER (1) DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND (2) DENYING IFP APPLICATION

Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Jason Scutt's ("Plaintiff") Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis ("IFP Application" or "Application"), filed July 26, 2021. ECF No. 3. For the following reasons, the Court DISMISSES the Complaint with leave to amend and DENIES the IFP Application.

BACKGROUND

This case — the tenth case filed by Plaintiff in this district since January 2020 — concerns Defendants UnitedHealth Insurance Company's ("UnitedHealth") and Maui Community Clinic aka Malama I Ke Ola's ("Malama") (collectively, "Defendants") alleged denial of insurance coverage and medical treatments for Plaintiff's gender dysphoria. Plaintiff asserts four claims: (1) medical malpractice related to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and "Hawaii state law § 431"; (2) defamation; (3) Eighth Amendment; and (4) Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). She requests compensatory, statutory, and exemplary damages and an injunction and protective order against Defendants, as well as the participants of other related proceedings. Compl. at 23.

DISCUSSION

I. Dismissal of the Complaint under the In Forma Pauperis Statute — 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. A court may deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset and shall dismiss the complaint if it appears from the face of the proposed complaint that the action: (1) "is frivolous or malicious"; (2) "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted"; or (3) "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see Tripati v. First Nat'l Bank & Tr., 821 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1987); Minetti v. Port of Seattle, 152 F.3d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1998). When evaluating whether a complaint fails to state a viable claim for screening purposes, the Court applies FRCP 8's pleading standard as it does in the context of an FRCP 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012).

FRCP 8(a) requires "a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction" and "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)-(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. See Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). "The Federal Rules require that averments 'be simple, concise and direct.'" McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996). FRCP 8 does not demand detailed factual allegations. However, "it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. (citation omitted) "[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). A claim is plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted).

Leave to amend should be granted even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless the Court determines that the pleading could not possibly becured by the allegation of other facts. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Tripati, 821 F.2d at 1370. Specifically, "pro se plaintiffs proceeding in forma pauperis must also be given an opportunity to amend their complaint unless it is 'absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.'" Tripati, 821 F.2d 1370 (quoting Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228 n.9 (9th Cir. 1984)); Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2011) ("If a pro se complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, the court must 'freely grant leave to amend' if it is 'at all possible' that the plaintiff could correct pleading deficiencies by alleging different or new facts." (citation omitted)).

In the present case, even construing Plaintiff's FAC liberally, see Bernhardt v. Los Angeles County., 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003); Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 757 (9th Cir. 2003), the Court finds that dismissal is appropriate because Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

A. Medical Malpractice Related to Title VI

Plaintiff inexplicably ties medical malpractice, an insurance provision from Hawai'i Revised Statutes ("HRS"), and Title VI, into a single claim. Plaintiff claims that "Hawaii state law § 431"¹ mirrors Title VI so Defendants' denial of coverage and medically necessary treatments violated state law and Title VIbecause they were due to her transgender status. Title VI provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. To state a Title VI claim, "a plaintiff must allege that (1) the entity involved is engaging in racial discrimination; and (2) the entity involved is receiving federal financial assistance."² Fobbs v. Holy Cross Health Sys. Corp., 29 F.3d 1439, 1447 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Daviton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 241 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (citations omitted). Plaintiff plainly alleges that Defendants discriminated against her "because she was seeking gender affirming surgery." Compl. at 12. This is unrelated to race, so Title VI is inapplicable and the claim is DISMISSED with prejudice.

B. Eighth Amendment

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the Eighth Amendment by depriving her of gender affirming surgery and other health care. Compl. at 20. "The government has an 'obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration,' and failure to meet that obligation can constitute an Eighth Amendment violation cognizable under § 1983. Colwell v. Bannister, 763F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-05 (1976)). Because Plaintiff is not incarcerated, she cannot state a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation. Therefore, her Eighth Amendment claim is DISMISSED with prejudice.

C. ADA

Plaintiff alleges that UnitedHealth violated Title III of the ADA by failing to provide her accommodations for her hearing and speaking impairments; namely, refusing to allow her to communicate with ground transportation drivers via text, thereby denying her the use of these services. Compl. at 21. She also asserts that UnitedHealth refused to authorize a wrist brace for her broken wrist. Id. at 21-22. Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination against individuals "on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a); Karczewski v. DCH Mission Valley LLC, 862 F.3d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 2017) ("Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination by public accommodations."). "Public accommodations must start by considering how their facilities are used by non-disabled guests and then take reasonable steps to provide disabled guests with a like experience." Karczewski, 862 F.3d at 1009 (citing Baughman v. Walt Disney World Co., 685 F.3d 1131,1135 (9th Cir. 2012)). A plaintiff alleging discrimination under Title III must show the following:

(1) he is disabled as that term is defined by the ADA; (2) the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation; (3) the defendant employed a discriminatory policy or practice; and (4) the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff based upon the plaintiff's disability by (a) failing to make a requested reasonable modification that was (b) necessary to accommodate the plaintiff's disability.

Fortyune v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1082 (9th Cir. 2004).

Plaintiff has not alleged that she is disabled as defined by the ADA, but assuming she is, she has not alleged that UnitedHealth owns, leases or operates a place of public accommodation related to her claim. The ADA identifies the following private entities as public accommodations, "if the operations of such entities affect commerce--"

(A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging, except for an establishment located within a building that contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and that is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as the residence of such proprietor;

(B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink;

(C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of exhibition or entertainment;

(D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of public gathering;(E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center, or other sales or rental establishment;

(F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or

...