SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc.

• Decision Date: 15 July 2014
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 1:14-cv-191
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
• Parties: SD3, LLC, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BLACK & DECKER (U.S.), INC., et al., Defendants.

SD3, LLC, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BLACK & DECKER (U.S.), INC., et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:14-cv-191

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Alexandria Division

Dated: July 15, 2014

MEMORANDUM OPINION

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Motions to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint.

Plaintiff SD3, LLC is an Oregon limited liability company with its principal place of business in Tualatin, Oregon. Plaintiff SawStop, LLC is also an Oregon limited liability company with its principal place of business in Tualatin, Oregon. SD3 and SawStop ("Plaintiffs") are connected; SD3 is SawStop's parent company. Plaintiffs bring suit against the Defendants: Stanley Black & Decker, Inc., Black & Decker Corp., Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc., Robert Bosch GmbH, Robert Bosch Tool Corporation, Techtronic Industries Co., Ltd., Techtronic Industries North America, Inc., Milwaukee Electric Tool Corp., Ryobi, One World Technologies Inc., OWT Industries, Inc.,Emerson Electric Company, Hitachi Koki Co., Ltd., Hitachi Koki USA Ltd., Makita Corporation, Makita USA, Inc., Pentair, Inc., Pentair Water Group, Inc., Chang Type Industrial Co., Ltd., Delta Power Equipment Corp., and alleged co-conspirators Power Tool Institute PPTI") and Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. PUL").

Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint alleges the following: (I) Violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act psherman Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 1, through a group boycott of Plaintiffs' "SawStop" technology; (II) A second Sherman Act Section 1 violation for conspiring via the PTI and UL to corrupt UL table-saw standards to prevent the Plaintiffs' technology from becoming an industry standard; (III) (against all Defendants except Defendant Emerson) A third Sherman Act Section 1 violation through the corruption of safety standards for table saw blade guards so as to implement a design standard rather than a performance standard; (IV) Violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 1331.04 through the group boycott alleged in Count I; (V) Violation of 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/3 through the "standards conspiracy" alleged in Count II; and (VI) (against all Defendants except Defendant Emerson) Violation of 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/3 through the corruption of industry standards at issue in Count III.

Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants engaged in a "group boycott" of Plaintiffs' table saw safety technology by agreeing to collectively refuse Plaintiffs' offers to license or implement their "Active Injury Mitigation Technology" ("AIMT"), and that Defendants corrupted relevant industry standards to prevent the industry-wide adoption of Plaintiffs' technology.

Plaintiffs allege that in 2000 Dr. Stephen F. Gass approached some of the Defendants to inquire if they would license Plaintiffs' AIMT. The AIMT, or "SawStop" technology, is alleged to significantly reduce the risk of table-saw accidents. Plaintiffs further allege that, beginning in October 2001, some Defendants agreed to boycott "SawStop" out of a concern that if any Defendant adopted Plaintiffs' technology then any non-adopting Defendant could be subjected to greater product-liability exposure for ignoring a commercially-viable safety technology. They also allege that these Defendants and other members of the PTI discussed developing something like the "SawStop" technology - which would give them comparable safety technology without having to pay Dr. Gass a royalty fee. PTI members then allegedly agreed not to license "SawStop" technology or otherwise implement AIMT within a certain period of months following the October 2001 PTI meeting.

Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint also alleges that three of the alleged conspirators, Defendants Black & Decker, EmersonElectric Company ("Emerson"), and Ryobi, engaged in licensing negotiations with Dr. Gass for months after the alleged conspiracy began. Ryobi signed a "non-exclusive" license agreement and sent it to Plaintiffs in January 2002, but Dr. Gass refused to sign it because of what he described as "minor" issues. Plaintiffs allege that Emerson negotiated with Plaintiffs between 2000 and January 2002 and then cut off negotiations for pretextual reasons. Plaintiffs also allege that Black & Decker negotiated with them for more than two years, and in April 2002 offered a license agreement with a 1% royalty payment. The Plaintiffs thought this unserious, seeking instead an 8% royalty payment.

Plaintiffs allege that after they were unsuccessful in convincing any Defendant to license the technology on their terms, Dr. Gass proposed a safety-standard revision to UL, which provides safety-related certification for table saws. His December 31, 2002 proposed revision would have mandated "SawStop" technology for all table saws. The revision was addressed by UL's Standards Technical Panel ("STP") 745, containing certain Defendants, in February 2003. Plaintiffs allege that due to an agreement among Defendants to vote as a bloc, STP 745 rejected Plaintiffs' proposal on February 11, 2003.

A short time after the STP 745 rejection, Defendant Emerson stopped manufacturing table saws, and some industry members - Defendants Black & Decker, Hitachi USA, Pentair, Robert Bosch GmbH, One World Technologies, and Techtronic Industries - sought to develop alternative safety technology not subject to Plaintiffs' patents. Plaintiffs allege that this served as a veneer to fend off "SawStop's" implementation by the U.S. Consumer Products Safety Commission through which the Plaintiffs also sought to effectively mandate their technology throughout the table-saw industry. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants did work to make incremental improvements to table-saw safety standards over the ensuing years, and UL did amend its safety standards both in 2005 and 2007 to include improved safety features designed to reduce table-saw accidents. But, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants' efforts were intended to prevent "SawStop's" industry-wide imposition.

After failing to agree to a licensing deal with any Defendant and failing to mandate their technology within the industry, Plaintiffs began their ongoing competition with some Defendants in 2004, entering the market of manufacturing and selling AIMT-equipped table saws.

Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits concerted action to restrain trade through a "contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy," see 15 U.S.C. § 1, but doesnot prohibit different market actors ultimately coming to the same conclusion on a particular issue, see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007). The latter behavior, "parallel conduct," even when "consciously undertaken, needs some setting suggesting the agreement necessary to make out a [Sherman] § 1 claim; without that further circumstance pointing toward a meeting of the minds, an account of a defendant's commercial efforts stays in neutral territory." See id. Moreover, a conspiracy to refuse to deal must indeed be concerted as businesses generally may refuse to deal with whomever they want. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984).

To survive Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, Plaintiffs' "allegations must produce an inference of liability strong enough to nudge the [Plaintiffs'] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 256 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Accordingly, an alleged antitrust conspiracy is not established simply by lumping "the defendants" altogether. Such pleading instead "must allege that each individual defendant joined the conspiracy and played some role in it because, at the heart of an antitrust conspiracy is an agreement and a conscious decision by each defendant to join it." In re Elec. Carbon Prods.Antitrust Litig., 333 F. Supp. 2d 303, 311-12 (D.N.J. 2004) (citing Jung v. Assoc. of Am. Med. Colls., 300 F. Supp. 2d 119, 163-64 (D.D.C. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted)). A conspiracy must be alleged by either direct or circumstantial evidence "^xthat tends to exclude the possibility' that the alleged conspirators acted independently." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986) (quoting Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764). Finally, while the Plaintiffs receive all inferences drawn in their favor on these Motions to Dismiss, they do not receive the benefit of "unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments," see Glassman v. Arlington County, 628 F.3d 140, 146 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), nor allegations based on portions of a document in conflict with its full contents that the Court can take notice of, see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569 n.13.

As both state laws alleged are construed in light of the Sherman Act, and the Sherman Act provides the basis for the federal claims here, the Court's analysis will center on the Sherman Act allegations. See 70 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/11 ("[T]he courts of this State shall use the construction of the federal law by the federal courts as a guide in construing this Act."); see also Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 893, 920 (S.D. Ohio 1981), aff'd, 691 F.2d818 (6th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff's failure to prove its claims under the Sherman Act was a failure to prove its claim under Ohio's Valentine Act). Accordingly, Plaintiffs' state law claims hinge on the fate of their Sherman Act claims.

Turning to the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs' conspiracy allegations are belied by their negotiating history with varying Defendants. Plaintiffs allege that they negotiated with Defendants Emerson, Ryobi, and Black & Decker, respectively, well after the alleged group boycott began in October 2001. Such history fails to show an agreement to restrain trade. See Greater Rockford Energy & Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 998 F.2d 391, 396 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Plaintiffs have failed to show a § 1 violation . . . . Indeed, the...