Seabd. Air Line Ry v. Miller

• Decision Date: 26 October 1908
• Docket Number: (No. 1,251.)
• Citation: 5 Ga.App. 402,63 S.E. 299
• Parties: SEABOARD AIR LINE RY. v. MILLER.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

63 S.E. 299

5 Ga.App. 402

SEABOARD AIR LINE RY.

v.MILLER.

(No. 1, 251.)

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Oct. 26, 1908.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 16, 1909.

1. Appeal and Error (§ 1004^*)—ReviewAmount of Damages.

A verdict in one-of that class of cases in which the amount of damage is left to the enlightened conscience of the jury is not to be declared by a reviewing court to be excessive, unless it is so large in amount as to justify the court in believing that it could not reasonably have resulted from any other cause than bias or gross mistake on the part of the jury.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3944-3947; Dec. Dig. § 1004.*]

2. No reason appears for granting a new trial.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from City Court of Atlanta; H. M. Reid, Judge.

Action by J. D. Miller, Jr., against the Seaboard Air Line Railway. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Brown & Randolph, for plaintiff in error.

Atkinson & Born, for defendant in error.

POWELL, J. Miller sued the railway company for damages resulting from a negligent injury in which both of his legs were cut off. He recovered a verdict of $25,000, which the trial judge expressly approved as being in his opinion not excessive under the circumstances. In this court it was practically conceded that the evidence was such as to authorize the jury to find that the defendant was negligent and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover in some amount; the chief insistence being that the verdict is excessive. At the time of the injury the plaintiff was 21 years old, was a locomotive fireman, and was earning $1.75 per day. He experienced great pain and suffering.

The power of this court to set aside a verdict on the ground that it is excessive is contained in, and is limited by, section 3803 of the Civil Code of 1895, which reads as follows: "The question of damages being one for the jury, the court should not interfere, unless the damages are either so small or so excessive as to justify the inference of gross mistake or undue bias." This is a different power from that exercised by the judge of the trial court in reviewing the verdict on a motion for a new trial. Holland v. Williams, 3 Ga. App. 636, 60 S. E. 331. In cases such as this the amount of the damages is to be determined solely (except so far as the trial judge has power to review the verdict) by the enlightened conscience of the jurors trying the case, provided only that they are impartial and that they have not acted under some gross mistake. The presumption is that the jurors were impartial and that they understood the case before them. If the verdict is so large that either by the very size alone, or by the size taken in connection with the other circumstances appearing, the reviewing court is justified in saying the jury was not impartial or the verdict was induced by a mistake, the presumption is overcome, and the verdict is set aside; for, of course, a verdict rendered by a prejudiced jury, or by a fair jury as the result of a mistake, is not a legal verdict.

The question is, how is this bias or this mistake to be shown? Sometimes it may be shown directly, but this is rarely so. Usually it is a matter of inference; and in that event the solution falls within the rule as to circumstantial evidence: There must be no reasonable hypothesis other than that the bias or the mistake did exist. Sometimes the verdict is so very large as to present a phase of "res ipsa loquitur." At common law it was long doubted that judges had the right to set aside verdicts and to grant new trials; and almost as early as this right was established the power to set aside a verdict as being excessive was recognized. The one proposition has the other as a corollary.

In Chambers v. Robinson (1739) 1 Strange, 691, the court awarded one new trial because the verdict in a case for malicious prosecution was excessive, but refused a second grant were the same amount—$1,000 —was returned by another jury.

In Wilford v. Berkeley (1758) 1 Burr. 609, the report states that "the court were, all three, clear and unanimous, that although there was no doubt of the power of the court to exercise a proper discretion in setting aside verdicts for excessiveness of damages, in cases where the quantum of the damages really suffered by the plaintiff could be apparent, or they were of such a nature that the court could properly judge of the degree of the injury, and could see manifestly that the jury had been outrageous in giving such damages as greatly exceeded the injury, yet thecas e was very different where it depended upon circumstances which were properly and solely under the cognizance of the jury and were fit to be submitted to their decision and estimate."

In Leeman v. Allen (1763) 2 Wils. 160, the court was asked to set aside a verdict in a case of tort on the ground that it was excessive. The court discharged the rule, saying, through the Chief Justice: "As to the excessiveness of damages, courts should be very cautious how they overthrow verdicts that have been given by 12 men on their oaths; however, if damages be unreasonableand outrageous indeed, as if £2, 000 or £3, 000 was to be given in a little battery, which all mankind might see to be unreasonable at first blush, certainly a court would set aside such a verdict, and try whether a second jury would not be more reasonable. The rule in the case of Ash v. Ash, Comb. 357, laid down by Lord Holt, is a good one: 'The jury are to try causes with the assistance of the judges, and ought to give their reasons when required, that if they go upon any mistake they may be set right.' And for their not doing so, and for excessiveness of damages, a new trial was granted. And this rule is universal and extends to all sorts of actions. But it may be said; what rule has the court to govern themselves by as to matters of tort? I answer, the court must be able to say the damages are beyond all measure unreasonable, though they cannot say exactly what damages ought to be given."

In Huckle v. Money (1763) 2 Wils. 205, upon a similar motion the court said: "It is very dangerous for the judges to intermeddle in damages for torts. It must be a glaring case, indeed, of outrageous damages in a tort, and which all mankind at first blush must think so, to Induce a court to grant a new trial for excessive damages."

In Beardmore v. Carrington (1763) 2 Wils. 244, the case of Chambers v. Robinson, supra, was severely criticised so far as it granted the first new trial, and the court, after a long review of cases, in which it showed that the judges had declined to declare a verdict of £4, 000 excessive in a slander suit, concludes: "We desire to be understood that this court does not say, or lay down any rule, that there never can happen a case of such excessive damages in tort where the court may not grant a new trial; but in that case the damages must be monstruous indeed, and such as all mankind must be ready to exclaim against at first blush."

In Gilbert v. Burtenshaw (1774) 1 Cowp. 231, Lord Mansfield said in...