Seaboard Air Line Railway v. Renn

• Decision Date: 22 May 1916
• Docket Number: No. 773,773
• Parties: SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY, Plff. in Err., v. J. T. RENN
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

241 U.S. 290

36 S.Ct. 567

60 L.Ed. 1006

SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY, Plff. in Err.,

v J. T. RENN.

No. 773.

Argued April 4, 1916.

Decided May 22, 1916.

Mr. Murray Allen for plaintiff in error.

[Argument of Counsel from page 291 intentionally omitted] Messrs. Robert N. Simms, William C. Douglass, and Clyde A. Douglass for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice Van Devanter delivered the opinion of the court:

This was an action by an employee of a railroad company to recover from the latter for personal injuries suffered through its negligence. The plaintiff had a verdict and judgment under the employers' liability act of Congress (chap. 149, 35 Stat. at L. 65, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8657; chap. 143, 36 Stat. at L. 291), the judgment was affirmed (——N. C. ——, 86 S. E. 964), and the defendant brings the case here.

The original complaint was exceedingly brief and did not sufficiently allege that at the time of the injury the defendant was engaged and the plaintiff employed in interstate commerce. During the trial the defendant sought some advantage from this, and the court, over the defendant's objection, permitted the complaint to be so amended as to state distinctly the defendant's engagement and the plaintiff's employment in such commerce. Both parties conceded that what was alleged in the amendment was true in fact and conformed to the proofs, and that point has since been treated as settled. The defendant's objection was that the original complaint did not state a cause of action under the act of Congress, that with the amendment the complaint would state a new cause of action under that act, and that, as more than two years had elapsed since the right of action accrued, the amendment could not be made the medium of introducing this new cause of action consistently with the provision in § 6 that 'no action shall be maintained under this act unless commenced within two years from the day the cause of action acrued.' Whether in what was done this restriction was in effect disregarded is a Federal question and subject to re-examination here, however much the allowance of the amendment otherwise might have rested in discretion or been a matter of local procedure. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Burnette, 239 U. S. 199, 60 L. ed. ——, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 75. If the amendment merely expanded or amplified what was alleged in support of the cause of action already asserted, it related back to the commencement of the action, and was not affected by the intervening lapse of time. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Cox, 145 U. S. 593, 603, 604, 36 L. ed. 829, 832, 833, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 905; Atlantic & P. R. Co. v. Laird, 164 U. S. 393, 41 L. ed. 485, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 120; Hutchinson v. Otis, 190 U. S. 552, 555, 47 L. ed. 1179, 1181, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 778; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Wulf, 226 U. S. 570, 576, 57 L. ed. 355, 363, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 135, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 134; Crotty v. Chicago G. W. R. Co. 95 C. C. A. 91, 169 Fed. 593. But if it introduced a new or different cause of action, it was the equivalent of a new suit, as to which the running of the limitation was not theretofore arrested. Sicard v. Davis, 6 Pet. 124, 140; 8 L. ed. 342, 348; Union P. R. Co. v. Wyler, 158 U. S. 285, 39 L. ed. 983, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 877; United States v. Dalcour, 203 U. S. 408, 423, 51 L. ed. 248, 251, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 58. The original complaint set forth that the defendant was operating a line of railroad in Virginia, North Carolina, and elsewhere; that the plaintiff was in its employ; that when he was injured he was in the line of duty and was proceeding to get aboard one of the defendant's trains, and that the injury was sustained at Cochran, Virginia, through the defendant's negligence in permitting a part of its right of way at that place to get and remain in a dangerous condition. Of course, the right...