Seaboard Air Line Railway Company v. Elizabeth Blackwell
| Citation | 61 L.Ed. 1160,37 S.Ct. 640,244 U.S. 310 |
| Decision Date | 04 June 1917 |
| Docket Number | No. 213,213 |
| Parties | SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY COMPANY, Plff. in Err., v. ELIZABETH BLACKWELL |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Messrs. Lamar C. Rucker, Andrew J. Cobb, Howell C. Erwin, and W. L. Erwin for plaintiff in error.
No appearance for defendant in error.
This writ of error is directed to a judgment entered upon a verdict for the sum of $1,000 in the city court of Elberton, Georgia, for the death of a son of defendant in error, alleged to have been caused by the railway company. The judgment was affirmed by the court of appeals of Georgia.
The facts as charged are: That the deceased was driving a horse and buggy along a public road in the county of Elbert, and while crossing the railroad track of the railway company at a public crossing outside of the city of Elberton, he was struck by the engine of one of the company's passenger trains and received injuries from which he died three days later.
That the employees of the company in charge of the train failed to blow the engine whistle at the blow post 400 yards south of the crossing, failed to keep blowing it until the train arrived at the crossing, and failed to check the speed of the train at such blow post and keep it checked until the train reached the crossing, and, so failing, the company was guilty of negligence.
That the employees of the company failed to keep the train under control, and approached the crossing at a high and dangerous rate of speed, so that they could not stop the same in time to save the life of the deceased, and that such conduct was negligence. And that 'such conduct was negligence if they saw said deceased on the crossing, and it was negligence if they did not see him, and it was negligence under the blow-post law,1 and it was negligence regardless of the blow-post law.'
The company by its answer denied the various acts of negligence charged against it and its employees and denied 'that the failure to comply with said blow-post law was negligence on its part relatively to the transaction in question.'
The company set out the applicable sections of the law and alleged that its train was running in interstate commerce between the states, and especially between Georgia and South Carolina. That between the city of Atlanta, Georgia, and the Savannah river, a distance of 123 miles, where the same is the boundary line of Georgia, there are 124 points where the line of the railroad crosses public roads of the different counties of the state, established pursuant to law, and that all of such crossings are at grade.
That in order to comply with the law the speed of a train would have to be so slackened that there would be practically a full stop at each of the road crossings; that the time required for such purpose would depend upon various conditions, which might or might not exist at the time and at the crossings; among others, the state of the weather and the percentage of grade; but it would not be less than three minutes for a train composed of an engine and three cars, and for a train of a greater number of cars the time would be greater,—for an average freight train, not less than five minutes.
That the train alleged to have caused the death of the deceased was composed of an engine, a mail car, and two coaches, and that if the blow-post law had been complied with on the day in question at least three minutes would have been consumed at each crossing,—more than six hours between Atlanta and the Savannah river. That the running time between those points according to the adopted schedule was four hours and thirty minutes. That if the law had been complied with the time consumed between those points would have been more than ten and one-half hours.
That for freight trains the time consumed would be more than sixteen hours, the maximum speed of such trains on the company's road being 20 miles an hour.
That the crossings are the usual and ordinary grade crossings and there are no conditions which make any one of them peculiarly dangerous other than such danger as may result from the crossing of a public road by a railroad track at grade.
That between the city of Atlanta and the Savannah river the line of the company's railroad crosses the tracks of two other railroads, and that under the laws of the state a train is required to come to a full stop 50 feet from the crossing, and that the time so consumed would increase the time required to operate between the points referred to.
That the law as applied to the train in question is an unreasonable regulation of interstate commerce and a violation of ¶3, § 8, article I., of the Constitution of the United States, and that therefore the company is not guilty of the various acts of negligence charged against it.
Upon demurrer to the answer of the company the averments in regard to the law were struck out except the denial that the failure to comply with the law was negligence on the company's part 'relatively to the transaction in question.'
The case so went to the jury, including the defense that the deceased failed to exercise ordinary care and diligence for his own safety. The jury returned a verdict for the sum of $1,000.
A motion for a new trial was denied. The railway...
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