Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Watson

• Decision Date: 12 November 1931
• Citation: Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Watson, 103 Fla. 477, 137 So. 719 (Fla. 1931)
• Parties: SEABOARD AIR LINE RY. CO. v. WATSON.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

137 So. 719

103 Fla. 477

SEABOARD AIR LINE RY. CO. v. WATSON.

Florida Supreme Court

November 12, 1931

Commissioners' Decision.

Error to Circuit Court, Gadsden County; E. C. Love, Judge.

Action by A. W. Watson against the Seaboard Air Line Railway Company. Judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant brings error.

Affirmed on condition of remittitur.

TERRELL J., dissenting.

Syllabus by the Court.

SYLLABUS

In an action against a railroad company for damage done to live stock or other property by the running of the train, under the issue of not guilty, the presumption that the injury was inflicted through the negligence of the railroad company or its employees is raised by evidence showing that the injury was committed by the defendant. Such presumption does not outweigh proof, and ceases when the defendant makes it to appear that its agents exercised all ordinary care and diligence.

Question of negligence in the operation of a train at a crossing is one which must be resolved by consideration of many things including condition of machinery and track in relation to speed, environment at point of accident, speed in relation to environment, and signals of train's approach.

Phrase 'all ordinary and reasonable care is susceptible of no hard and fast definition, but varies with circumstances.

'Negligence' is failure to observe for protection of another's interest such reasonable care, precaution, and vigilance as circumstances justly demand and want of which causes him injury.

In an action against railroad for damage done to property by running of train, evidence held to show that plaintiff's servant did not approach crossing with ordinary care and prudence, when he drove a team of mules on track immediately in front of approaching train.

Railroad company's trains have right of way at crossings, and persons on highway should give precedence to passing trains.

It is as much the duty of a person traveling upon the public highway, who is about to cross a railroad track, to use ordinary care and prudence to ascertain if a train is approaching upon the railroad track, ad it is the duty of the railroad the railroad track, as it is the duty of the railroad signals, to be given of an approaching train operated by it to all persons who may be upon the public highway.

In an action against railroad for damage done to property by running of train, evidence held insufficient to show that railroad used all ordinary and reasonable care necessary to relieve it of liability, where there was a curve in the track, a cut in the approach to the crossing, and conflict in the evidence as to where warning of the train's approach was given.

Where injury at railroad crossing is caused solely by negligence of party injured, there can be no recovery; but if both injured party and employees of company were at fault, there may be recovery, but damages will be reduced in proportion to contributory negligence.

In determining the legality and effect of a statutory regulation, the court should ascertain the legislative intent; and if the ascertained intent will permit, the enactment should be construed and effectuated so as to make it conform to, rather than violate, applicable provisions and principles of the state and federal Constitutions, since it must be assumed that the Legislature intended the enactment to comport with the fundamental law.

A statute must be so construed, if fairly possible, as to avoid, not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon that score.

All that the statute does in this state in creating a presumption of negligence is thereby to cast upon the railroad company the burden of affirmatively showing that its agent exercised all ordinary and reasonable care and diligence. and here the statutory presumption ends.

The application of a statute in a particular case may violate organic laws, but the statute as framed may not be unconstitutional when properly applied.

A statute does not offend any provision of organic law merely because it may not in legal effect cover the entire field that is subject to similar legislation.

Judgment for $564 for damage done to live stock and other property by the running of train, reduced to $264, in view of plaintiff's contributory negligence, under rule that where both parties are at fault, damages will be reduced in proportion to contributory negligence of plaintiff.

COUNSEL

W. J. Oven, of Tallahassee, for plaintiff in error.

J. Baxter Campbell and Watson & Taylor, all of Quincy, for defendant in error.

OPINION

MATHEWS C.

A. W. Watson, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff, sued the Seaboard Air Line Railway Company, hereinafter referred to as defendant, in an action at law in the circuit court of Gadsden county, Fla., for damages sustained by the killing of live stock and breaking of wagon by the running of a train.

The declaration alleged that the defendant did carelessly and negligently run and operate its engine and train of cars across the public crossing at a high, rapid, and excessive rate of speed and failed to give warning and notice by the blowing of the whistle, or otherwise, of the approach of the train; that the engine ran against and killed plaintiff's mules and damaged plaintiff's wagon.

The defendant pleaded: (1) Not guilty; (2) that plaintiff's servant failed to stop, look, and listen at the railroad crossing to determine whether or not the train was then and there approaching, and that by reason of such failure the damage and injury sustained was caused solely by the negligence of plaintiff's servant; (3) that the plaintiff was barred from recovery because of the facts set forth in the second plea regardless of the failure of defendant to give warning and notice by the blowing of the whistle or otherwise. The fourth plea sets forth substantially the same defendant as the second, except that instead of being a plea in bar, it alleges contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff through and by his servant. The fifth plea alleges contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, in that the plaintiff's servant in driving of the team when approaching the track of the defendant failed to observe and use reasonable and ordinary care to determine whether or not a train of the defendant was approaching said crossing before he, the said servant, attempted to drive thereon.

Plaintiff joined issue on each of the defendant's five pleas. The case was tried on March 22, 1929, and a verdict was rendered by the jury in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $564. Judgment was entered accordingly in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.

A motion for new trial was filed and in due course denied, and the cause comes here on writ of error.

The specific acts of negligence, as charged in the declaration, are running the train across the public road crossing at a high, rapid, and excessive rate of speed, and failure to give warning and notice by the blowing of the whistle or otherwise of the approach of the train.

The first, second, and third assignments, of error question the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict and judgment.

The evidence, without contradiction, showed the train was on schedule time, and the evidence was sufficient to warrant the finding that the defendant's locomotive ran against plaintiff's mules and wagon, killing the mules and damaging the wagon.

'Under the issue of not guilty, the injury being shown to have been committed by the defendant in the running of its train, the presumption that it was through the negligence of the railroad that the injury was inflicted obtains against the defendant railroad, but such presumption does not outweigh proofs, and it ceases when the company makes it to appear that its agents have exercised all ordinary and reasonable care and diligence. See section 7051(4964) Compiled General Laws of Florida 1927; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Crosby, 53 Fla. 400, 43 So. 318; Jones v. Jacksonville Electric Co., 56 Fla. 452, 47 So. 1; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Thompson, 57 Fla. 155, 48 So. 750; Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Moseley, 60 Fla. 186, 53 So. 718; Florida East Coast R. Co. v. Welch, 53 Fla. 145, 44 So. 250, 12 Ann. Cas. 210; Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Smith, 53 Fla. 375, 43 So. 235; Johnson v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 59 Fla. 305, 52 So. 195.' Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Myrick, 91 Fla. 918, 109 So. 193, 195.

The question of negligence in the operation of a train at a crossing is one which must be resolved by consideration of many things, including condition of machinery and track in relation to speed, environment at point of accident, speed in relation to environment, and signals of train's approach. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Watkins, 97 Fla. 350, 121 So. 95.

The phrase 'all ordinary and reasonable care' is susceptible of no hard and fast definition but varies with circumstances, and negligence in cases of this kind is failure to observe for the protection of another's interest such care, precaution, and vigilance as the circumstances justly demand and the want of which causes injury. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co. v. Watkins, supra.

There was testimony by the defendant's witnesses in this case as follows:

By Hays, fireman on the locomotive: 'He (the engineer) did not blow his whistle again after blowing for the crossing.'

Thomas, conductor of the train: 'I am positive the crossing signal was blown. My recollection is that the whistle was being sounded as the brakes were applied in emergency. The brakes were applied. They responded very promptly. I think we had seven cars and the rear car was still on the crossing when it stopped.'

Johnson porter on the train: 'It went about a train length from the time...