Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 22 December 1927
• Docket Number: 3 Div. 782
• Citation: Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 217 Ala. 251, 115 So. 168 (Ala. 1927)
• Parties: SEABOARD AIR LINE RY. CO. v. JOHNSON.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

115 So. 168

217 Ala. 251

SEABOARD AIR LINE RY. CO. v. JOHNSON.

3 Div. 782

Supreme Court of Alabama

December 22, 1927

Rehearing Denied Jan. 28, 1928

Appeal from Circuit Court, Montgomery County; Leon McCord, Judge.

Action by J.E. Johnson against the Seaboard Air Line Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Steiner Crum & Weil, of Montgomery, for appellant.

Hill Hill, Whiting, Thomas & Rives, of Montgomery, for appellee.

BOULDIN J.

The action is for personal injuries under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 USCA §§ 51-59; U.S.Comp.St §§ 8657-8665).

The pleas were the general issue, assumption of risk, and contributory negligence in mitigation of damages. Refusal of the affirmative charge requested by defendant is insisted upon as error to reverse.

The argument presents two grounds for this insistence: (1) Failure of proof of negligence of defendant or its employees as a proximate cause of the injury; (2) assumption of risk on the part of the plaintiff.

Admittedly, the case is governed by the Federal Employers' Liability Act.

The testimony of the plaintiff was the sole evidence of the details of the accident. Briefly it was to this effect:

The accident occurred in the switchyard of defendant railway company near Montgomery. Plaintiff was a brakeman in the switching crew, which consisted of the foreman, two brakemen, the engineer, and fireman. They were engaged in breaking up a freight train and switching the cars into the several sidetracks. The car being moved at the time was to go into siding No. 1. This siding, after leaving the lead track, crossed a public highway at grade. On the lower end of the switch track, about 1,000 feet below the public road crossing, was a caboose, in which trainmen were asleep. From a point at or near the road crossing toward this caboose the track had a slight down grade, such that a detached and uncontrolled loaded car passing over the crossing would move with accelerated speed, and come in collision with the caboose with such violence as to endanger the men there asleep. The foreman was away on other duty. Plaintiff and the other brakeman, Betts, were the two ground men to direct the enginemen in moving the car. Betts was at the switch. Plaintiff was on the public road at such distance from the crossing as enabled him to signal the engineer. Betts, not in view of the engineer, gave his signals to the plaintiff, who repeated or passed them to the enginemen. In this instance, Betts gave the "come ahead" signal. This the plaintiff gave or repeated to the engineer, and followed it with the "shove" or "shove ahead" signal. The car was "kicked" into the siding. Plaintiff discovered the car was detached some 150 to 200 feet from the crossing, and ran some 270 feet to intercept the car, mount it, and set the brakes. He caught the car at the crossing, but in mounting the ladder his right foot slipped, his left foot went through the sill step, the wheel ran over it, crushing or cutting off parts of the toes on that foot, and, in trying to extricate himself, the right foot was caught under the wheel, and the toes cut off at the base.

Appellant's view that there was no negligence in "kicking" the detached car, rather than shoving it under the control of the engine, seems to proceed on this line:

That it was the regular custom to kick the cars under like conditions, the brakeman at the crossing to catch it and control its movement thereafter; that this was well known to plaintiff and others of the crew; that Betts, the other brakeman, had the duty to ascertain into which switch the car was to go, line up the switch accordingly, and give a signal when ready; that, before giving a signal, he was expected to uncouple the car so that it could be kicked in the usual way, and being so uncoupled without negligence on his part, the engineer could not shove the car, and he was without negligence in shunting the car as he did. The general custom of kicking cars, known to, and participated in by, plaintiff, was clearly shown in plaintiff's testimony. That the car was detached before signals given, and that the engineer was not in position to execute the order to "shove," rest upon inferences drawn by appellant.

In dealing with these inferences, some other facts need be noted. By a rule of the company, it was the duty of the trainmen during switching operations to guard this public road crossing. This duty at the time devolved on plaintiff. Another rule required brakes set up on the cars when placed in the siding. This duty was on plaintiff.

The duties of plaintiff at the moment seem to have been these: To guard the crossing, to give signals, to stop the moving car at proper place on the siding, to set up brakes, and to conserve the safety of the men in the caboose.

Appellant correctly, we think, takes the position that plaintiff had the primary duty to direct the movement of this car. If so, the other men were subject to his orders or signals in so doing, and had the duty to watch for, and observe, his signals after Betts had signalled him that all was ready at the switch. Each participated in the movement of the car so far as his duties extended. Davis v. Sorrell, 213 Ala. 191, 104 So. 397.

All the crew knew of the position of the caboose. They had "shoved" it in a short time before. Betts knew all the facts suggesting caution in the movement of the car. If we assume that he, without negligence, expected the car to be kicked, and to this end uncoupled it before giving the signal to plaintiff, it would still become his duty, knowing the movement was under the control of plaintiff in the protection of the crossing and the men in the caboose, to take note of the signal to shove, and pass such signals, if need be, as were required to recouple the car, and execute the order to shove.

If the engineer, as argued, did not know the car was to go into track No. 1, we do not conceive this to justify ignoring the signal to shove. The order to shove was notice enough of the occasion therefor.

It would be a dangerous rule of law to make the duty to obey orders coming from a proper source turn on whether the occasion or necessity of the order was known to the party to whom it is given. Nor would the engineer's assumption or knowledge that the car was uncoupled and not in position to be controlled by the engine warrant the kicking of the car in violation of order.

Such condition might suggest delay in movement for such time as needed to recouple. If we assume Betts had no duty to note the further signal from plaintiff to the enginemen, still, if the engineer had proceeded to shove the car, a movement markedly different from that of "kicking," it is a fair inference that Betts would, in the discharge of his duty, have become promptly advised of the need to recouple the car, and charged with the duty to take proper steps to that end.

In any view of the evidence, we must conclude there was negligence in ignoring...