Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Mullin

• Decision Date: 10 December 1915
• Citation: 70 So. 467,70 Fla. 450
• Parties: SEABOARD AIR LINE RY. v. MULLIN.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

70 So. 467

70 Fla. 450

SEABOARD AIR LINE RY. v. MULLIN.

Florida Supreme Court

December 10, 1915

Error to Circuit Court, Marion County; W. S. Bullock, Judge.

Action by W. H. Mullin against the Seaboard Air Line Railway. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed.

Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Where in the course of transportation goods are injured by an unprecedented flood and there is no negligence on the part of the common carrier in taking care of the goods or otherwise the loss is attributable to the flood as an 'act of God,' and the carrier is not liable.

Whether a common carrier is liable for injury to goods, where, after being negligently delayed in transit, the goods, while still in transit, are injured by an act of God, such as an unprecedented flood, depends upon whether the negligent delay of the carrier has a proximate causal relation or a mere remote or casual relation to the subsequent injury.

A merely negligent delay in transporting goods, which delay causes the goods to be at a point in transit where they are injured or destroyed by an unprecedented flood that could not have been foreseen at the time of the delay, does not render the carrier liable for the direct consequences of the flood upon the goods, if there be no malconduct by the carrier, and negligence of the carrier in providing reasonably safe and adequate facilities for and attention to the safety of the goods does not directly contribute to the injury, even though the goods would not have been at the point where they were injured, and would have escaped the flood but for the negligent delay of the carrier at a time when the flood could not have been foreseen. Such an injury is not an ordinary natural sequence of the delay.

COUNSEL L. N Green, of Ocala, for plaintiff in error.

H. M Hampton, of Ocala, for defendant in error.

OPINION

WHITFIELD J.

An action was brought by Mullin against the carrier to recover damages for the loss of freight injured by a flood in transit. There was judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant took writ of error.

It appears by an agreed statement of facts: That the goods were delivered to the defendant carrier at Ocala, Fla., on February 22, 1913, for transportation to Youngstown, Ohio according to the terms and conditions of a bill of lading delivered to the shipper by the agent of the defendant. That the shipment was loaded on the same day and was by the defendant for warded on the route towards its destination in the state of Ohio, arriving in Atlanta, Ga., on March 18, 1913, where it was delivered by the defendant at once to the next succeeding carrier for further transportation. That if said transportation by the defendant had been with due and reasonable speed and diligence said shipment would have arrived in Atlanta, Ga., and been delivered to the next succeeding carrier not later than February 28, 1913, instead of March 18, 1913. That on receipt of said shipment the next succeeding carrier, and those carriers thereafter in the line of transportation, forwarded said shipment with all due and reasonable speed toward the ultimate destination thereof in the state of Ohio, and with no negligence which in any manner contributed to the loss or damage, as hereinafter mentioned of the aforesaid personal property. That if the defendant had transported said shipment to Atlanta, Ga., and delivered the same to the next succeeding carrier with due and reasonable speed and dispatch, the same would have arrived at its destination in the state of Ohio and been delivered to the plaintiff in time to have avoided the loss. That said shipment having arrived from Atlanta, Ga., in due course, in the state of Ohio, was caught in the latter state in great rains and floods of water which destroyed certain portions of said shipment and badly injured other portions thereof. That the rains and floods aforesaid were the most sudden and violent ever known at or in the vicinity where said shipment was then caught and damaged as aforesaid, and they occurred at least six days after the defendant had delivered said shipment to the next succeeding carrier at Atlanta, Ga., as hereinbefore mentioned, the coming or happening of which rains and floods it was utterly impossible for the defendant under any circumstances to have foreseen at any time prior to the delivery of said shipment to the aforesaid next succeeding carrier. That during the months of February, March, April, and May, 1913, the defendant, and other common carriers over whose line of road plaintiff's shipment aforesaid moved had on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission of the United States, and in full force and effect, certain tariffs or schedules of freight rates applicable to this shipment. That as a matter of fact the shipment was turned over by the representative of the plaintiff to the defendant as a carload shipment, which the defendant accepted. The car was duly sealed up at Ocala and moved forward to Youngstown, Ohio, under that seal for the entire distance. That had the shipment gone forward as less than a carload movement, it would have been subject to a number of removals between Ocala and Youngstown, aforesaid, thereby greatly increasing danger of damage and loss thereto. The statement of facts shows that a carload of household goods being transported in interstate commerce from Ocala, Fla., to Youngstown, Ohio, was negligently delayed en route before it reached Atlanta, Ga. After leaving Atlanta and before reaching destination the goods were injured by an unprecedented flood--an act of God--which could not reasonably have been foreseen when the negligent delay occurred. If there had been no delay in the transportation before reaching Atlanta, the shipment might have been completed without injury from the flood.

The liability of a common carrier of goods is that of an insurer; and in cases of loss of or injury to goods intrusted to it for transportation no excuse avails the carrier, except that such loss or injury was caused by the act of God, or by the public enemies of the state or by the sole fault of the shipper or his agent. 1 Moore on Carriers, 306. A common carrier of goods is an insurer against all risks of loss or injury, except those resulting directly from the act of God or the public enemy and without the intervention of human agency. Clyde Steamship Co. v. Burrows, 36 Fla. 121, 18 So. 349.

The only acts of God that excuse common carriers from liability for loss of or injury to goods in transit are those operations of the forces of nature that could not have been anticipated and provided against and that by their superhuman force unexpectedly injury or destroy goods in the custody or control of a common carrier. See 4 R. C. L., p. 709; Benedict Pineapple Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 55 Fla. 514, 46 So. 732, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 92. See, also, 13 M. A. L. 79.

Where in the course of transportation goods are injured by an unprecedented flood and there is no negligence on the part of the common carrier in taking care of the goods or otherwise, the loss is attributable to the flood as an act of God, and the carrier is not liable. Norris v. Savannah, F. & W. Ry. Co., 23 Fla. 182, 1 So. 475, 11 Am. St. Rep. 355. But where the flood should have been anticipated in time to save the goods, or the carrier was negligent in not protecting the goods, or exposed the goods to the flood, or toriously withheld the goods, or so deviated from the proper route as to amount to a conversion of the goods, or the negligence of the carrier contributes directly to the injury, or the carrier fails to provide reasonably adequate and safe facilities which directly contributed to the injury, the carrier is liable. See National Rice Mill Co. v. New Orleans & N.E. R. C., 132 La. 615, 61 So. 708, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 1099; Wabash R. Co. v. Sharpe, 76 Neb. 424, 107 N.W. 758, 124 Am. St. Rep. 823; Michaels v. N.Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 30 N.Y. 564, 86 Am. Dec. 415; Wolf v. American Express Co., 43 Mo. 421, 97 Am. Dec. 406; New Brunswick Steamboat Co. v. Tiers, 24 N. J. Law, 697, 64 Am. Dec. 394; Crosby v. Fitch, 12 Conn. 410, 31 Am. Dec. 745; Henry v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 83 Kan. 104, 109 P. 1005, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1088; Davis v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 89 Mo. 340, 1 S.W. 327; Pruitt v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R. Co., 62 Mo. 527; Richmond & Danville R. Co. v. Benson, 86 Ga. 203, 12 S.E. 357; 22 Am. St. Rep. 446; 1 R. C. L. p. 718; Pinkerton v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 117 Mo.App. 288, 93 S.W. 849; Wabash Railroad Co. v. Sharpe, 76 Neb. 424, 107 N.W. 758, 124 Am. St. Rep. 823; McGraw v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 18 W.Va. 361, 41 Am. Rep. 696; Hewett v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. 63 Iowa, 611, 19 N.W. 790; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Dreyfus, 42 Okl. 401, 141 P. 773, L. R. A. 1915D, 547; Bell v. Union Pac. R. Co., 177 Ill.App. 374; Thomas v. Lancaster Mills, of Clinton, Mass., 71 F. 481, 19 C. C. A. 88; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Coutourie, 135 F. 465, 68 C. C. A. 177; Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Madden, Sykes & Co., 46 Tex.Civ.App. 597, 103 S.W. 1193. See, also, Benedict Pineapple Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 55 Fla. 514, 46 So. 732, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 92; Town of De Funiak Springs v. Perdue, 69 Fla. 326, 68 So. 234.

In Read v. Spaulding, 30 N.Y. 630, 86 Am. Dec. 426; Green-Wheeler Shoe Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Co., 130 Iowa, 123, 106 N.W. 498, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 882, 8 Ann Cas. 45; Bibb Broom Gorn Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 94 Minn. 269, 102 N.W. 709, 69 L. R. A. 509, 110 Am. St. Rep. 361, 3 Ann. Cas. 450; Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Quarles & Coutourie, 145 Ala. 436, 40 So. 120, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 867, 117 Am. St. Rep. 54, 8 Ann. Cas. 308; Wald v. Pittsburg, C. C. & St. L. R. Co., 162...