Seaboard Nat. Bank v. Woesten

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Missouri
Writing for the CourtMarshall
Citation176 Mo. 49,75 S.W. 464
PartiesSEABOARD NAT. BANK OF NEW YORK v. WOESTEN.
Decision Date15 June 1903
75 S.W. 464
176 Mo. 49
SEABOARD NAT. BANK OF NEW YORK
v.
WOESTEN.
Supreme Court of Missouri.
June 15, 1903.

APPEAL—LAW OF THE CASE—SPECIAL OR LOCAL LAWS.

1. On the retrial of a case reversed on appeal, the opinion of the appellate court is the law of the case.

2. The charter of St. Louis, art. 6, § 25, permitting a recovery of 15 per cent. interest on a tax bill for street improvements, when not paid within six months after demand, is not in conflict with Const. art. 4, § 53, prohibiting the passing of local or special laws "fixing the rate of interest," and of special laws in general.

In Banc. Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; John W. McElhinney, Judge.

Action by the Seaboard National Bank of New York, assignee, against Frederick Woesten. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Pending appeal, defendant died, and the cause was revived against his executor and heirs at law. Affirmed.

[75 S.W. 465]

Judson & Green, for appellant. Boyle, Priest & Lehmann and Geo. W. Easley, for respondent.

MARSHALL, J.


For the purposes of this appeal, the full and accurate statement of the case made by counsel for the appellant is adopted. It is as follows:

"This is a suit upon a special tax bill issued by the city of St. Louis for the reconstruction of Grand avenue from St. Louis avenue to Montgomery street. Plaintiff sues as the assignee of the Barber Asphalt Paving Company, the original contractor to whom the tax bill was issued. In its petition, plaintiff sets out the ordinances and the contract under which the alleged work was done; alleges compliance by the contractor with all the terms of said contract and ordinances; that defendant, Frederick Woesten, was the owner of certain property abutting upon said reconstructed street; and that the tax bill which was filed with its petition had been regularly issued. This cause was tried upon the petition and an amended answer filed by defendant, Woesten, since the former appeal of the case, which is reported in 147 Mo. 467, 48 S. W. 939, 48 L. R. A. 279, which amended answer is: First. A general denial. Second. A cross-bill to plaintiff's petition, alleging that the ordinances of the city of St. Louis under which the alleged work was done, the contract for said work, and the special tax bill issued therefor, were all of them null and void, for the following reasons: (1) That said ordinance provides for the repair and maintenance of Grand avenue for a period of nine years, commencing one year after the work of reconstruction shall be completed, and said ordinance does not specify the materials to be used in such work of repair and maintenance and was not indorsed with an estimate of the cost of such repair and maintenance, as required by the city charter, and that said ordinance does not contain a specific appropriation for the cost of said repair and maintenance from the proper revenue fund of the city of St. Louis, as required by the city charter. (2) That said ordinance provides for the payment of public money for the public work of repair and maintenance of part of said Grand avenue for nine years, but that the comptroller of the city never indorsed said ordinance, to the effect that sufficient unappropriated means stood to the credit of the fund set aside for street repairs to meet the requirements of said ordinance. (3) That the said ordinance requires that the work of reconstruction of said street, and the repair and maintenance thereof for nine years, should be advertised, bid for, let, and contracted for, in one and the same bidding, letting, and contract, and to and by the same contractor, and that it was unlawful to so confuse and combine the cost of reconstruction and the cost of repairs to said street. (4) That in recommending Ordinance No. 16,943, set out in plaintiff's petition, the board of public improvements of the city of St. Louis were acting under section 562 of the Revised Ordinances of 1887 and section 564 of the Revised Ordinances of 1893, and that said ordinances are null and void, because they are repugnant to sections 14, 15, 17, 18, 24, 27, and 28 of the charter of the city of St. Louis. (5) That the board of public improvements did arbitrarily fix the price and rate for said work of repair and maintenance, and did withdraw said work of repair and maintenance from public bidding, by adopting a uniform rule to the effect that no bid for the public work of reconstruction, repair, and maintenance should be accepted by them in which the bid for repair and maintenance to be paid by the city should exceed fifty cents per square of one hundred feet per annum. (6) That said price of fifty cents per square per annum, adopted by said board, for said work of maintenance and repair, was inadequate and insufficient to cover the cost thereof during the whole of said period, and that, by arbitrarily fixing the price of said maintenance and repair at said sum, said board invited and permitted plaintiff to bid an exorbitant price for the work of reconstruction, in order to make up what plaintiff would lose on said repairs and maintenance, and that the price bid by plaintiff for the work of reconstructing said street was and is exorbitant and unreasonable, and plaintiff is, by said rule and method of letting contracts, compelled to pay a portion of the cost of the repair and maintenance of said street. (7 and 8) That at the time of letting of said contract the board of public improvements well knew that the contractor, the Barber Asphalt Paving Company, owned and possessed the exclusive right to produce and use the materials specified therein, and that by selecting said monopolized materials the cost of said construction was greatly increased, and said contract was not let by competitive bidding, as required by the charter. (9 to 13) That the provisions of the charter and ordinances of the city of St. Louis in reference to special tax bills for work of the character done by plaintiff's assignor were and are unconstitutional and unreasonable, and, in effect, provide for taking defendant's property without due process of law, and that they are therefore null and void. And defendant alleges that said tax bill was and is a cloud upon his title to the real estate described in the petition, and he prays the court to declare said tax bill to be null and void and of no effect.

"Reply. Plaintiff, for reply to this amended answer, denied each and every allegation therein contained.

"Evidence. For plaintiff, the cause was submitted upon the pleadings, the tax bill, which was admitted to have been...

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15 practice notes
  • Jones v. Williams, No. 6051.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Texas
    • December 23, 1931
    ...L. Ed. 405; Eyerman v. Blaksley, 78 Mo. 145; City of St. Joseph v. Forsee, 110 Mo. App. 237, 84 S. W. 1138; Seaboard Nat. Bank v. Woesten, 176 Mo. 49, 75 S. W. 464; Colby v. City of Medford, 85 Or. 485, 167 P. 487; State v. Coos County, 115 Or. 300, 237 P. 678; Livesay v. DeArmond, 131 Or. ......
  • Farr v. Nordman, No. 90
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Michigan
    • September 4, 1956
    ...61 S.W.2d 750, 753: 'With regard to what may be called the interest penalty, this court en banc, in Seaboard National Bank v. Woesten, 176 Mo. 49, loc. cit. 62, 75 S.W. 464, held, that the statute (now section 9914) does not change the character of the imposition; that it is not an 'additio......
  • St. Francis Levee Dist. v. Dorroh, No. 26850.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • December 31, 1926
    ...does not attempt to fix a rate of interest, but prescribes and imposes, purely and solely, a penalty. In Seaboard National Bank v. Woesten, 176 Mo. 49, 75 S. W. 464, this court, in banc, held that a section of the St. Louis charter allowing a recovery of 15 per cent. interest per annum, if ......
  • State ex rel. Crutcher v. Koeln, No. 33128.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • June 16, 1933
    ...uniform in its operation, provide for and regulate the fees of all county officers." Sec. 9935, R.S. 1929; Seaboard Natl. Bank v. Woester, 176 Mo. 49; Sec. 9914, R.S. 1929; State ex rel. v. Gordon, 245 Mo. 27; Sanderson v. Pike County, 195 Mo. 605; State ex rel. v. Brown, 146 Mo. 406; State......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
15 cases
  • Jones v. Williams, No. 6051.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Texas
    • December 23, 1931
    ...L. Ed. 405; Eyerman v. Blaksley, 78 Mo. 145; City of St. Joseph v. Forsee, 110 Mo. App. 237, 84 S. W. 1138; Seaboard Nat. Bank v. Woesten, 176 Mo. 49, 75 S. W. 464; Colby v. City of Medford, 85 Or. 485, 167 P. 487; State v. Coos County, 115 Or. 300, 237 P. 678; Livesay v. DeArmond, 131 Or. ......
  • Farr v. Nordman, No. 90
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Michigan
    • September 4, 1956
    ...61 S.W.2d 750, 753: 'With regard to what may be called the interest penalty, this court en banc, in Seaboard National Bank v. Woesten, 176 Mo. 49, loc. cit. 62, 75 S.W. 464, held, that the statute (now section 9914) does not change the character of the imposition; that it is not an 'additio......
  • St. Francis Levee Dist. v. Dorroh, No. 26850.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • December 31, 1926
    ...does not attempt to fix a rate of interest, but prescribes and imposes, purely and solely, a penalty. In Seaboard National Bank v. Woesten, 176 Mo. 49, 75 S. W. 464, this court, in banc, held that a section of the St. Louis charter allowing a recovery of 15 per cent. interest per annum, if ......
  • State ex rel. Crutcher v. Koeln, No. 33128.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • June 16, 1933
    ...uniform in its operation, provide for and regulate the fees of all county officers." Sec. 9935, R.S. 1929; Seaboard Natl. Bank v. Woester, 176 Mo. 49; Sec. 9914, R.S. 1929; State ex rel. v. Gordon, 245 Mo. 27; Sanderson v. Pike County, 195 Mo. 605; State ex rel. v. Brown, 146 Mo. 406; State......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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