Seabolt v. Commissioners of Northumberland County

• Decision Date: 21 July 1898
• Docket Number: 169
• Parties: J. A. Seabolt, R. K. Kline, C. P. Smith, W. H. Cool, Frank B. Rine, B. S. Hummel, Daniel H. Riegel, Benjamin Rine, Harvey Wenzel, Charles A. Frey, Edward Hummel, J. B. Morrow and Joseph M. Waters, Appellants, v. The Commissioners of Northumberland County
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

41 A. 22

187 Pa. 318

J. A. Seabolt, R. K. Kline, C. P. Smith, W. H. Cool, Frank B. Rine, B. S. Hummel, Daniel H. Riegel, Benjamin Rine, Harvey Wenzel, Charles A. Frey, Edward Hummel, J. B. Morrow and Joseph M. Waters, Appellants, v. The Commissioners of Northumberland County

No. 169

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

July 21, 1898

Argued May 25, 1898

Appeal, No. 169, Jan. T., 1898, by defendants, from order of C.P. Northumberland Co., Sept. T., 1897, No. 16, dismissing petition for mandamus.

Petition for mandamus.

The facts appear by the opinion of the court below, SAVIDGE P.J., which was as follows:

This is a rule for a mandamus on the commissioners of Northumberland county to require them to build, jointly with the commissioners of Union county, a bridge across the West Branch of the Susquehanna river at Lewisburg.

The river at this point forms the boundary line between the two counties, and the proceeding is under the Act of May 6, 1897 P.L. 46. The original bridge, maintained by the Lewisburg Bridge Company, was destroyed by the flood of 1865. It was rebuilt in 1868, and by authority of the legislature (see act of February 19, 1868), the location was slightly changed, the bridge company being empowered to rebuild at any place within one half mile of the location of the old bridge. In point of fact the new bridge was built north of the cite of the old bridge, 196 feet at one end and 444 feet at the other end. By the same act the bridge company was authorized to construct for railroad purposes as well as for travel by wagons and otherwise, and the bridge has ever since been used for such purposes. All the property and franchises at the site of the old bridge were saved to it by the said act, and it still owns and occupies its toll house and other property at the Lewisburg shore end of the old bridge.

It is urged that the act of 1897 is unconstitutional, because special legislation. With this view we agree. A proper classification of bridges is not objectionable. It may be conceded that there would be no offense in making a class to include all bridges spanning county line streams and which are owned and maintained by corporations, etc., and which have been destroyed and abandoned, and to provide for their rebuilding in the manner prescribed. But the act goes much further. It operates upon certain bridges of this class to the exclusion of all others. They are to be bridges used exclusively for vehicles and foot purposes. A bridge having in addition to the carriage and footway, a street railway, a towing path or a steam road upon it, is left out. [Bridges which have been destroyed and not rebuilt are unprovided for. It is only where the same has been "rebuilt by said corporation or private persons, or by public subscriptions on another site," that the act takes hold. Where there has been a rebuilding of the old bridge a short distance further up or down the stream, a second structure must be built at the public expense. Where the bridge has been destroyed or abandoned and not rebuilt, the traveling public may swim.] In the language of Mr. Justice PAXSON, in Commonwealth v. Patton, 88 Pa. 258: "This is classification run mad," and [the method in the madness was to provide for a free bridge over the West Branch of the Susquehanna at Lewisburg, by legislation that would not be applicable anywhere else in the commonwealth. It is not probable that there can be found elsewhere in the commonwealth a situation that would meet all the conditions of this extraordinary act of assembly.] To provide for the reconstruction of a bridge already rebuilt to the exclusion of all cases where there has been no rebuilding is, it seems to us, a very peculiar kind of legislation. We cannot see any reason in it, nor do we think there is any, except as above intimated. It is certainly not general legislation: Commonwealth v. Patton, supra. There are numerous other authorities to which it is not necessary to refer.

The act provides in the fourth section for the taking of private property, and the method of compensation. There is no reference to this in the title. In this we think it offends the constitution. The title must so express the purpose as to clearly and fully give notice to those who may be specially interested therein: Sewickley Boro. v. Sholes, 118 Pa. 169. It was claimed that inasmuch as there had been no abandonment of the bridge in question, the same having been rebuilt as directed by the act of 1868, this case did not come within the provisions of the act of 1897. It will be seen, however, by a close examination of that act that it was not an abandoned bridge that the legislature attempted to provide for. A rebuilt bridge cannot be said to have been abandoned. If constitutional, the act would be applicable to bridges which have been destroyed and rebuilt upon another site, or, in other words, to a change in location.

We have no doubt the public are poorly accommodated by the present bridge and that there is danger in crossing it with vehicles; that, however, is not the question here. We are dealing solely with the constitutionality of this act of assembly. If the public demands better accommodation than it now has, there are other methods of getting it. The act of 1897 does not provide the only means of securing free bridges.

[Being of the opinion that, for reasons given, the act in question is unconstitutional, we discharge the rule at the cost of the petitioners and note an exception and seal a bill for them.]

Errors assigned were (1-3) portions of the opinion as above, quoting them; (4) in refusing the mandamus prayed for.

Judgment reversed and procedendo awarded.

Henry C. McCormick and W. W. Ryon, with them Seth T. McCormick, Lewis Dewart, Philip B. Linn and R. M. Cummings, for appellants. -- We start with the presumption that the statute is constitutional. Every intendment is in favor of its constitutionality: Pennsylvania R.R. v. Riblet, 66 Pa. 164; Speer v. School Directors, 50 Pa. 150.

Where it is proposed to show that an act is unconstitutional by proof, the burden of such proof is undoubtedly upon the person seeking to show the unconstitutionality of the act: R.R. Co. v. Casey, 26 Pa. 300.

The power of making a proper classification is vested in the legislature: McCarthy v. Com., 110 Pa. 243; Van Riper v. Parsons, 40 N.J.L. 123; Ayars's App., 122 Pa. 281; Perkins v. Phila., 156 Pa. 554; Kilgore v. Magee, 85 Pa. 401.

The title gives sufficient notice of the purposes of the act: Allegheny County Home's Case. 77 Pa. 78; R.R. Co.'s App., 77 Pa. 429; Mauch Chunk v. McGee, 81 Pa. 433; Dewhurst v. Allegheny, 95 Pa. 437.

C. B. Witmer, for appellees. -- The word "or" is frequently read "and" in the construction of statutes in order to render the whole operative and consistent: Murray v. Keyes, 35 Pa. 384.

The title does not give sufficient notice of its subject to reasonably lead persons to inquire into the body of the bill: Phoenixville Road, 109 Pa. 44; Com. v. Samuels, 163 Pa. 283; Sewickley Borough v. Sholes, 118 Pa. 169.

It is true that the presumption is in favor of the constitutionality of a statute, but this presumption must of necessity fall in the light of the test that constitutional provisions are to be so construed as to prevent the mischief designed to be remedied by their adoption: Ayars's App., 122 Pa. 266; York School District's App., 169 Pa. 70.

The act under consideration is special legislation in the guise of a general law, which has been pronounced the most specious and vicious form that special legislation can assume: Philadelphia v. Cemetery Co., 162 Pa. 107; Com. v. Patton, 88 Pa. 258; Scowden's App., 96 Pa. 422.

Before STERRETT, C.J., GREEN, McCOLLUM, MITCHELL and FELL, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE MITCHELL:

The learned judge below held that the act of 1897 was unconstitutional because it was special legislation, and because it contained a subject not clearly expressed in the title.

Legislation is not necessarily unconstitutional because it is special or local. On the contrary legislative authority inherently includes power to pass laws for special or local needs, and this principle is recognized in section 8 of article III. of the constitution which provides that "no local or special bill shall be passed unless notice of the intention to apply therefor shall have been published," etc. But by section 7 of the same article, local or special laws "regulating the affairs of counties," etc., or "relating to ferries or bridges," are, inter alia, expressly prohibited. The subject of the act of 1897 being a certain class of bridges falls within the prohibition, if the act is local or special.

Legislation for a class distinguished from a general subject is not special but general, and classification is a legislative...