Seabourn v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I–300 of Woodward County

• Decision Date: 21 December 2010
• Docket Number: Case No. CV–10–92–R.
• Citation: 269 Ed. Law Rep. 556,775 F.Supp.2d 1306
• Parties: Donna SEABOURN, Plaintiff,v.INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. I–300 OF WOODWARD COUNTY, a/k/a Sharon–Mutual Public Schools, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma

775 F.Supp.2d 1306

269 Ed. Law Rep. 556

Donna SEABOURN, Plaintiff,

v.INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. I–300 OF WOODWARD COUNTY, a/k/a Sharon–Mutual Public Schools, et al., Defendants.

Case No. CV–10–92–R.

United States District Court, W.D. Oklahoma.

Dec. 21, 2010.

Blake Sonne, Norman, OK, for Plaintiff.Cheryl A. Dixon, McDaniel, Longwell & Acord & Kroll PLLC, John E. Priddy, Rosenstein Fist & Ringold, Tulsa, OK, for Defendants.

ORDER

DAVID L. RUSSELL, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by Defendants (Document No. 15) and the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff (Document No. 16). Plaintiff responded to Defendants' motion, and Defendants responded to Plaintiff's motion. Having considered the parties' submissions, the Court finds as follows.

Plaintiff was employed as a “career teacher” with the Independent School District No. I–300 of Woodward County until the Board voted for her nonreemployment for the 2009–10 school year. As a result of the decision, Plaintiff filed this action asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of substantive and procedural due process. She also seeks relief under state law, asserting claims for breach of contract, tortious interference and civil conspiracy. The parties seek summary judgment on all claims.

The following facts are undisputed:

For the 2008–09 school year, Plaintiff was employed as a “career teacher,” as defined in Okla. Stat. tit. 70 § 6–101.3(4). She served as the certified science teacher. Prior to the 2008–09 academic year, Defendant Emma Sidders became principal of the high school and superintendent of the district, Plaintiff's boss.

On September 16, 2008, Ms. Sidders conducted a formal evaluation of Plaintiff. As a result of what Ms. Sidders perceived as deficiencies in classroom management and supervision during the evaluation, Plaintiff was placed on a Professional Growth Improvement Plan. On October 8, 2008, Ms. Sidders conducted another evaluation of Plaintiff, and commented that Plaintiff's classroom management was satisfactory, and noted improvement over the last observation. On October 30, 2008, Ms. Sidders again evaluated Plaintiff, and noted nothing as “unsatisfactory.” On November 4, 2008, Ms. Sidders evaluated Plaintiff, and this time marked several areas as unsatisfactory. Upon recommendation made by Ms. Sidders, Plaintiff attended professional workshops. On January 8, 2009, Ms. Sidders wrote comments about Plaintiff's performance as part of a review on her prior evaluation form, noting that Plaintiff “is working on her classroom/student management [and] I feel is making progress. It is still not at the point I would like it to be.” On that same date Ms. Sidders authored a second Professional Growth Improvement Plan, which contained a deadline for improvement of February 26, 2009. Ms. Sidders indicated Plaintiff was deficient in controlling student behavior in the classroom and in being able to clearly relate the curriculum for student's understanding.

The Notice of Board Meeting for a March 9, 2009 school board meeting indicated that executive session would be held to “consider and take action on the following personnel with continuing contracts,” followed by a list that included Plaintiff's name. According to Plaintiff, which Defendants do not dispute, following executive session the names of teachers whose contracts had been renewed were read aloud and Plaintiff's name was not included on the list. ¹ As a result, Plaintiff assumed as of that date that she would not be rehired for the next school year, although no one told her as much. ²

On March 16, 2009, Ms. Sidders authored a letter to Plaintiff, stating:

This letter is to inform you that at the March 9, 2009 meeting of the Sharon–Mutual Board of Education it was determined that your teaching contract will not be renewed for the 2009–2010 school year.

The letter listed three reasons for the Board's decision, and advised Plaintiff she was entitled to all of the rights and procedures outlined in the Board's policy and Oklahoma law.³ The letter informed Plaintiff a hearing before the Board would be held on April 9, 2009.

In response to Ms. Sidders' letter, Plaintiff's counsel authored a March 23, 2009 response requesting clarification, as it appeared, to him that the Board had violated Oklahoma law and its own policy by deciding not to renew Plaintiff's contract at the March 9, 2009 meeting. On March 24, 2009, Ms. Sidders sent a second letter to Plaintiff, which included the following:

At the March 9, 2009 meeting of the Sharon–Mutual Board of Education continuous teaching contracts were considered for the 2009–2010 school year. At that time your contract was not renewed.

The March 24, 2009 letter listed the same three reasons for the nonrenewal and informed Plaintiff of the April 9, 2009 hearing. It reiterated the Board's intention to provide her with due process.

On March 27, 2009, Superintendent Sidders presented a memorandum to the Board of Education Sharon–Mutual Public Schools, which indicated it was an “[a]mended Recommendation for the Nonreemployment of Donna Seabourn.⁴” It included the following:

Pursuant to the Oklahoma Teacher Due Process Act of 1990, as amended, this memorandum is an amended recommendation to the Board of Education for the nonreemployment of Donna Seabourn from her employment as a teacher in the Sharon–Mutual Public Schools for the 2009–10 School Year.The memorandum listed four grounds for the recommendation, all of which are found in the Oklahoma statute. The memorandum reiterated the original three reasons as well, although none of these is a statutory reason for nonreemployment.

Minutes from an April 3, 2009 Special Board Meeting of the Sharon–Mutual Board of Education indicate a meeting was held and that the Board had received a recommendation from the superintendent for the nonreemployment of Plaintiff for the 2009–10 school year. The board unanimously agreed that a copy of the recommendation should be mailed to Plaintiff along with a notice of her rights and of a hearing to be held on May 14, 2009. A letter dated April 3, 2009 from Ms. Sidders to Plaintiff reiterates the recommendation by Ms. Sidders to the Board and notified Plaintiff of a pre-termination hearing to be held on May 14, 2009.

An untitled document provided by Defendant, which the Court assumes to be minutes, indicates a special board meeting was held on May 14, 2009 to consider the nonrenewal of Plaintiff's contract. Three Board members were present, two were absent. The Board's counsel presented the basis for the recommendation of nonrenewal and Plaintiff's counsel responded thereto. The members present all voted for nonrenewal of Plaintiff's contract. On May 18, 2009, the Clerk of the Board of Education, Kevin Townsend, sent Plaintiff a letter indicating the Board's decision not to reemploy Plaintiff and notifying her of her rights to a trial de novo under Oklahoma law.

Plaintiff initially filed a petition for trial de novo in the District Court of Woodward County, which she withdrew upon deciding that she did not desire reinstatement as a teacher with the district.

Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings and affidavits show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). “[A] motion for summary judgment should be granted only when the moving party has established the absence of any genuine issue as to a material fact.” Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 561 F.2d 202, 204 (10th Cir.1977). The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of material fact requiring judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A fact is material if it is essential to the proper disposition of the claim. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If the movant carries this initial burden, the nonmovant must then set forth “specific facts” outside the pleadings and admissible into evidence which would convince a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmovant. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). These specific facts may be shown “by any of the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c) except the mere pleadings themselves.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Such evidentiary materials include affidavits, deposition transcripts, or specific exhibits. Thomas v. Wichita Coca–Cola Bottling Co., 968 F.2d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir.1992). “The burden is not an onerous one for the nonmoving party in each case, but does not at any point shift from the nonmovant to the district court.” Adler v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 672 (10th Cir.1998). All facts and reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

Defendants first contend that Plaintiff has waived the right to challenge the process provided to her in her pretermination hearing by failing to pursue the trial de novo, which would have reevaluated the process and outcome of the hearing conducted by the Board. As noted by Plaintiff, the only remedy permitted by Oklahoma's Teacher Due Process statute in the trial de novo is reinstatement, and Plaintiff contends that because she did not desire reinstatement, she was not required to pursue de novo review.

“To set forth an actionable procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) the deprivation of a liberty or property interest and (2) that no due process of law was afforded.” Ripley v. Wyoming Medical Center, Inc., 559 F.3d 1119, 1122 (10th Cir.2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The root of the due process clause requires that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing...