Seabourne v. Seabourne

• Decision Date: 20 May 2016
• Docket Number: No. 06-15-00088-CV,06-15-00088-CV
• Citation: 493 S.W.3d 222
• Parties: Thomas Seabourne, Appellant v. Danese Seabourne, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

493 S.W.3d 222

Thomas Seabourne, Appellant

v.Danese Seabourne, Appellee

No. 06-15-00088-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Texarkana.

Submitted: March 1, 2016

Decided: May 20, 2016

Joe Shumate, Law Office of Joe Shumate, Henderson, TX, for appellant.

Clay Wilder, Attorney at Law, Henderson, TX, for appellee.

Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.

OPINION

Opinion by Justice Moseley

Danese Seabourne brought a breach-of-contract claim against Thomas Seabourne after the couple divorced pursuant to an agreed decree and Thomas refused to reimburse Danese for one-half of the college tuition she paid on behalf of the couple's two daughters. The trial court entered judgment against Thomas for the sum of $10,475.13, plus attorney fees and expenses in the amount of $4,828.34. We affirm the trial court's judgment because (1) the trial court was authorized to enter the judgment, (2) the contractual provision is enforceable, (3) sufficient evidence supports the damage award, and (4) the award of attorney fees and costs was proper.

I. Background

Danese and Thomas entered into an agreed final decree of divorce on October 29, 2012, in Rusk County, Texas. Pursuant to the decree, Thomas was ordered to pay monthly child support on behalf of two children of the marriage, Susanna and Julia Seabourne.¹ In a different section of the decree, captioned “College Tuition,” the parties were required to “each pay 50% of the college tuition for the children subject of this suit. DANESE SEABOURNE shall provide THOMAS SEABOURNE with a statement from the college upon receipt [by] her. Each party shall pay their portion of the tuition within 30 days of receipt.”

At the time of the June 2015 hearing on Danese's breach-of-contract action, both Susanna and Julia were attending Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU).² Danese testified that although she provided Thomas with statements of tuition costs, Thomas did not pay any portion of the college tuition for either Susanna or Julia. Consequently, Danese paid one hundred percent of the girls' tuition. Danese expended a total of $23,174.43 either in direct payments, or by incurring loans, for the tuition of both Susanna and Julia, and claimed that Thomas owed fifty percent of that amount, or $11,587.22. Thomas testified that he did not intend to pay any portion of the girls' college tuition, also claiming that he did not agree to pay out-of-state tuition.

Danese introduced evidence that she notified Thomas of the amount of tuition he owed for both girls in accord with the decree. On appeal, Thomas does not dispute the adequacy of this notice. Thomas does claim, however, that (1) the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Danese post-majority support in the absence of a written agreement or express order of the court providing for enforcement as a contractual obligation, (2) the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Danese a lump sum judgment for one-half of the children's unpaid college tuition because the alleged agreement is too uncertain and ambiguous to enforce, (3) there is no evidence, or in the alternative, there is insufficient evidence, to sustain the trial court's finding that appellee was entitled to an award of $10,475.13 in damages for the breach of contract, because this award was not offset for scholarships and grants, and (4) the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Thomas to pay court costs and attorney fees.

II. Analysis

We review the trial court's judgment for an abuse of discretion. See Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex.1990)

(per curiam). When a trial court acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles or when it fails to analyze or apply the law correctly, it abuses its discretion. Id. ; Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex.1985). “A trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is or in properly applying the law.” In re Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 273 S.W.3d 637, 643 (Tex.2009) (citing In re Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 210 S.W.3d 609, 612 (Tex.2006) ).

A. The Trial Court Was Authorized to Enter the Judgment

In his first point of error, Thomas claims that the trial court lacked the authority to enter judgment because the provision of the final decree requiring that each party pay one-half of the children's college tuition constituted a post-majority support provision which was not established by a separate written agreement.³ In support of this contention, Thomas relies on Elfeldt v. Elfeldt, 730 S.W.2d 657, 658 (Tex.1987)

(per curiam), and Bruni v. Bruni, 924 S.W.2d 366, 367 (Tex.1996). We examine each case in turn.

In Elfeldt,

the trial court entered an agreed modification order requiring the father to pay child support until the younger of the parties' two children reached the age of eighteen or until either or both children completed four years of college. The father stopped paying child support when the youngest child reached the age of eighteen. Because both children were in college, the children's mother brought a breach of contract suit to enforce the terms of the agreed order.⁴

The court interpreted former Section 14.06(d) of the Texas Family Code⁵

to require the order incorporating the agreement to provide “that its terms are enforceable as contract terms for that remedy to be available.” Elfeldt, 730 S.W.2d at 658. Because the parties “did not stipulate that the agreed order was contractually enforceable,” the father was not bound to support the children past the age of eighteen. Id.

Bruni,

like Elfeldt, involved the enforcement of an agreement to provide child support beyond age eighteen. Bruni, 924 S.W.2d at 367. There, the trial court entered a modification order awarding additional support until each child reached the age of twenty-one. Id. In discussing the enforceability of the order, the Bruni court, again applying former Section 14.06(d) of the Texas Family Code, held that “[w]hen there is no separate written agreement” for post-majority support “and the trial court's order is the only written manifestation of the parties' agreement on support, Elfeldt requires that the trial court's order provide for enforceability.” Id. at 368.

In Bruni,

though, the agreement specifically provided that it survived the divorce decree and was binding on the parties if the trial court approved the agreement and incorporated it into the decree. Id. Further, “the inclusion of the parties' agreement for child support in[to] the decree” constituted approval of those terms by the trial court. Id. Because the original agreement was enforceable as a contract, the modification of child support was likewise enforceable as a contract. The court, therefore, held that the amended agreement satisfied the requirements of the Family Code and was enforceable in contract. Id. at 369.

Thomas contends that because, as in Elfeldt,

the parties here did not enter into a separate written agreement which was incorporated into the final decree and because the decree does not include language to provide for the enforceability of the obligation to pay post-majority support, the trial court did not have the authority to enforce the post-majority support provision by reducing it to judgment. We disagree.

Initially, we recognize that Elfeldt

and Bruni each dealt with the continuation of preexisting child support obligations under Section 154.124(c)' s predecessor statute.⁶

See Bruni, 924 S.W.2d at 367

; Elfeldt, 730 S.W.2d at 658 ; see also

Bartlett v. Bartlett, 465 S.W.3d 745, 750 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (recognizing that Elfeldt and Bruni each dealt with continuations of preexisting child support obligations). The tuition-payment requirement in this case is not, as in Elfeldt and Bruni, a continuation of a preexisting child support obligation. Instead, it is an independent contractual promise falling under the caption of “College Tuition,” rather than under the section of the decree having to do with child support. In reaching this conclusion, we find Bartlett instructive.

In that case, Lori Bartlett brought a breach of contract action against William Bartlett for his alleged failure to pay college expenses for their son pursuant to an agreed decree of divorce. Bartlett, 465 S.W.3d at 747

. William claimed that the Texas Supreme Court's decisions in Elfeldt and Bruni prevented the college-expense provision of the decree from being enforced as a contract. Id. at 750–51. The court determined that the orders for continued child support in those cases differed from the provision in Bartlett. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the fact that the Bartlett college-expense provision was not included in the portion of the decree addressing child support. Id. at 750. Instead, the college-expense provision was included as part of the “Division of the Marital Estate” section of the decree. Id. Moreover, William's child support payments terminated under terms separate and distinct from those applicable to the college-expense provision. Id.

The court distinguished Huffines v. McMahill, No. 07–10–00029–CV, 2010 WL 2836980 (Tex.App.—Amarillo July 20, 2010, no pet.)

(mem.op.), in which the court found that a college-expense provision was child support. In Huffines, the college-expense provision was located under the heading of “Support.” Id. at *1. The provision stated that “neither party is to pay child support, except that [father] is to continue to provide health insurance for [the child].” Id. This provision also provided that father would be responsible for his son's “clothing needs, sports activities fees, and future vehicle needs.” Id. at *2. The next sentence obligated father to pay for one-half of the son's college tuition and for unreimbursed medical expenses. Id. “Of key importance to the Amarillo Court's conclusion that the college-expense provision was child support, the provision was found in the ‘support’ section of the decree and various expenses were listed in lieu of...