Seabright Ins. Co. v. Lopez

Decision Date12 June 2015
Docket NumberNO. 14–0272,14–0272
Citation465 S.W.3d 637
PartiesSeaBright Insurance Company, Petitioner, v. Maximina Lopez, Beneficiary of Candelario Lopez, Deceased, Respondent
CourtTexas Supreme Court

Bradley Dean McClellan, Richard Pena, Law Offices of Richard Pena, PC, Austin, for Amicus Curiae Combined Law Enforcement Associations of Texas.

Dana Marie Gannon, Joy M. Brennan, Smith & Carr, P.C., Houston, for Petitioner SeaBright Insurance Company.

Craig Michael Saucier, Saucier & Smaistral PLLC, San Antonio, Kimberly S. Keller, Shane John Stolarczyk, Keller Stolarczyk PLLC, Boerne, Martin J. Phipps, Phipps Cavazos PLLC, San Antonio, for Respondent Maxima Lopez, beneficiary of Candelario Lopez, deceased.

Opinion

Justice Green delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Hecht, Justice Willett, Justice Guzman, Justice Lehrmann, Justice Boyd, Justice Devine, and Justice Brown joined.

This workers' compensation case requires us to determine whether summary judgment evidence conclusively established that an employee was acting in the course and scope of his employment when he died in an automobile accident while traveling to a job site. A contested case hearing officer for the Texas Department of Insurance, Workers' Compensation Division, heard evidence and determined that the employee suffered a compensable injury, and a three-member appellate panel affirmed. The insurer sought judicial review, and the trial court granted summary judgment for the claimant and affirmed the administrative decision. The court of appeals likewise affirmed. 427 S.W.3d 442, 450–51 (Tex.App.–San Antonio 2014). We agree that conclusive evidence established that the employee was acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of his death and affirm the court of appeals' judgment.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The relevant facts of this case are undisputed. Interstate Treating, Inc., a company that fabricated and installed materials for the oil and gas processing industry, hired Candelario Lopez in 1999.1 Interstate Treating's primary office and fabrication department was in Odessa, Texas. Interstate Treating provided its installation services at other, often remote, locations. Lopez resided in Rio Grande City, Texas, with his wife, Maximina Lopez, but he never worked in the vicinity of Rio Grande City during his employment with Interstate Treating. When Interstate Treating assigned Lopez to work at remote job sites, Lopez made his own living arrangements—usually staying in a motel—and Interstate Treating paid Lopez an hourly wage plus per diem for his lodging and food expenses. Interstate Treating also would provide Lopez with a company vehicle to use at the remote job locations, but Lopez was not paid for any time traveling to or from the job site.

In September 2007, Interstate Treating assigned Lopez to work on the installation of a gas processing plant near Ridge, Texas—a distance the parties estimate to be 450 miles from Lopez's home in Rio Grande City. Although Interstate Treating expected Lopez to stay in a motel, Lopez had full control of which motel he stayed in while working at the Ridge job site. He chose to stay approximately forty miles from Ridge at a motel in Marlin, Texas. Interstate Treating allowed Lopez to use a company vehicle to drive between his motel in Marlin and the Ridge job site. Interstate Treating paid the vehicle's insurance and provided Lopez with a credit card so that he could fuel the vehicle. Lopez drove from his motel in Marlin to the Ridge job site every day, often allowing other Interstate Treating employees to ride with him. Although Interstate Treating had no express policy regarding carpooling, the use of company vehicles to transport employees to and from remote job sites was a common occurrence. On the morning of September 11, 2007, Lopez was transporting two other Interstate Treating employees to the Ridge job site when he died in an automobile accident.

Maximina sought death benefits from Interstate Treating's workers' compensation insurance carrier, SeaBright Insurance Co. SeaBright denied coverage, taking the position that Lopez was not acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. Maximina then initiated an administrative proceeding to challenge SeaBright's denial of benefit payments. The parties participated in a contested case hearing under Texas Labor Code section 410.151, and the hearing officer determined that Lopez was acting in the course and scope of his employment and ordered SeaBright to pay death benefits. A three-member appeals panel affirmed the hearing officer's decision.

SeaBright sought independent judicial review of the administrative decision. SeaBright's petition challenged four administrative determinations:

• Lopez's work involved travel away from Interstate Treating's premises;

• Lopez was engaged in or furthering the affairs or business of Interstate Treating at the time of his fatal vehicle accident on September 11, 2007;

• Lopez sustained damage or harm to the physical structure of his body in the course and scope of his employment at the time of his fatal vehicle accident on September 11, 2007; and

• Lopez sustained a compensable injury on September 11, 2007.

Both parties filed motions for summary judgment on the issue of whether Lopez was acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. The trial court granted Maximina's motion and denied SeaBright's motion, affirming the administrative decision.

SeaBright appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. 427 S.W.3d at 450–51. The court of appeals began its opinion by noting that [f]or an employee's injury to be considered in the course and scope of employment, it must (1) relate to or originate in the employer's business, and (2) occur in the furtherance of the employer's business.” Id. at 447. In analyzing the first element, the court of appeals concluded that the accident occurred during Lopez's commute from his employer-provided housing to the job site, in an employer-provided vehicle, and in an area of the state he would not have been in but for his employment with Interstate Treating. Id. at 450. This evidence of the relationship between Lopez's travel and his employment with Interstate Treating was “so close it can fairly be said the injury had to do with and originated in the work, business, trade, or profession of Interstate [Treating].” Id. (citation omitted). Citing this Court's opinion in Leordeanu v. American Protection Insurance Co., 330 S.W.3d 239, 242 (Tex.2010), the court of appeals held that Lopez's travel to the job site met the second element because such travel always furthers the employer's business. 427 S.W.3d at 447–48. Ultimately, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, finding the summary judgment evidence established that Lopez was acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident as a matter of law. Id. at 450–51.

SeaBright petitioned this Court for review. We granted the petition. 58 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 369 (Feb. 23, 2015).

II. Discussion

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. State v. Ninety Thousand Two Hundred Thirty–Five Dollars & No Cents in U.S. Currency ($90,235), 390 S.W.3d 289, 292 (Tex.2013). A party moving for traditional summary judgment has the burden to prove that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) ; Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex.2009). We review summary judgment evidence “in the light most favorable to the party against whom the summary judgment was rendered, crediting evidence favorable to that party if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.” Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc., 289 S.W.3d at 848 (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex.2005) ). When both sides move for summary judgment and the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, we review the summary judgment evidence presented by both sides, determine all questions presented, and render the judgment the trial court should have rendered. Comm'rs Court of Titus Cnty. v. Agan, 940 S.W.2d 77, 81 (Tex.1997).

“The Texas Legislature enacted the [Texas Workers' Compensation] Act in 1913 in response to the needs of workers, who, despite escalating industrial accidents, were increasingly being denied recovery.” Kroger Co. v. Keng, 23 S.W.3d 347, 349 (Tex.2000) (citation omitted). In order to balance the competing interests of providing “compensation for injured employees while protecting employers from the costs of litigation, the Legislature provided a mechanism by which workers could recover from subscribing employers without regard to the workers' own negligence while limiting the employers' exposure to uncertain, possibly high damage awards permitted under the common law.”In re Poly–Am., L.P., 262 S.W.3d 337, 350 (Tex.2008) (citations omitted). The Act ultimately struck a bargain that allows employees to receive “a lower, but more certain, recovery than would have been possible under the common law.” Kroger Co., 23 S.W.3d at 350 (citation omitted). We liberally construe the Act in favor of injured workers to effectuate these purposes. In re Poly–Am., L.P., 262 S.W.3d at 350.

The Act provides for employee compensation when injuries “arise[ ] out of and in the course and scope of employment for which compensation is payable.” Tex. Lab. Code § 401.011(10) (defining “compensable injury”). While determining whether an injury is compensable may involve other inquiries, the only issue the parties present in this case is whether Lopez was acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of his death. See id. §§ 401.011(10), (12) ; 410.302(b) (“A trial [reviewing a final decision of the appeals panel regarding compensability] is limited to issues...

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