Seabrook v. Raft of Railroad Cross-Ties

Decision Date06 November 1889
Citation40 F. 596
PartiesSEABROOK v. RAFT OF RAILROAD CROSS-TIES.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

W. H Parker, Jr., for libelant.

I. N Nathans, for claimant.

SIMONTON J.

The libelant is the owner of a steam-dredge used in mining phosphate rock from the bed of navigable streams. While at anchor in the stream of Stono river, a navigable salt-water river, on 13th September last, his dredge was run into by a raft floating down the stream with the tide, and injured. He brings this libel in rem. An exception is taken to the jurisdiction. Will a libel in rem lie against a raft for collision on navigable waters? The precise question has not been decided in any case reported. Chief Justice Taney, in Tome v. Four Cribs of Lumber, Taney, 533, was of the opinion that rafts anchored in a stream, although it be a public, navigable river, are not the subject-matter of admiralty jurisdiction, when the right of property or possession along is concerned. In that case he refused to allow salvage for saving rafts. But his decision went off on the custom of the Chesapeake. See Fifty Thousand Feet of Timber, 2 Low. 64. In Jones v. The Coal Barges, 3 Wall.Jr. 53,-- a libel for collision,-- Justice Grier held, with respect to coal-barges: 'Mere open chests or boxes of small comparative value, which are floated by the stream, and sold for lumber at the end of their voyage. A remedy in rem against such a vessel, either for its contracts or its torts, would not only be worthless, but ridiculous; and the application of the maritime law to the cargo and hands employed to navigate her would be equally so. * * * Every mode of remedy and doctrine of the maritime law affecting ships and mariners may be justly applied to ships and steamboats, but could have application whatever to rafts and flat-boats. ' Since this decision, however, other judges have had wider views of the jurisdiction of admiralty. In The General Cass, 1 Brown Adm. 334, a scow-- a mere float or lighter-- was held to come within the jurisdiction of the court. In The Pioneer, 30 F. 206, a steam-dredge was held subject to a maritime lien for supplies. In Disbrow v. The Walsh Bros., 36 F. 607, a barge without sails or rudder, used for transporting brick, on which men are employed for loading, carrying, and delivering brick, is held subject to a lien for wages of the men in this service. In The Hezekiah Baldwin, a canal-boat used as a floating elevator, having no motive power of its own, or capacity for cargo, is held maritime property. 8 Ben. 556. In this circuit, Judge Bond held that flats on which machinery for digging phosphate in navigable streams, and the lighters attached to them, were vessels, and that the hands employed on them had a lien for wages, and material-men a lien for supplies. Miller & Kelly v. Dredges, MS. Circuit Court S.C. 1884. [1] So, also, with respect to salvage, other judges entertain different views from the late chief justice. In Fifty Thousand Feet of Timber, 2 Low. 64, Judge Lowell held that a salvage service is performed when a raft of lumber is saved from peril on navigable waters, and that a claim for such service may be made in a court of admiralty. He quotes Judge Betts, A Raft of Spars, 1 Abb.Adm. 485. Judge Pardee, in Muntz v. A Raft of Timber, 15 F. 555-557, held that a raft of timber is subject to the jurisdiction of the admiralty court in the matter of salvage; reserving, however, the question whether it can commit a maritime tort. In Gastrel v. A Cypress Raft, 2 Woods, 213, it was held that admiralty has not jurisdiction to try title to logs because they have been formed into a raft; but on examination of that case it will be seen that the raft was made up of logs cut on a piece of land, the title to which was in dispute, and that the libel was filed in order to determine the title to this land. The logs were in New Orleans, their navigation was over, and they were really nothing but a pile of timber. The cases are collected and commented upon in The F. & P.M. No. 2, 33 F. 512. The result is that, while there have been obiter dicta on the point, there is no direct decision. Such being the state of the authorities, we can safely proceed on general principles

That a raft is a water-craft distinctly appears in section 4233, Rev. St. rule 12: 'Coal-boats, trading-boats, rafts, or other water-craft. ' In U.S. v. One Raft of Timber, 13 F. 796, Judge Bond held that a raft was a vessel, under sections 4233, 4234, and must carry lights.

'The true criterion by which to determine whether any water-craft or vessel is subject to admiralty jurisdiction is the business or employment for which it is intended, or is susceptible of being used, or in which it is actually engaged, rather than its size, form, capacity, or means of propulsion. ' The General Cass, 1 Brown, Adm. 334. The raft in this case was of cross-ties, and was used as the cheapest and most convenient mode of bringing them to market. It was made up of several small rafts, 36 in number, technically known as 'bulls.' Each bull was made up of cross-ties, three or four deep, securely and compactly joined together, and fastened in a crib, so as to be immovable; and then all the bulls were united by fastenings, making one body,-- the raft,-- in the shape most suited for navigating the streams which it must pass. It was manned with a pilot, who was in command, a crew of four men, and a cook. The pilot and crew, during the voyage,-- many days in duration,-- lived on the raft, on which was constructed a small shelter. The raft had come from the Edisto river, and, pursuing its way towards the sea, had used the many navigable streams forming the inland navigation of this coast. Necessarily, it was constructed to withstand the buffeting of the waves and winds, and the strain of passing over shallow places. Its locomotion depended almost altogether upon the tides; but poles and large oars, known as 'sweeps' were used constantly, as well in the propulsion of as in giving direction to, the raft. Rafts like this are in constant use. Sometimes they bring down only the timber or lumber which forms the raft; at others, cargo in the shape of cross-ties or fire-wood is brought. Their proper navigation requires vigilance, experience, and skill. Courts of admiralty have jurisdiction in rem in cases of collision between vessels on navigable waters. 'The word 'vessel' includes every description of water-craft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation by water. ' Rev. St. Sec. 3. 'Navigium'-- vessel-- is a general word used for any kind navigation. Ben. Adm. Secs. 216, 218. The first vessels were rafts. The raft is the parent of the modern ship. Encyclopaedia Britannica, art. 'Ship.' 'A maritime lien can only exist upon movable things engaged in navigation, or upon things which are the subjects of commerce on the high seas or navigable waters. It may arise with reference to vessels, steamers, and rafts, and upon goods and merchandise carried by them. ' Per Field, J., The Rock Island Bridge, 6 Wall. 213. In my opinion, this raft fulfills the definition of the subject of maritime lien, and the libel will lie.

On The Merits.

The dredge was a quadrangular flat, 20 feet wide by 60 feet long. On one side of her was a flat or lighter 40 feet long and 14 feet beam; on the other side, a smaller lighter-- feet long and -- feet beam. She was lying in Stono river, between Rantowles creek and Wappoo cut, the highway over which all rafts from the Edisto river to Charleston must pass. She was in the channel. At that point the river is at its greatest width, estimated by some witnesses at half a mile, by others 500 yards, and certainly not less than 1,000 feet. Her exact location was two-fifths of the width of the channel from the south shore. The channel of this river extends from shore to shore, of the uniform medium depth of 8 feet, gradually shoaling as it reaches the shore. Poles can be used anywhere about this place in navigating a raft. The dredge was at anchor fore and aft with the stream. She had out a double anchor and chain at the end looking up the stream, styled her 'stern;' one anchor with chain cable...

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