Seachange Intern., Inc. v. C-Cor Inc.
| Decision Date | 29 June 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 04-1498.,No. 04-1375.,04-1375.,04-1498. |
| Citation | 413 F.3d 1361 |
| Parties | SEACHANGE INTERNATIONAL, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. C-COR INC., Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit |
Robert E. Hillman, Fish & Richardson P.C., of Boston, Massachusetts, argued for plaintiff-appellee. With him on the brief were Lawrence K. Kolodney and Steven R. Katz.
Robert J. Gunther, Jr., Latham & Watkins LLP, of New York, New York, argued for defendant-appellant. With him on the brief were David A. Nelson and Israel Sasha Mayergoyz, of Chicago, Illinois. Of counsel was Mary B. Graham, Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnel, of Wilmington, Delaware.
Before BRYSON, GAJARSA, and LINN, Circuit Judges.
C-COR Inc. ("C-COR")1 appeals from a final judgment of the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware ("district court") in favor of Seachange International, Inc. ("Seachange") on Seachange's claim for infringement of its U.S. Patent No. 5,862,312 ("the '312 patent"). Seachange Int'l, Inc. v. nCUBE Corp., No. 00-568-JJF (D. Del. June 30, 2004). On C-COR's challenge to the district court's claim construction rulings, we conclude that the district court erred in construing the limitations "network for data communications," "distributed computer system," and "processor systems." Based on our revised claim construction, we conclude that C-COR does not infringe as a matter of law, and affirm the denial of C-COR's motion for judgment as a matter of law ("JMOL") on invalidity for lack of written description. Because the district court correctly denied C-COR's motion for JMOL on anticipation as to the Frey and Mendelsohn references, we affirm that ruling. However, we vacate the denial of the JMOL motion as to anticipation by Gardner and remand. Because C-COR was prejudiced by the district court's failure to properly instruct the jury on the construction of the "distributed computer system" limitation, we reverse the denial of C-COR's alternative motion for new trial on anticipation and remand. Thus, we affirm-in-part, reverse-in-part, vacate-in-part, and remand.
Seachange and C-COR are competitors in the video server industry. Seachange is the assignee of the '312 patent, which is directed to a method and apparatus for redundantly storing data—in particular, video data—for video-on-demand. The prior art "RAID-5" (Redundant Array of Inexpensive Disks) storage protocol provides redundant storage of video data by splitting a data file into segments and "striping" the segments across multiple disk drives within a single "processor system." The system retrieves the data by accessing the segments in round-robin fashion. In addition, it stores and strips "parity data," which enables recovery of video data if a drive crashes. See '312 patent, col. 1, II. 11-62.
The '312 patent expands the RAID-5 concept to a "distributed computer system." The distributed computer system includes at least three processor systems, yielding redundant data storage at both the processor-system level (within the processor system) and the computer-system level (across processor systems). Id., col. 2, II. 16-32. This "RAID Squared" system results in increased fault tolerance over the RAID-5 system. Id., II. 6-14, 33-43. Furthermore, the '312 patent teaches that connecting every processor system to every other processor system using point-to-point, two-way channel interconnections makes more efficient use of the read and write bandwidth, an object of the invention. Id., II. 7-9; col. 7, II. 63-67. Thus, "the invention relates generally to mass storage device interconnections and in particular, to a method and apparatus for increasing delivery bandwidth, providing fault tolerance, and input/output load balancing in a multiprocessor computer cluster." Id., col. 7, II. 4-8.
On June 13, 2000, Seachange filed suit against C-COR alleging that C-COR's technology infringed claims 37-38, 40-42, 52-53, and 57-58 of the '312 patent. C-COR asserted affirmative defenses and counterclaims on invalidity. The district court bifurcated the trial of liability and damages. On August 29, 2000, the district court issued its claim construction order. SeaChange Int'l, Inc. v. nCUBE Corp., 115 F.Supp.2d 473 (D.Del.2000). The district court construed the limitation "interconnecting each of said processor systems through a network for data communications with each other one of said processor systems" to mean "establishing data communications between every pair of processor systems in the distributed computer system using any kind of network." Id. at 482. The district court construed the limitation "processor systems" to require that each system have "at least one central processing unit ["CPU"] capable of running application type software, and at least one mass storage subsystem." Id. at 483. In light of the claim construction order, C-COR stipulated to infringement.
In September 2000, the invalidity issues were tried to a jury. At the pre-trial conference and during trial, C-COR requested that the district court construe the preamble phrase "distributed computer system." The district court declined. The jury found the claims not invalid for inadequate written description, not invalid due to anticipation, and not invalid due to obviousness. C-COR appealed, and we dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because final judgment was not entered. Seachange Int'l, Inc. v. nCube Corp., 81 Fed.Appx. 325 (Fed.Cir.2003).
On April 7, 2004, the district court issued an opinion denying C-COR's motion, in the alternative, for new trial on written description, anticipation, and non-obviousness. nCUBE Corp. v. SeaChange Int'l. Inc., 313 F.Supp.2d 393 (D.Del.2004). The district court admitted that it had erred when it did not construe the limitation "distributed computer system." Id. at 397. The district court found the error to be harmless because it had explained to the jury that "essentially [the phrase] would require a stand-alone computer in each processor system." Id. at 398. The district court explained that if the Federal Circuit decides that C-COR's proposed construction was correct, then C-COR would be entitled to a new trial. Id. The district court rejected C-COR's argument that under the district court's construction of the "network for data communications" limitation, the asserted claims were invalid for failure to comply with the written description requirement. Id. at 400. Finally, the district court reviewed the evidence presented at trial as it related to anticipation, addressing several references, three of which are discussed on appeal. The district court concluded that the jury's finding that Gardner et al., U.S. Patent No. 5,583,995 ("Gardner"), did not disclose "processor systems" was not against the weight of the evidence, SeaChange, 313 F.Supp.2d at 401; that the jury's findings that Frey, Jr. et al., U.S. Patent No. 5,130,992 ("Frey"), did not disclose either a "distributed computer system" or "processor systems" were not against the weight of the evidence, id. at 401-02; and that the jury's finding that Mendelsohn et al., U.S. Patent No. 5,488,731 ("Mendelsohn"), did not disclose "at least three processor systems" was not against the weight of the evidence, id. at 402-03.
On April 29, 2004, the district court denied C-COR's motion for JMOL on the invalidity issues for the same reasons discussed in the April 7, 2004 opinion. On June 30, 2004, the district court entered final judgment. C-COR timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
C-COR argues that the "network for data communications" limitation does not cover a system using any type of network other than a network that interconnects every processor system to every other processor system using direct, point-to-point two-way channel interconnections. C-COR argues that under this construction, it is entitled to a judgment of non-infringement as a matter of law. Alternatively, C-COR argues that under the district court's broader construction, it is entitled to JMOL that the asserted claims are invalid for inadequate written description. C-COR asserts that under the district court's construction of "distributed computer system" and "processor systems," it is entitled to JMOL that the asserted claims are invalid as anticipated by Gardner, Frey, and Mendelsohn. C-COR alternatively challenges the district court's construction of these limitations and argues that under the correct construction it is entitled to a new trial on anticipation. C-COR argues that "distributed computer system" does not require "stand-alone" computers in every processor system. C-COR argues that each "processor system" need not have a CPU capable of running application software.
Seachange asserts that the district court did not err in its claim construction rulings or in denying C-COR's motions for JMOL and a new trial. Seachange asserts that even if C-COR's construction of "network for data communications" is correct, this court should remand the case to the district court to consider infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Seachange adds that even if the district court erred in its construction of the "distributed computer system" and "processor systems" limitations, we should not grant C-COR a new trial on anticipation because C-COR did not establish that the references disclosed the "storing data input" limitation.
Claim construction is a question of law reviewed de novo. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1451 (Fed.Cir.1998) (en banc). This court applies regional circuit law in reviewing the denial of a motion for JMOL, Summit Tech., Inc. v. Nidek Co., 363 F.3d 1219, 1223 (Fed.Cir.2004), and the denial of a motion for a new trial, Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Mustek Sys., Inc., 340 F.3d 1314, 1318 & 1323 (Fed.Cir.2003). The Third...
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