Seal v. Laborers Int'l Union of N. Am. Highway

Decision Date02 March 2001
Docket NumberAFL-CIO,No. 99-55883,99-55883
Citation241 F.3d 1142
Parties(9th Cir. 2001) ROY ALLAN SLURRY SEAL; ROY ALLAN SLURRY SEAL, INC. Plaintiff-counter defendants-Appellees, v. LABORERS INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA HIGHWAY AND STREET STRIPERS/ROAD AND STREET SLURRY LOCAL UNION 1184,; LABORERS HEALTH AND WELFARE TRUST FUND FOR SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA; CONSTRUCTION LABORERS VACATION PENSION TRUST FOR SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA; LABORERS TRAINING AND RETRAINING TRUST FUND FOR SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA; FUND FOR CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY ADVANCEMENT; LABORERS CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION TRUST FUND FOR SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA; CENTER FOR CONTRACT COMPLIANCE, Defendants-counter claimants-Appellants
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

J. David Sackman, Reich, Adell, Crost & Cvitan, Los Angeles, California, for the defendants-counter-claimants appellants.

Bethany A. Pelliconi, Musick, Peeler & Garrett, LLP, Los Angeles, California, for the plaintiff-counter-defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Terry J. Hatter, Jr., Chief District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No.CV-97-02340-TJH

Before: William C. Canby, Jr., M. Margaret McKeown, and Richard A. Paez, Circuit Judges.

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:

This case requires us to determine the relationship between a state attorney's fees provision and federal labor law. Specifically, we must consider whether California Civil Code section 1717, which renders reciprocal an otherwise unilateral contractual provision for attorney's fees, is preempted by the federal Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"). Because an award of fees under section 1717 would read a new term into the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"), thereby undermining two primary goals of the LMRA-interpreting CBAs uniformly, and respecting the intentions of the CBA's signatories--we conclude that section 1717 is preempted here. Therefore, we reverse the award of fees, and remand for consideration of whether fees are otherwise available under federal law.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

For many years, Plaintiff/Appellee Roy Allan Slurry Seal ("RASS")1 has supplied road slurry under subcontract to two general contractors, the R.J. Noble Company ("R.J. Noble") and the Southern Pacific Milling Company ("S.P. Milling"), neither of which is a party to this litigation. Important here, RASS is a non-union contractor.

In 1992, the Southern California General Contractors and the Southern California District Council of Laborers entered into a collective bargaining agreement, the Master LaborAgreement ("MLA"). It is undisputed that the MLA bound R.J. Noble, S.P. Milling, and Defendant/Appellant Laborers International Union of North America Highway and Street Stripers/Road and Street Slurry Local Union 1184, AFL-CIO ("the Union").

The MLA contained three provisions that are relevant here. First, it provided that signatory employers would not hire nonunion subcontractors. Second, signatory employers would use a union hiring hall. Third, signatory employers would contribute to the Fund for Construction Industry Advancement, the Contract Administration Trust Fund for Southern California, and the Center for Contract Compliance Trust Funds. If an employer became delinquent in its contributions, and a fund incurred legal expenses "in connection with [the] delinquency," the fund would be entitled to attorney's fees. Conversely, if the employer were found not to have been delinquent, then the employer would be entitled to attorney's fees.

In 1996, the Union filed grievances against RASS, alleging that RASS had violated the hiring hall and wage and benefit provisions of the MLA. The Union contended that, although RASS was not a party to the MLA, it was nonetheless bound by the Agreement because RASS's subcontracts with R.J. Noble and S.P. Milling incorporated the MLA by reference. In the ensuing arbitrations, the Laborers Joint Adjustment Board ruled in favor of the Union. RASS was ordered to pay back wages to the Union, and back contributions for fringe benefits to the Trust Funds.2

In April 1997, RASS filed suit in federal court, seeking to vacate the arbitration award. Claiming jurisdiction under the LMRA, RASS contended, among other things, that the arbitrators exceeded their power under the MLA when they ruled against RASS, because RASS was not party to that agreement. In this initial set of claims, RASS was the only plaintiff, and the Union was the sole defendant.

In June 1997, the Union and the Trust Funds filed counterclaims to confirm the arbitration awards, and to collect delinquent contributions to the employee benefit plans. They claimed jurisdiction under both the LMRA and the Employment Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. S 1132(e)(1). This action involved slightly different parties than RASS's original complaint; both the Union and the Trust Funds were counterclaim plaintiffs and, in addition to RASS, Roy Allan was individually named as a counterclaim defendant. The Union and the Trust Funds sought the back wages and unpaid fringe benefit contributions specified in the arbitration award, interest on the award, and attorney's fees.

In March 1998, the Union brought a motion to confirm the arbitration awards. While the motion was still pending, we decided Cariaga v. Local No. 1184 Laborers International Union, 154 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1998). In Cariaga, we held that a contract between a general contractor and a subcontractor is interpreted under state law, rather than under the LMRA. Id. at 1074. We also held that under California law, a subcontract does not incorporate a collective bargaining agreement by reference unless the subcontract points specifically to such an agreement. Id. at 1074-75. Soon thereafter, the Union and the Trust Funds filed a supplemental brief in which they conceded that under Cariaga, the S.P. Milling arbitration award should be vacated. They contended, however, that the R.J. Noble award should stand.

Little happened in the case until March 1999, when the district court denied the motion to confirm the arbitration awards, and sua sponte vacated the arbitration awards without explanation. The remaining counterclaim was dismissed by stipulation.

RASS then moved for attorney's fees under the MLA as augmented by California Civil Code section 1717, 3 seeking 19,500.50 in fees from the Union and the Trust Funds, to whom it referred collectively as "Defendants. " The court awarded RASS $119,392.50 in attorney's fees. As with its order vacating the arbitration awards, the court provided no reason for awarding fees, nor for the particular amount of fees. It simply stated that the motion was granted, ordering "Defendant" to pay fees. The Union and the Trust Funds timely appealed.

We review attorney's fees awards for an abuse of discretion. Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000). Supporting factual findings are reviewed for clear error; legal determinations are reviewed de novo. Id. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291, and we reverse.

II. LMRA PREEMPTION

Section 301 of the LMRA has broad preemptive effect over many state statutes. LMRA S 301, 29 U.S.C. S 185(a).4 It "displace[s] entirely any state cause of action `for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization.' "

Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 23 (1983) (quoting 29 U.S.C. S 185(a)). Likewise, it preempts state law when "resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a collective-bargaining agreement." Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405-06 (1988) (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 218 (1985)). And, important here, it mandates that "substantive principles of federal labor law must be para-mount in the area covered by the statute." Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962). This last principle stems from a longstanding concern that federal labor law be uniform, and that collective bargaining agreements be interpreted uniformly. Id. at 103-04.

Precisely because of this concern with uniformity, we have previously held that the broad preemptive force of the LMRA applies against California Civil Code section 1717, and we reach the same conclusion here. In Waggoner v. Northwest Excavating, Inc., we considered an action brought by union trust funds to recover trust fund contributions allegedly owed by the defendant employer under an MLA. 642 F.2d 333, 335 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 455 U.S. 931 (1982), reaff'd, 685 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1982). Among other issues, we considered the employer's claim that the district court should have awarded attorney's fees under California Civil Code section 1717. We held that attorney's fees were properly denied because Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), "prohibits a federal court from awarding attorney's fees under state statutes allowing such fees unless the court's jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizenship. " 642 F.2d at 338. Thus, we concluded, "section 1717 is inapplicable to the instant case." Id.

We went on to explain that Alyeska "impos[es] strict limits on the use of state law to support attorney's fees awards," and that "federal labor policy supports the district court's decision to decline to award fees under section 1717" because "[u]niformity would be defeated, with few, if any, countervailing benefits, by applying fifty different state laws on the issue of attorney's fees." Id. at 338-39. Thus, as a general matter, section 1717 cannot be invoked as a basis to award attorney's fees in actions under the LMRA. See also Burke v. French Equip. Rental, Inc., 687 F.2d 307, 312 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing Waggoner).

For these same reasons, attorney's fees cannot be awarded here under section 1717. As in Waggoner , this was a suit under the LMRA....

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