Seale v. Stephens

• Citation: 24 So.2d 651
• Decision Date: 31 January 1946
• Docket Number: 2780.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana (US)
• Parties: SEALE v. STEPHENS (EMPLOYERS CASUALTY CO. et al., Interveners).

24 So.2d 651

SEALE v. STEPHENS (EMPLOYERS CASUALTY CO. et al., Interveners).

No. 2780.

Court of Appeals of Louisiana, First Circuit

January 31, 1946

Frank M. Brame, of Lake Charles, for defendant and intervenors.

Preston L. Savoy and Chas. C. Jaubert, both of Lake Charles, for appellee.

DORE, Judge.

In this case plaintiff seeks a judgment against the defendant in the sum of $1,600, for the loss of his automobile in the sum of $1,100, and for pain, suffering, inconvenience and trouble in the sum of $500, arising out of a collision between plaintiff's automobile and that of defendant on Saturday May 18, 1944, at about 11:00 A.M., while plaintiff was driving west on U. S. Highway 90, near a night club located west of the entrance to the Cities Service Refinery, several miles west of the City of Lake Charles, and while defendant was travelling east on the said highway in the direction of Lake Charles.

He alleges that he was driving on his right hand side at about a speed of 35 miles per hour, without any traffic in front of him that after he had passed an entrance to the Continental Oil Company, and before reaching the night club, defendant without any signal or indication, in order to enter the premises of the night club, made a left turn directly in front of him and when he was so close to the point of impact that he was unable to stop or turn aside to avoid the accident. He charges that the accident was caused solely by defendant's negligence in thus making the left turn.

The defendant answered and denied any negligence on his part, and contended, on the other hand, that the accident happened through plaintiff's own gross negligence. In the alternative, he pleads that plaintiff had the last clear chance to avoid the accident. He further pleads, in the alternative, the gross contributory negligence of plaintiff as a bar to plaintiff's recovery. The defendant then assumes the position of plaintiff in reconvention and seeks a judgment against plaintiff for damages to his automobile and for personal injuries caused to him by the collision together with medical expenses.

Defendant had a collision insurance policy to the amount of $500 with the Employers Casualty Company, for which amount defendant subrogated the insurance company. The insurance company appeared and intervened in the suit by joining defendant in the defense of the suit, and reconvened for a judgment in said sum.

In defendant's car, there were two passengers, employees of defendant who worked at the night club, namely: Tiney Cortez and Jimmie Honneycutt; each of these filed interventions and seek judgment against the plaintiff for alleged injuries received in said accident.

On the issues thus made, the case was tried, resulting in a judgment in favor of plaintiff for the sum of $1,100 for the loss on his car and $300 for personal injuries, making a total of $1,400, and costs, against defendant R. C. Stephens. There was further judgment disallowing the reconventional demand of defendant Stephens; and the interventions of the Employers Casualty Company, of Tiney Cortez, and of Jimmie Honneycutt were dismissed and disallowed at defendant's and intervenors' cost. The defendant and the intervenors have appealed.

As is generally the case in such suits as this one, the evidence on many important and essential facts is conflicting and irreconcilable. This case depends on a conclusion of fact to be found, and unless we can find manifest error committed by the trial judge, we should approve his finding.

It is well established in our jurisprudence and in our law that the making of a left turn on a much travelled highway is a very dangerous operation, requiring great care and caution. The responsibility for seeing that such a left turn can be made in safety is placed upon the driver desiring to make such left turn. The law, Highway Regulatory Act of 1938 (Rule 9, Section 3 of Act 286), requires a driver to ascertain before making such a left turn that there is no traffic approaching from either direction which will be unduly or unnecessarily delayed and requires him to yield the right of way to such approaching traffic.

In the light of the above jurisprudence and law, the main question involved herein is as to how far the plaintiff was from the defendant when the defendant began to make the left turn across the highway into the premises in front of the night club.

It is the contention of the plaintiff that he was not over 75 feet from defendant when the defendant slowed down and began to make a left turn across the highway to enter the premises of the night club in front of him; that he was then travelling at a speed of 35 miles per hour; on account of the oncoming traffic in the rear of defendant, he could not go to the left; he did everything within his power to avoid running into the defendant; that despite his carefulness he ran into the rear right side of defendant's automobile, while said automobile was in his lane of travel on the paved portion of the highway.

Defendant contends that he was at least 200 feet from the plaintiff's car when he began the left turn and had entirely completed the left turn and had entirely cleared the paved portion of the highway, the rear portion of his automobile being some three feet off of the paved portion of the said highway and that the said accident occurred on the shoulder and premises of the night club. He further contends that prior to the accident, he had been travelling at a rate of 20 to 25 miles per hour, had reduced his speed to approximately 10 miles per hour when he began to make the left turn and probably was travelling at the speed of 5 miles per hour at the time of the accident.

Without reviewing what each witness testified to, we deem it sufficient to say that plaintiff and his witnesses...