Sealey v. Stidham

• Decision Date: 30 July 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:14cv1036-MHT-WC
• Citation: Sealey v. Stidham, Case No. 2:14cv1036-MHT-WC (M.D. Ala. Jul 30, 2015)
• Parties: MELVIN L. SEALEY, Plaintiff, v. TAMARA A. STIDHAM, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

MELVIN L. SEALEY, Plaintiff, v. TAMARA A. STIDHAM, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 2:14cv1036-MHT-WC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA NORTHERN DIVISION

July 30, 2015

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter is before the court on Defendants' Motion To Dismiss, Or In The Alternative, Motion For More Definite Statement (Doc. 2), as well numerous filings by the Plaintiff, some of which appear related and responsive to the motion to dismiss, and some of which, to the extent they are comprehensible, appear to concern other matters Plaintiff believes relevant to this litigation. The District Judge referred this case to the undersigned Magistrate Judge "for consideration and disposition or recommendation on all pretrial matters as may be appropriate." Order (Doc. 6). After a review of the parties' filings and supporting evidentiary materials, and for the reasons that follow, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 2) be GRANTED, that this case be DISMISSED, and that Plaintiff's pending motions be DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 2, 2014, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed the instant complaint in the Circuit of Crenshaw County, Alabama. Because the complaint purported to assert numerous violations of Plaintiff's constitutional and federal statutory rights, see Complaint (Doc. 1-2) at ¶ 1, Defendants removed the complaint to this court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 on the basis of this court's federal question subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Not. of Rem. (Doc. 1) at 2. The specific factual allegations of Plaintiff's complaint are numerous, mostly conclusory, and, as a whole, difficult to decipher. There is no doubt that Plaintiff's complaint concerns a foreclosure on property that he previously owned in Alabama, and that he believes the foreclosure was without proper authority. The bulk of the allegations in the complaint appear to describe the various correspondences sent and received by Plaintiff in a prolonged dispute with Branch Banking and Trust ("BB&T"), the entity which the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation assigned as successor of the rights of Colonial Bank after it was declared insolvent in 2009. See Complaint (Doc. 1-1) at ¶¶ 11-31. While it is perhaps unnecessary to summarize each of these allegations of correspondences sent or received in order to properly contextualize Plaintiff's claims and adjudicate Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, out of an abundance of caution the court will endeavour to set out what appears to be the substance of Plaintiff's dispute with Defendants and how the specific allegations of his complaint relate to any claims he purports to assert.

The complaint lacks any sort of helpful overview of Plaintiff's claims against Defendants before it dives, headlong, into a confusing and idiosyncratic description of Plaintiff's lengthy history of correspondences with individuals representing BB&T. Elsewhere, Plaintiff himself has more lucidly and intelligibly described the core of his dispute with Defendants as follows:

The Petitioner resides at [sic] in the County of Crenshaw in the State of Alabama. Defendants are four (4) agents employed by a corporation upon information and belief are doing business in the County of Crenshaw, State of Alabama. Petitioner never received a document from Colonial Bank of a default regarding the loan in question dated April 4, 2004 from Colonial Bank Account #8040535398. On or about November 19, 2009 Petitioner received a loan package from BB&T over night via Fed Ex # 420568883479, the documentation contained a NOTICE REGARDING LOANS CLOSED IN THE NAME OF COLONIAL BANK ON OR AFTER AUGUST 17, 2009. In which BB&T agreed to assume certain liabilities of the failed institution. Paragraph five (5) states that Borrowers with existing loans would receive a separate notice from BB&T confirming a BB&T'S acquisition of the loan etc. At all times relevant to this assumption Petitioner never signed a contract with BB&T. Yet, BB&T did send a loan package via of FED EX # 420568883479, in an attempt to induce Petitioner into a forcible loan contract. This new contract was for a new loan with BB&T, being confused Petitioner did not sign the documents. The new contract had the same Loan # 8040535398 as Colonial Bank's Account Number. This is the same number [Defendant] Miller stated BB&T no longer uses for accounting purposes. And at the same time replacing and foreclosing on Petitioner's property with loan number 9641482436-1. In which any person of sound mind would not sign for an additional loan contract for the same property. At all times relevant Petitioner did not have a forcible contract with BB&T.

Compl. (Doc. 1) at 2-3, Sealey v. Stidham, et al., Civ. No. 14cv1117-MHT-WC (filed Oct. 28, 2014).¹

Provided this overview of Plaintiff's core dispute with BB&T, the numerous allegations of the instant complaint can be, even if not fully decipherable, at least placed in an appropriate frame of reference. Plaintiff alleges that he began corresponding with BB&T in November of 2009 "regarding loans closed in the name of Colonial Bank on or after August 17, 2009." Compl. (Doc. 1-2) ¶ 11. In December of 2009, he received "an improper response for verification of alleged debut," to which he responded by serving on unspecified persons a "Notice of Conditional Acceptance" under the purported authority of some unspecified provision of the Administrative Procedures Act. Id. at ¶ 12. He was then "offered a loan by BB&T," but he requested "full disclosure of the facts relating to the loan offer or alleged thereof." Id. at ¶ 13. In January of 2010, Plaintiff served on BB&T representatives his "AFFIDAVIT of a Notice of None Response" to his prior "Conditional Acceptance Offer." Id. at ¶ 15. Later, in February of 2010, Plaintiff served on Defendant Stidham a "Notice of Fault With the Opportunity to Cure," which Plaintiff alleges included an "Affidavit" in in "attempt to settle and close the matter in reference to the alleged note/mortgage No.:8040355398." Id. at ¶ 16. Plaintiff alleges that because "no response and/or verification of alleged debt was ever receive [sic] by the Plaintiff," Defendants (Stidham?) violated some unspecified dictate of "the Fair Debt and Collections Practices Act." Id. In March of 2010, Plaintiff again sent to Defendant Stidham a "Notice of Default With The Opportunity to Cure," for which he, again, did not receive a response. Id. at ¶ 17. In April of 2010, Plaintiff sent to "BB&T allegedSenior Vice President a Notice of Default with Opportunity to Settle," which, again, was unanswered. Id. at ¶ 18. Plaintiff alleges that this Notice in effect advised its recipient that a failure to respond to it constituted a tacit acceptance or agreement of the terms of the settlement disclosed therein. Id. In July of 2010, Plaintiff sent a "Notice of Settlement and Closure to BB&T, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer," which advised the recipients that Plaintiff had run a "legal posting in the Luverne Journal" from June 3 through June 17, and that, because no response had been received after the legal notice, any entity asserting any interest in the property "should be barred from all rights, claims and liens if any of any kind forever in reference to Original Note No. :8040355398[.]" Id. at ¶ 19.

In September of 2010, Plaintiff corresponded with Defendant Wright regarding his position that BB&T "defaulted on verification of alleged debt since July 5, 2010, whereas Plaintiff had a Public notice posted since June 3, 2010, and no qualify [sic] representative for BB&T ever acknowledged any interest in the property and/or land[.]" Id. at ¶ 20. Jumping forward to August of 2011, the complaint next alleges that Plaintiff responded to Defendant Wright's letter "for demand of payment on a alleged debt" with his own "Notice of Debt Collector Disclosure Statement, pursuant to Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 USC § 1692g, applicable portions of Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 12 CFR 226[,]" and that he never received a response from Defendant "for verification of alleged Debt." Id. at ¶ 21. Plaintiff also wrote to Defendant Stidham in August of 2011 in response to Defendant Wright's letter demanding payment, explaining that all of hisprevious correspondence "requested verification of all and any debt associated with Plaintiff property, would have solve [sic] any confusion and/or deception by all BB&T representatives who continue to violate Fair Debt Collection Practices Act." Id. at ¶ 22. Jumping forward to June of 2013, the complaint next alleges that Plaintiff sent to Defendant Miller a "Conditional Acceptance" which instructed that, if the recipient did not "notify [Plaintiff] with proof of your claim of ownership as outlined in this notice within thirty days I will assume you have no proof of your claim thereby forfeiting your claims." Id. at ¶ 23. Plaintiff also sent to Defendant Miller in June of 2013 his "Affidavit of Truth" in which he explained that he wanted BB&T to "verify the indebtedness by way of a completed Affidavit of Indebtedness along with producing the original alleged loan/note No.:964182436-1[.]" Id. at ¶ 24. Plaintiff also sent to Defendant Miller an "Affidavit of Truth" concerning the "unlawful sale" of a parcel of land which stated that he had never received a "lawful response from [his] correspondences" to Defendant Miller or BB&T so that he could "clarify and verify lawful ownership of the alleged Note pursuant to RESPA and Debt Collectors Act." Id. at ¶ 25.

In July of 2013, Plaintiff sent to Defendant Miller another "Affidavit of Truth" noting the failure of any BB&T representative to respond to his "Conditional Acceptance notice," and stating that Defendant Miller and BB&T had caused he and his family substantial hardship over the previous four years. Id. at ¶ 27. The final correspondence detailed in the complaint is another "Affidavit of Truth" sent...