Seals v. H & F, Inc.

• Decision Date: 15 January 2010
• Docket Number: No. M2009-00330-SC-R23-CQ.,M2009-00330-SC-R23-CQ.
• Parties: Linda F. SEALS v. H & F, INC. et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

301 S.W.3d 237

Linda F. SEALS v. H & F, INC. et al.

No. M2009-00330-SC-R23-CQ.

Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Nashville.

October 7, 2009 Session.

January 15, 2010.

Robert D. MacPherson and Elizabeth Lee Luongo Youmans, Lebanon, Tennessee, for the plaintiff, Linda F. Seals.

Alisha M. Toll, Benjamin James Miller, and Dianne M. Schwartz, Nashville, Tennessee, for the defendant, H & F, Inc; and James Randolph Tomkins, Nashville, Tennessee, for the defendant, Sellars Cremation Service, Inc.

OPINION

GARY R. WADE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JANICE A. HOLDER, C.J., CORNELIA A. CLARK, and SHARON G. LEE, JJ., joined. WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

The defendants, a funeral home and a crematory operator, arranged for and conducted a cremation at the joint request of the decedent's fiancée and his fourteen-year-old son. The decedent's mother, who claims the entitlement to have directed the disposal of his body, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee contending wrongful cremation and seeking damages under a variety of theories in tort. Three certified questions of state law have been presented to this Court for consideration. Our responses are as follows: (1) where decedent did not make a pre-mortem election for the method of disposal of his remains, a parent has a right of control superior to that of a fiancée or minor child; (2) while a minor may be an "heir" under the safe harbor provisions for crematory operators under our statute, reliance on the instructions of a minor may qualify as so reckless as to subject the operator to liability; and (3) a funeral home that merely makes arrangements for a cremation and contracts for another party to perform the cremation is not the operator of a crematory facility for purposes of the statutory safe harbor.

Facts and Procedural History¹

Rodney Leon Boling (the "Decedent") died on October 28, 2007. At the joint request of his fiancée² and his fourteen-year-old son, whose names are not a part of this limited record, the body was cremated by the defendants, H & F, Inc. ("H & F"), a funeral home operator, and Sellars Cremation Service, Inc. ("Cremation Service") (the "Defendants"). While H & F made contractual arrangements with Cremation Service for the cremation, both businesses are owned by the same individual, Judd Sellars. Linda F. Seals (the "Plaintiff"), is the Decedent's mother and his sole surviving parent.

The Plaintiff filed a diversity-of-citizenship suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, arguing that she alone was entitled to control the disposition of the body pursuant to the order of priority established in Akers v. Buckner-Rush Enterprises, Inc., 270 S.W.3d 67, 73 (Tenn.Ct.App.2007), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 7, 2008), reh'g denied (Tenn. May 12, 2008), and that the Defendants either negligently or intentionally failed to either ascertain or respect her right to do so. She is seeking damages under a variety of theories sounding in tort.

In response, both of the Defendants first claim that the fiancée and child led them to believe that the Plaintiff had not survived the Decedent, and that they were entitled to rely upon their representations. Secondly, the Defendants assert that the Decedent's minor son, rather than the Plaintiff, had the right to control the disposition of his father's remains. As an alternative defense, Cremation Service contends that even if the Plaintiff had the superior right to control the disposition of the body, Tennessee Code Annotated section 62-5-511 (2009), which establishes a safe harbor for the operator of a crematory facility, precludes liability for an operator following the instructions of an heir, unless the operator acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner. Finally, H & F argues that it also qualifies as an operator of a crematory facility and is, therefore, also protected from liability by the terms of section 62-5-511.

The district court found that there were determinative questions of state law for which there was no precedent. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 23, a certification order was filed on February 20, 2009, presenting three questions of law, each of which has been accepted by this Court for consideration:

1. Who has the legal control over the disposition of the remains of a decedent when there is no surviving spouse? Specifically, with respect to the facts of this case, with whom is such control vested among a sole surviving parent of the decedent, a fiancée of the decedent, and a fourteen-year-old minor child of the decedent?

2. If the answer to Question #1 is such that the fourteen-year-old minor has no legal control or has no superior or exclusive right of control over the disposition of the remains of his deceased parent, is such a child nonetheless an "heir" of the decedent, as that term is used in section 62-5-511, Tennessee Code Annotated, such that an operator of a crematory facility acting without malicious purpose or bad faith, and not in a wanton or reckless manner, in cremating the remains of the decedent in accordance with instructions set forth by the child is not liable for damages in a civil action for such cremation, as provided by said statute?

3. Does the defendant funeral home, H & F, Inc., fall under the definition of a crematory facility for purposes of section 62-5-511, Tennessee Code Annotated, given its role in the disposition of the decedent's remains?

Authority, Standard of Review, and Statutory Interpretation

Under Rule 23 of the Tennessee Supreme Court Rules, we may "accept and answer a question of state law certified . . . by the federal court to assist the federal court in deciding a question of state law." Haley v. Univ. of Tenn.-Knoxville, 188 S.W.3d 518, 521 (Tenn.2006) (citing 17A Charles Alan Wright, Edward H. Cooper, Arthur R. Miller & Vikram David Amar, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4248 (2d ed. 1988)). Although "answering a certified question is not an adjudicative function" and, in consequence, "not an exercise of this Court's jurisdiction," id. at 522, we have held that we are authorized to answer certified questions as part of our inherent judicial power under Article VI, section 1 of the state's Constitution.³ Id. at 523.

Rule 23 permits consideration of questions of law only, not questions of fact or controversies as a whole. Our scope of review for questions of law is de novo. Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 263 S.W.3d 827, 836 (Tenn.2008) (citing Perrin v. Gaylord Entm't Co., 120 S.W.3d 823, 826 (Tenn.2003); Ganzevoort v. Russell, 949 S.W.2d 293, 296 (Tenn.1997)); S. Constructors Inc. v. Loudon County Bd. of Educ., 58 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tenn.2001). Issues of statutory construction are questions of law. Hayes v. Gibson County, 288 S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tenn.2009).

When interpreting a statute, we "must first ascertain and then give full effect to the General Assembly's intent and purpose" in drafting those sections. Waldschmidt v. Reassure Am. Life Ins. Co., 271 S.W.3d 173, 176 (Tenn.2008). Our chief concern is to carry out the legislature's intent without unduly broadening or restricting the statute. Houghton v. Aramark Educ. Res., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tenn.2002) (quoting Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn.1995)). We presume that every word in a statute has meaning and purpose and should be given full effect if so doing does not violate the legislature's obvious intent. In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 722 (Tenn.2005). When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we simply apply its plain meaning. Eastman Chem. Co. v. Johnson, 151 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tenn.2004). When a statute is ambiguous, however, we may refer to the broader statutory scheme, the history of the legislation, or other sources to discern its meaning. Colonial Pipeline, 263 S.W.3d at 836. We presume that the General Assembly was aware of its prior enactments and knew the state of the law at the time it passed the legislation. Owens, 908 S.W.2d at 926.

Question 1

The federal district court has asked us first to ascertain who has control over the disposition of remains when there is no surviving spouse. For the reasons set out below, we have determined that the decedent, as a general rule, has the primary entitlement to expressly elect the method of disposal of his or her body, or, in the alternative, to designate an individual to elect the method of disposal; if the decedent does not do so, however, the legal right to direct the disposal of remains descends to the following parties, in order of priority: (1) the spouse of the decedent; (2) adult children of the decedent; (3) parents of the decedent; (4) adult siblings of the decedent; (5) adult grandchildren of the decedent; (6) grandparents of the decedent; and (7) an adult who has exhibited special care and concern for the decedent. Thus, the right of a surviving parent (who would be third in priority), absent an election by the decedent to the contrary, will control over the wishes of a fiancée (seventh in priority) or minor child, to whom priority would never descend.

Before we consider the specific rights of survivors, we must raise a point that the certified question neglects. The question appears to assume—perhaps inadvertently —that the decision to cremate will always rest in the hands of either the surviving spouse or some other survivor. First and foremost, however, the decedent has the right to direct the method of disposal for his or her body. The policy of the General Assembly confers upon the individual the opportunity to make decisions of this nature. See Tenn.Code. Ann. § 68-30-104 to -108 (Supp. 2009) (empowering individuals to make anatomical gifts during life and placing restrictions upon those who might elect to revoke that gift); Tenn. Code Ann. § 62-5-511(a)(1) (providing a safe harbor for a crematory...