Seaman Dist. Teachers' Ass'n of Shawnee County v. Board of Ed. of Seaman Unified School Dist. No. 345

• Decision Date: 10 May 1975
• Docket Number: No. 47715,47715
• Citation: 217 Kan. 233,535 P.2d 889
• Parties: , 90 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2652 The SEAMAN DISTRICT TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION OF SHAWNEE COUNTY, Kansas, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. The BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SEAMAN UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 345, Appellee and Cross-Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 889

535 P.2d 889

217 Kan. 233, 90 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2652

The SEAMAN DISTRICT TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION OF SHAWNEE COUNTY Kansas, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. The BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SEAMAN UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO 345, Appellee and Cross-Appellant.

No. 47715.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

May 10, 1975.

Syllabus by the Court

The Collective Negotiations Act (K.S.A. 72-5413 through 72-5425) as a whole discloses an intention on the part of the legislature to authorize a professional employees' organization of teachers to sue or be sued in the association's name.

2. The Collective Negotiations Act (K.S.A. 72-5413 through 72-5425) provides that nothing in the Act shall be construed to authorize a strike by professional employees (K.S.A. 72-5423(b)). To enforce such legislative mandate our courts will give no assistance under the Act to professional employees who do strike.

3. Where a professional employees' association petitions a court and is successful in procuring a preliminary order of mandamus requiring the parties to resume forthwith professional negotiations in accordance with the Collective Negotiations Act, requiring the parties to negotiate in a good faith effort to reach agreement, and in procuring a temporary injunction, and a negotiated agreement subsequently results from such order which is ratified by the teachers' unit represented by the petitioner, the ratification of the negotiated agreement constitutes an acquiescence in the judgment.

4. Anything that savors of acquiescence in a judgment by a party to the lawsuit cuts off the right to appellate review.

5. Where a party acquiesces in a judgment, an issue charging the opponent with failure to negotiate in good faith upon various factual grounds asserted, prior to the termination of negotiations and the filing of the action, is moot.

6. On facts and circumstances related in the opinion, the refusal of the trial court to grant a permanent order of mandamus is affirmed on the ground that issuance of the writ would not be of any practical benefit to the petitioner or serve a proper purpose.

7. Attorney fees in a mandamus action will be allowed only where the refusal of the public official, commission or board to perform the duty imposed by law was unreasonable under all the facts and circumstances.

Ward D. Martin, Crane, Martin, Claussen, Hamilton & Barry, Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant and cross-appellee.

William E. Enright, Scott, Quinlan & Hecht, Topeka, argued the cause, and George A. Scott, Topeka, on the brief for appellee and cross-appellant.

SCHROEDER, Justice:

This action is brought by The Seaman School District Teachers' Association of Shawnee County, Kansas, (plaintiff-appellant) to obtain an order of mandamus and injunction enjoining and restraining The Board of Education of Seaman Unified School District No 345 (defendant-appellee) from unilaterally issuing individual contracts of employment to certified employees of the defendant and to require the defendant to return to the negotiating table and for damages, attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to K.S.A. 72-5413 et seq.

During the school year 1972-1973, the plaintiff was the exclusive representative of the professional employees, less administrators, of the defendant pursuant to K.S.A. 72-5416. On December 1, 1972, the plaintiff and defendant gave notice to each other of their desire to negotiate an agreement on certain items for the 1973-1974 school year.

In the month of December 1972 the parties had three meetings for the purpose of reaching a procedural agreement. Unable to agree, they proceeded to negotiate on substantive proposals. Thereafter, the parties met together for the purpose of negotiations eleven different times during the months of January, February March and April of 1973. Three other meetings were scheduled on March 26, March 30 and April 2; however, the plaintiff's negotiating team failed to appear for those sessions. During the meeting of March 8, 1973, the plaintiff's negotiating team invited approximately 35 to 40 members of their association to observe the negotiations. This led to a breakdown of negotiations at that meeting because the defendant's representatives did not feel they could negotiate with that many people present.

During the negotiating meeting of February 19, 1973, the defendant stated in writing that it would receive input and discussion but would not formally negotiate on the following items requested by the plaintiff in its notice: Class size; teachers' aides; public board meetings; planning period for elementary teachers; inclusion of agreed terms in contract by reference; teachers' evaluation of administrators; and maintenance of standards.

Items upon which the parties negotiated were: Constribution to Blue Cross-Blue Shield; personal leave; grievance procedures; teachers' salaries; sick leave; and reimbursement for college credit. The plaintiffs in their petition charge that the defendant and the defendant's representatives wholly failed and refused to enter into professional negotiations on the above items in a good faith effort to reach agreement with respect to the terms and conditions of professional service.

On the night of April 13, 1973, the defendant's negotiating team recommended to the Board of Education that negotiations stop and contracts be issued. Accordingly, the Board voted to unilaterally issue contracts to the teachers for the next year. This decision was based on the fact that, under the law, by April 15 teachers were to notify the district if they did not wish to teach during the following year. The Board thought it would be difficult for teachers to make such a decisions if they did not have a contract by that date. The Board also requested advice from its attorney relative to termination of negotiations and was referred to the decision of Judge Walton in National Education Association v. Board of Education, 212 Kan. 741, 512 P.2d 426. (At that time the case had not been decided by the Supreme Court.) The trial court held that it was reasonable to negotiate until April 15, but unreasonable to negotiate past that date. The defendant also based its decision on the administrative needs of the district.

During the 1972 session of the legislature, a proposed amendment was made to the School Foundation Act (Senate Bill 92) which, eventually as amended, passed both houses of the legislature as Substitute Senate Bill 92. A computer runoff on the financial aspects of Substitute Senate Bill 92 was received by the defendant on April 11, 1973, and a representative of the defendant attended a seminar concerning the matter. However, the financial information was not available to the defendant until April 13, 1973. On that date the defendant's representative advised the Board that he believed, under the provisions of Substitute Senate Bill 92 and cutting the budget for new equipment, it would be possible to give the professional employee of the plaintiff a $400 across-the-board salary raise. This was based upon information available through the representative of the Board at the time the decision was made. The $400 salary raise had not been presented by the defendant's representatives in prior negotiations.

On April 16, 1973, approximately 83 professional employees of the defendant and members of the plaintiff association struck and picketed defendant by failing to attend and instruct their assigned class duties.

On April 19, 1973, the plaintiff filed its action in the District Court of Shawnee County, Kansas. Hearings were held on April 26, 27 and 30, and in its memorandum opinion filed May 2, 1973, the trial court stated and found:

'Kansas States Annotated 72-5413(g) defines 'professional negotiation' as 'meeting, conferring, consulting and discussing in a good faith effort by both parties to reach agreement with respect to the terms and conditions of professional service.'

"Good faith effort' as used in the foregoing statute means an effort actuated by honest intention. It follows, therefore, that said statute imposes a duty on parties engaged in professional negotiations to confer and discuss the terms and conditions of professional service with an honest intention of reaching agreement. A party does not bargain in good faith if it adopts an adamant or unyielding position on an issue which would fall within that category of issues reasonably subject to negotiation under the statute. Any intention on the part of one party to totally dominate the other party engaged in negotiations or to impose substantially all of its own terms on the other party without a fair consideration of such other party's terms is inconsistent with the good faith requirement. Similarly, a party which refuses to negotiate at all or which engages in conduct calculated to obstruct negotiations, fails to satisfy the statutory duty to engage in professional negotiations prior to the issuance of contracts. Finally, a party which assumes a position characterized by excessive demands, unreasonable proposals or terms clearly beyond the capability of the other negotiating party is also acting in violation of the letter and the spirit of the act.

'In the instant case, the board failed to fully satisfy the requirement of professional ngotiations with the association in the following respects:

'1. At the outset of negotiations the board rejected the 'discrimination clause' as contained in the procedural agreement proposal of the association. As a consequence of said rejection, the board refused to agree that members of the association team would not suffer discriminatory acts by the board by reason of the professional negotiations of the parties.

'2. The board adopted an adamant and unyielding position in refusing to negotiate and to fairly consider the 'maintenance of standards' proposal of the association. The board treated this proposal as non-negotiable notwithstanding the fact that the 1972-1973 Negotiated...