Seanez v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.
| Decision Date | 10 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:21-CV-00553-AWI-HBK |
| Parties | THOMAS SEANEZ, an individual, Plaintiff, v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, John Doe 1, an individual, and DOES 2 THROUGH 20, inclusive Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND AND DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Thomas Seanez filed this action in Fresno County Superior Court on January 5, 2021, alleging claims for discrimination, wrongful termination and defamation against his former employer, Union Pacific Railroad Company ("Union Pacific"), as well as a claim for defamation against an unnamed former co-worker sued as "John Doe 1." Doc. No. 1 at 9. Union Pacific removed the action to this Court on March 31, 2021 and filed a motion to dismiss on April 7, 2021. Doc. Nos. 1, 4. On April 15, 2021, Seanez filed a motion to remand. Doc. No. 5. Both motions have been fully briefed and the Court has deemed both motions suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 230(g) of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. See Doc. No. 11. For the reasons set forth below, Seanez's motion to remand will be granted and Union Pacific's motion to dismiss will be denied as moot.
The relevant allegations in the Complaint are as follows:
Seanez is a resident of California who was more than 40 years of age at all times relevant to this action. Doc. No. 1 at 10:2-6. Union Pacific is a corporation that was formed under Delaware law and that has its principal place of business in Nebraska. Id. at 10:2-8.1
Seanez was employed by Union Pacific for 40 years, most recently as a locomotive engineer in Union Pacific's Fresno, California location. Doc. No. 1 at 11:19-21. Approximately 20 years ago, while employed by Union Pacific, Seanez severely injured his left arm in a motorcycle accident. Id. at 11:22-23. Seanez missed four months of work due to the accident, then returned to work at Union Pacific as a locomotive engineer, until Union Pacific terminated his employment in July 2019. Id. at 11:23-25.
In May 2019, John Doe 1 sent an anonymous letter (the "May 2019 Letter") to Union Pacific's headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska that stated as follows:
I am a conductor/brakeman working out of JQ292 Fresno, California. Locomotive Engineer Tom Seanez is a working engineer working out of Fresno, California as well and I am concerned about my safety and others working with Mr. Seanez. He only has use of one arm due to a motorcycle crash, and now he deems [sic] to be losing any strength or use of his good hand. I have watched him struggle to climb aboard locomotives but now he struggles to control the locomotive while operating it. I have to call for him to stop far in advance while working local switching operations and constantly am tieing [sic] extra brakes on cars hoping not to shove over bumpers or into other cars. I worry about young and new employees working with him that are not aware of his extra stopping space and help he needs on a daily basis. A new employee asked him to hand him paperwork recently and he dropped the paperwork due to his lack of grip. Please help me/us working around him to not be injured or get killed.
Doc. No. 1 at 12:2-12. The envelope was postmarked May 22, 2019 from Fresno, California and the return address was Union Pacific's facility in Roseville, California. Id. at 12:11-14.
On May 30, 2019, an occupational nurse at Union Pacific informed Seanez that he was being "taken out of service." Doc. No. 1 at 12:15-20. A "ride check" was then scheduled, whichSeanez "passed with a score of 100%." Id. at 12:16-17. In June 2019,2 Seanez was summoned to Union Pacific's Roseville, California facility, without pay and at his own expense, to undergo a "fitness for duty test." Id. at 12:17-18. On or about June 30, 2019, Seanez was terminated and "required to take medical retirement." Id. at 12:18-19.
Based on these allegations, Seanez alleges a defamation claim against John Doe 1, as well as a defamation claim, wrongful termination claim and several claims under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA") against Union Pacific.3 Doc. No. 1 at 9.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction that can hear only the types of cases that they are authorized by the Constitution and Congress to adjudicate. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441,4 "[a] defendant generally may remove an action filed in state court if a federal district court would have had original jurisdiction over the action." Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co, 888 F.3d 413, 415-16 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and Gonzales v. CarMax Auto Superstores, LLC, 840 F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 2016)). Thus, "[a] defendant may remove an action to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction." Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441).
Union Pacific removed this action based on diversity jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (addressing diversity jurisdiction) and 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (). Doc. No. 1 at 1. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) gives federal courts original jurisdiction over civil actions between "citizens of different states," "where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs." "Section 1332 requires complete diversity of citizenship; each of the plaintiffs must be a citizen of a different state than each of the defendants." Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996)). Moreover, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) provides that, for removal based on diversity jurisdiction, no "properly joined" defendant may be a citizen of the state in which the action is brought. See Homesales, Inc. v. Amora, 2012 WL 2061923, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2012).
28 U.S.C. § 1441 is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction; it is presumed that a case lies outside the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction. Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 2010); see also, Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1042 (). "The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction" also means that "the court resolves all ambiguity in favor of remand to state court." Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1042 (quoting Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). That is, federal jurisdiction over a removed case "must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance." Geographic Expeditions, 599 F.3d at 1107 (quoting Gaus, 980 F.2d at 567) (internal quotation marks omitted). "If at any time prior to judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) "is mandatory, not discretionary." Bruns v. NCUA, 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997). That is, the court "must dismiss a case when it determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, whether or not a party has filed a motion." Page v. City of Southfield, 45 F.3d 128, 133 (6th Cir. 1995).
As stated above, Union Pacific removed this case based on diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). See Doc. No. 1. Seanez does not dispute that Union Pacific is a diversedefendant or that this action satisfies the amount in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction. See Doc. No. 5. Thus, the question before the Court on the motion to remand is whether Union Pacific, as the removing party, has met its burden to show that 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)'s complete diversity requirement has been satisfied. Seanez argues that allegations indicating John Doe 1 is a California citizen are sufficiently specific to destroy diversity, even though John Doe 1 is not named. Id. at 4:19-5:7. Union Pacific argues, in opposition, that John Doe 1's citizenship should be disregarded because John Doe 1 was fraudulently joined in this action, Doc. No. 8, Part III.B., and that, regardless, Seanez has not "produced any evidence" of John Doe 1's citizenship. Id., Part III.C. Finally, Union Pacific contends that the Court should sever the defamation claim against John Doe 1 for remand and exercise jurisdiction over claims against Union Pacific if the Court finds that allegations regarding John Doe 1 destroy diversity jurisdiction.5 Id., Part III.D. The Court will address each of Union Pacific's arguments in turn.
The "fraudulent" inclusion of a non-diverse defendant creates an "exception to the requirement of complete diversity" for diversity jurisdiction. Morris, 236 F.3d at 1067; see McCabe v. Gen. Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987). Under the fraudulent-joinder doctrine, "[j]oinder of a non-diverse defendant is deemed fraudulent, and the defendant's presence in the lawsuit is ignored for purposes of determining diversity, '[i]f the plaintiff fails to state a cause of action against a resident defendant, and the failure is obvious according to the settled rules of the state.' " Weeping Hollow Ave. Trust v. Spencer, 831 F.3d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 2016) () (some internal quotation marks omitted).
There is a "general presumption against fraudulent joinder," Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1046(citing Hamilton Materials, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Corp., 494 F.3d 1203, 1206 (9th Cir. 2007)), and prevailing on a theory of fraudulent joinder requires more than a showing that a complaint fails to state a cause of...
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